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THE TRUTH ABOUT TRUTH COMMISSIONS: WHY 
THEY DO NOT FUNCTION OPTIMALLY IN POST-
CONFLICT SOCIETIES 
Matiangai V.S. Sirleaf† 
Almost forty years after the first truth commission convened and more than 
sixty-seven others have been employed, there is little clarity on how they 
contribute to their stated objectives and in which transitional contexts they 
succeed or fail. This Article uses data gathered from my field research in 
Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Liberia to develop a theoretical framework for 
understanding in which contexts truth commissions may be the most 
effective. Using insights from the legal transplant literature and applying it 
to the diffusion of truth commissions, this Article finds that truth 
commissions face greater challenges carrying out their mandates in post-
conflict as opposed to post-authoritarian societies. In post-conflict societies, 
weak institutions to support a truth-telling process combined with large 
numbers of victims and perpetrators will tend to overwhelm truth 
commissions. These factors, along with the lack of moral consensus 
surrounding mass violence, interact to make truth commissions function 
less optimally in post-conflict contexts. This Article finds that despite their 
widespread use in post-conflict and fragile states, truth commissions may 
have more utility in post-authoritarian or even non-transitional states. In 
sum, this Article argues that the kind of transition should determine the 
kind of transitional-justice interventions employed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From the trials at Nuremberg to the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,1 societies have reckoned with issues of 
truth and punishment following a period of massive human rights 
violations. Resort to the regular judicial system is often impossible due 
to the complete breakdown of the rule of law, the existence of a 
weakened judiciary, as well as procedural and operational limitations. 
Transitions are characterized by widespread criminality and norm 
breaking, which complicates efforts to resort to the criminal justice 
system. Transitional justice2 mechanisms are usually set up to address a 
period of mass violence, increasingly through truth commissions. A 
truth commission is an officially sanctioned non-judicial body 
organized for a limited time. They are usually set up at a time of 
transition for the specific purpose of examining serious human rights 
violations.3 They aim to achieve restorative-justice goals by combining 
elements of public truth seeking, victim-offender confrontation, public 
apology, and historical accounting.4 Some have even advocated that 
there is an emerging legal justification for pursuing truth commissions 
following mass atrocity based on the “right to truth.”5 The many 
 
 1 See generally Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.) 
(the SATRC Act). 
 2 I employ Naomi Roht-Arriaza’s definition of transitional justice: “that set of practices, 
mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, 
and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights 
and humanitarian law.” Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 2 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier 
Mariezcurrena eds., 2006). Although a number of scholars take issue with the concept of 
“transitional justice,” this Article utilizes this term because other terms used to describe the 
pursuit of justice during transition are also contested. See, e.g., Pablo de Greiff, Theorizing 
Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 31 (Melissa S. Williams, et al. eds., 2012) 
(discussing the concept of justice in times of transition). 
 3 See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND 
ATROCITY 14 (2002). 
 4 See Elizabeth Haumann, Striking a Balance Between Justice and Peace: Restorative Justice 
in States of Transition, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EXPLORING THE 
RELATIONSHIP 142, 150 (Linda Gröning & Jørn Jacobsen eds., 2012). For further discussion, see 
generally John Braithwaite, Narrative and “Compulsory Compassion”, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
425 (2006) and Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: 
Reflections on Restorative Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
68, 79–83 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
 5 See HAYNER, supra note 3, at 31; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, 
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); Organization of African Unity, 
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 9, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/6713 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, available at 
https://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm; Organization of American States, 
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_
Human_Rights.htm; Juan E. Méndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 255, 261 
(1997). 
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objectives of truth commissions often include promoting truth-telling 
and reconciliation, psychological healing for victims, establishing an 
accurate historical record, recommending reparations for victims, 
ensuring minimal accountability, restoring dignity to victims, making 
recommendations for institutional reform, as well as preventing 
violence and repetition of abuses.6 In recent years, many societies have 
adopted a South African-style truth commission,7 including Kenya,8 
South Korea,9 the Democratic Republic of Congo,10 Ecuador,11 the 
Solomon Islands,12 and Honduras.13 A number of countries, such as 
 
 6 See HAYNER, supra note 3, at 15–16. 
 7 South African-style truth commissions emphasize not only traditional truth recovery 
functions, but also facilitating healing and reconciliation. For further discussion, see infra Part 
I.C. 
 8 The government established the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission in 
November of 2008 to investigate and recommend appropriate action on human rights abuses 
committed by authoritarian regimes between December 12, 1963 and February 28, 2008 
following the period of post-electoral communal violence. See TRUTH JUSTICE & 
RECONCILIATION COMM’N, KENYA, REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION, at vi (2013), available at http://www.tjrckenya.org/images/documents/TJRC_
report_Volume_1.pdf.  
 9 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission for the Republic of Korea was established in 
May of 2005. The Commission investigated incidents regarding human rights abuses, violence, 
and massacres occurring since Japanese rule up to the nation’s various authoritarian regimes. 
See AHN BYUNG-OOK, TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION: ACTIVITIES OF THE PAST THREE YEARS 5, 8 (Sung-Soo Kim et al. trans., 2009), 
available at http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/index.asp (click on “TRC Report”).  
 10 The transitional government in the Democratic Republic of Congo established the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (Commission Verité et Réconciliation) in 2003, which was one 
of the transitional institutions provided for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. See Truth 
Commission: Democratic Republic of Congo, U.S. INST. PEACE, http://www.usip.org/
publications/truth-commission-democratic-republic-of-congo (last visited June 28, 2014). 
 11 Ecuador established the Truth Commission to Impede Impunity (Comisión de la Verdad 
para impedir la impunidad) in May of 2007 to investigate, clarify, and “impede impunity” with 
respect to human rights abuses perpetrated between 1984 and 1988 and other periods of 
authoritarian rule. See Truth Commission: Ecuador 07, U.S. INST. PEACE, http://www.usip.org/
publications/truth-commission-ecuador-07 (last visited June 28, 2014). 
 12 The government established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2008 after the 
civil war to examine the nature, antecedents, root causes, responsibility for, and the extent of 
the impact on human rights violations or abuses that occurred between January 1, 1998 and 
July 23, 2003. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 5 of 2008 § 5 (Solom. Is.), 
available at http://www.parliament.gov.sb/files/committees/bills&legislationcommittee/2008/
bills/Truth Recon Comm bill 2008.pdf. 
 13 The government established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la 
Verdad y la Reconciliación) in 2010 to provide a report on the events leading up to and 
following the June 28, 2009 coup, during which military troops in Honduras ousted then 
President Manuel Zelaya after a power struggle over plans to change the Constitution. See 
Truth Commission: Honduras 2010, U.S. INST. PEACE, http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-
commission-honduras-2010 (last visited June 28, 2014). The accord signed by the government 
and the coup regime called for a truth commission. See Diálogo Guaymuras Acuerdo 
Tegucigalpa/San José: para la reconcilación nacional y el fortalecimiento de la democracia en 
Honduras [Accord for National Reconciliation and the Strengthening of Democracy in 
Honduras], Oct. 30, 2009, available at http://www.narconews.com/Issue61/article3910.html. 
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Libya14 and South Sudan,15 are also considering adopting truth 
commissions. Even non-transitional countries like the United States 
have used truth commissions, notably in North Carolina16 and Illinois.17 
Yet, almost twenty years after the iconic truth commission in South 
Africa, there is little clarity on where truth commissions function 
optimally. There is also insufficient clarity on what role truth 
commissions can or should play in “non-transitional” societies. 
While there has been a growth in scholarly attention paid to truth 
commissions18 and trials following mass atrocity,19 much of the 
 
 14 See Adam Nossiter, On Road to Reconciliation, Libya Meets Trail of Anguish, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at A4. 
 15 See Charlton Doki, Time for Truth and Reconciliation in South Sudan, RADIO NETH. 
WORLDWIDE (June 5, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/time-truth-and-
reconciliation-south-sudan. 
 16 The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established to investigate the 
events of November 3, 1979, during which a number of demonstrators for racial and economic 
justice were killed and wounded in what is known as the “Greensboro Massacre.” See 
GREENSBORO TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, GREENSBORO TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2–3 (2006), available at 
http://www.greensborotrc.org/exec_summary.pdf. For more information, see GREENSBORO 
TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, http://www.greensborotrc.org (last visited June 28, 
2014). 
 17 The Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission was established in 2010 to 
investigate widespread allegations of police torture from prisoners, who alleged they had been 
convicted based on forced confessions. See Mission and Procedures Statement, STATE OF ILL. 
TORTURE INQUIRY & RELIEF COMMISSION, http://www2.illinois.gov/itrc/Pages/default.aspx (last 
visited June 28, 2014). 
 18 See, e.g., ALISON BISSET, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND CRIMINAL COURTS (2012); MARK 
FREEMAN, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2006); JAMES L. GIBSON, 
OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED NATION? (2004) [hereinafter 
GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID]; TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH 
COMMISSIONS, supra note 4; ERIC WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND 
TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: THE IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY (2010); Tristan 
Anne Borer, Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity: A Theoretical Overview, in TELLING THE 
TRUTHS: TRUTH TELLING AND PEACE BUILDING IN POST CONFLICT SOCIETIES 1 (Tristan Anne 
Borer ed., 2006); Audrey R. Chapman & Patrick Ball, The Truth of Truth Commissions: 
Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (2001); 
Lansana Gberie, Truth and Justice on Trial in Liberia, 107 AFR. AFF. 455 (2008) [hereinafter 
Truth and Justice on Trial in Liberia]; James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the 
Effectiveness of Truth Commissions, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (2009) [hereinafter 
Gibson, Legitimacy Theory and Truth Commissions]; Tricia D. Olsen et al., When Truth 
Commissions Improve Human Rights, 4 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 457 (2010). 
 19 See, e.g., LARA J. NETTELFIELD, COURTING DEMOCRACY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: 
THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL’S IMPACT IN A POSTWAR STATE (2010); TRICIA D. OLSEN ET AL., 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY (2010); 
CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: JUSTICE VS PEACE 
IN TIMES OF TRANSITION (2004); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International 
Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001); Laurel E. Fletcher & 
Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to 
Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002); Patrice C. McMahon & Jennifer L. Miller, From 
Adjudication to Aftermath: Assessing the ICTY’s Goals Beyond Prosecution, 13 HUM. RTS. REV. 
421 (2012); James Meernik, Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal Affects 
Societal Peace in Bosnia, 42 J. PEACE RES. 271 (2005); Kathryn Sikkink & Carrie Booth Walling, 
SIRLEAF.35.6 (Do Not Delete) 8/1/2014  8:01 PM 
2268 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:2263 
 
literature does not sufficiently account for the variation in truth 
commissions’ performance in various societies. Rather than assuming 
the benefits of these transitional justice mechanisms irrespective of the 
nature of the transitions, as much of the literature does,20 I use a more 
analytical approach toward truth commissions and identify key 
variables that begin to help us understand how these factors influence 
the effectiveness of truth commissions. The larger size of the victim and 
perpetrator class, the lesser degree of moral consensus surrounding 
violence, and the weakness of institutions in post-conflict societies 
interact to limit the utility of truth commissions compared to post-
authoritarian contexts. Conversely, in post-authoritarian societies that 
are marked by stronger institutions to support a truth-telling process, 
relatively small victim or perpetrator classes, and higher levels of moral 
consensus surrounding mass violence, truth commissions are likely to 
function more optimally in meeting stated objectives. This finding has 
profound implications for the types of interventions customarily made 
in post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies. 
Countries that have undergone conflict generally experience 
extreme violence, social disruption, human suffering, and economic 
destruction, while authoritarian rule is characterized by the 
concentration of power in a small group of politicians who maintain 
control through the exclusion of political challengers and political 
repression. In post-authoritarian contexts, the state generally 
perpetrates abuses against citizens. However, in post-conflict contexts, 
while the state may be implicated in abuses—mass violence also 
envelopes individuals, with neighbor turning against neighbor, 
engulfing whole communities. The interventions needed following 
transitions from periods of repressive rule or conflicts are quite 
different. Posner and Vermuele have argued elsewhere “that the kind of 
transition affects the kind of transitional justice that will occur.”21 This 
Article argues that the kind of transition should determine the kind of 
 
The Impact of Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 44 J. PEACE RES. 427 (2007); Tove Grete 
Lie et al., Post Conflict Justice and Sustainable Peace (World Bank Policy Research, Working 
Paper No. 4191, 2007), available at http://go.worldbank.org/0LQ66BH110. 
 20 See, e.g., Par Engstrom, Transitional Justice and Ongoing Conflict, in TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE AND PEACEBUILDING ON THE GROUND: VICTIMS AND EX-COMBATANTS 41, 48 (Chandra 
Lekha Sriram et al. eds., 2013) (noting empirical studies that question the impact of transitional 
justice); Oskar N.T. Thomas et al., The Effects of Transitional Justice Mechanisms: A Summary 
of Empirical Research Findings and Implications for Analysts and Practitioners 45 (Apr. 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~rparis/CIPS_Transitional_
Justice_April2008.pdf (discussing the need for the transitional justice field to move away from 
“faith-based” discussions about the impact of transitional justice mechanisms to “fact-based 
discussions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 21 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 761, 770 (2004) (“Where the elites lead the transition, transitional justice is limited. Where 
the elite and the opposition enter a bargain, transitional justice is moderate. Where the 
opposition or a foreign nation leads the transition, transitional justice is significant.”). 
SIRLEAF.35.6 (Do Not Delete) 8/1/2014  8:01 PM 
2014] THE T RU T H  A B O U T  T RU T H  C O M M IS S IO N S  2269 
 
transitional justice institution utilized. For example, the need for “truth” 
takes on much more significance in a post-authoritarian context where 
“deception is so central to the abuses,”22 while in post-conflict contexts 
where abuses are not “hidden” and were committed openly, “truth” in 
and of itself takes on much less significance.23 Yet, the same institution 
is usually employed in drastically different circumstances. 
I draw on original fieldwork that I conducted in Ghana, Sierra 
Leone, and Liberia to make a series of different observations.24 I selected 
these countries for this cross-national study because they are located in 
the same sub-region and have somewhat similar historical and cultural 
backgrounds as well as socio-economic development levels. They 
represent a mix of transitions with Ghana emerging from a series of 
authoritarian regimes, while Sierra Leone and Liberia transitioned from 
devastating conflicts. The transitional justice experiences of the 
countries examined in this Article, particularly Ghana and Liberia, are 
also not as well documented as other cases from Africa or Latin 
America.25. 
 
 22 HAYNER, supra note 3, at 27 (citing Aryeh Neier). 
 23 Some have argued that in these circumstances, acknowledgement takes on added 
significance. See, e.g., ERIN DALY & JEREMY SARKIN, RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: 
FINDING COMMON GROUND 162 (2007). However, acknowledgment without more in 
conditions of abject poverty is inadequate for reasons discussed more fully below. See 
discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 24 I conducted a series of interviews in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Liberia between November 
2008 and January 2009, interviewing over 100 victims of human rights violations, community, 
religious, and nongovernmental organizations that assist victim groups, as well as relevant 
actors from truth commissions, courts, governments, and U.N. agencies. A fuller discussion of 
my methodological choices is included in the Methodological Appendix, which also includes a 
sample of questions and common responses and a brief discussion of the surveys and indicators 
on which this Article relies. See infra Methodological Appendix. 
 25 See, e.g., David Backer, Cross National Comparative Analysis, in ASSESSING THE IMPACT 
OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CHALLENGES FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 23, 58 (Hugo van der 
Merwe et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the bias in the selection of transitional justice cases studied, 
which may be unrepresentative of the potential for these processes); see also Thomas et al., 
supra note 20, at 27 (discussing the over reliance of those in the transitional justice world on a 
“biased sample”). While I refer to the South African experience, a thorough discussion of South 
Africa’s truth-telling process is beyond the scope of this Article and has been amply covered 
elsewhere. See generally COMMISSIONING THE PAST: UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH 
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (Deborah Posel & Graeme Simpson eds., 2002); GIBSON, 
OVERCOMING APARTHEID, supra note 18; LYN S. GRAYBILL, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: MIRACLE OR MODEL? (2002); ANDREA LOLLINI, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 95–125 (2011); JEREMY SARKIN, CARROTS AND 
STICKS: THE TRC AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMNESTY PROCESS (2004); THE PROVOCATIONS OF 
AMNESTY: MEMORY, JUSTICE AND IMPUNITY (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Erik Doxtader eds., 
2003); TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID THE TRC DELIVER? (Audrey R. 
Chapman & Hugo van der Merwe eds., 2008); Ronald C. Slye, Amnesty, Truth, and 
Reconciliation: Reflections on the South African Amnesty Process, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE 
MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 4, at 170; Paul van Zyl, Unfinished Business: 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Contribution to Justice in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 745 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002). 
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This Article builds on findings from an earlier article, which 
focused on the ability of truth commissions and trials to contribute to 
restorative, retributive, expressive, and utilitarian goals.26 In my recent 
Article Beyond Truth & Punishment, I argued that scholars and 
practitioners have misplaced confidence in the ability of truth 
commissions and trials to contribute toward restorative, retributive, 
expressive, and utilitarian goals.27 I concluded that the number of goals 
of truth commissions should be limited to increase their effectiveness, 
and that transitional institutions should focus on their comparative 
advantage.28 In Beyond Truth & Punishment, I was mainly concerned 
with the sociological legitimacy29 of transitional institutions. As such, I 
privileged the perceptions of the relevant society in evaluating each 
mechanism by drawing on data from qualitative interviews as well as 
survey data (as opposed to other metrics for measuring effectiveness).30 
Perceptions of the effectiveness of transitional institutions are especially 
important in determining legitimacy.31 It is important to examine the 
way people most impacted by mass violence perceive transitional justice 
processes meant to provide redress to them.32 The literature has given 
insufficient attention to these perceptions. 
 
 26 Matiangai V.S. Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment in Transitional Justice, 54 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 223 (2014) [hereinafter Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment]. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 284–85. 
 29 See, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 325 
(Talcott Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947) (describing the bases for 
sociological legitimacy). 
 30 For example, this Article could have relied on indicators of human rights such as the 
Political Terror Score or the CIRI Physical Integrity Index, which rely on the annual reports of 
Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department. See Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 43. 
However, both of these sources have their own biases. I also eschew the use of such indicators 
for purposes of assessing the truth commissions’ impact due to the inherent difficulty in 
attempting to “represent complex social phenomena” such as respect for human rights, 
reconciliation, or truth with a numerical scale. Id. For further discussion, see infra 
Methodological Appendix. 
 31 See, e.g., Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of 
International Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 
45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 405, 407 n.2 (2012) (“Numerous studies by psychologists and 
sociologists have concluded that legitimacy is important to political and legal institutions 
because individuals are more likely to voluntarily adopt the norms of such institutions to 
regulate their own conduct when the institutions are perceived as legitimate.”). For further 
discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 227–29. 
 32 See, e.g., Backer, supra note 25, at 66 (discussing the ways in which “preoccupation with 
institutional design and system-level effects” have obscured questions regarding how 
transitional justice processes affect real people); see also Ford, supra note 31, at 407 n.1 (noting 
that “[t]he international community’s perception of” the legitimacy of transitional justice 
mechanisms matter as well, “particularly for issues like funding”). The international 
community’s perceived legitimacy of the transitional justice mechanisms utilized is not the 
primary focus of this Article. Neither is this Article concerned with the moral or legal 
legitimacy of the transitional justice mechanisms employed. Cf. Margaret M. deGuzman, 
Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400, 
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This Article explores a unique and under-researched area and adds 
to our understanding of when transplanted institutions work. I use 
insights from the legal-transplant literature to analyze truth 
commissions, and my analysis yields contributions for both the 
transitional-justice literature and the legal-transplant literature. 
Admittedly, much more research is needed to determine how the factors 
analyzed in this Article interact in other post-conflict and post-
authoritarian societies. Notwithstanding these limitations, my analysis 
produces a number of important theoretical and policy implications. 
First, the truth about truth commissions is that their success depends on 
the nature of the transitions. My key-variable approach helps to 
illuminate the contexts in which truth commissions may be the most 
effective. Paradoxically, it seems that despite their widespread use in 
post-conflict and fragile states, truth commissions may have more utility 
in post-authoritarian or even non-transitional states. Moreover, my key-
variable approach helps to identify important social and institutional 
factors in both the origin and transplant country33 that elucidate how 
much innovation may be required for transplanted institutions to be 
effective. Yet, the conundrum of transplants is that countries with the 
least amount of capacity34 may be the least likely to adapt transplanted 
institutions to local conditions, but these are the very countries that 
need to innovate the most. Further, the analysis in this Article 
complicates critiques of the legal transplant literature as synonymous 
with Western imperialism and colonialism by illustrating the difficulties 
posed even where transplants are ostensibly South-to-South. My 
analysis indicates that much more experimentation needs to be done in 
order to formulate effective and contextually appropriate responses to 
mass violence. In particular, the use of more decentralized and informal 
institutions that promote objectives of truth-telling and reconciliation 
may be more impactful at assisting with the United Nation’s (U.N.’s) 
and other international actors’ post-conflict rebuilding efforts. 
Additionally, the foreign policy implications for the United States and 
its interventions in post-conflict and failed states are that longer-term 
efforts aimed at building institutions and moral consensus around 
violence may be better placed than limited and quick interventions. The 
increasing use and popularity of the truth commission model means 
that the findings of this Article will be instructive. 
 
1436–38 (2009) (noting the possible tension between sociological legitimacy and moral or legal 
legitimacy). 
 33 See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 
51 AM. J. COMP. L 163, 171 (2003) (“[T]he social, economic and institutional context often 
differs remarkably between origin and transplant country . . . .”). 
 34 See infra note 41 (defining capacity). 
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This Article is organized as follows: Part I distinguishes post-
conflict and post-authoritarian contexts, summarizes the nature of the 
transitions and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms in 
Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, as well as discusses the limits of 
transplants. Part II analyzes how the relative weakness of state 
institutions in post-conflict as opposed to post-authoritarian countries 
limits the effectiveness of truth commissions in post-conflict contexts. 
Part III focuses on how the lack of moral consensus surrounding mass 
violence in post-conflict societies versus the higher levels of moral 
consensus in post-authoritarian societies enables the “truth” emanating 
from commissions to fit comfortably in post-authoritarian societies. 
Part IV examines how the larger classes of victims and perpetrators in 
post-conflict contexts overwhelm truth commissions and frustrate their 
ability to carry out their mandates relative to truth commissions in post-
authoritarian contexts. Part V discusses the main theoretical and policy 
implications of this Article. 
I.     THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT 
The “states of disrepair” in a post-authoritarian society versus a 
post-conflict society are drastically different. An “ideal type” of post-
conflict society might exhibit the following characteristics: 
[E]conomically the infrastructure has been destroyed; the currency 
has been undermined; commerce is at a standstill; agriculture has 
been devastated; unemployment is high, which means there are no 
jobs for former soldiers; and there is no basis for exports. The 
country’s society has been undercut by the mutual dislike between 
warring groups, which is not any weaker than before the war; the 
wide distribution of weapons within the population; the people’s 
habit of non-obedience to government and authority generally; the 
undermining of traditional sources of authority; the need to 
demobilize and disarm at least two armies quickly; and the 
prevalence of young soldiers with no skills other than killing. The old 
political process has been discredited . . . , there is no single legitimate 
government, there is a low tolerance for legitimate oppositions, there 
is often little democratic tradition, and the police and judicial 
systems are seen (usually correctly) as part of the 
problem . . . because they have no legitimacy for much of the 
population.35 
In contrast, in a post-authoritarian society, an “[i]llegitimate but 
functional” system exists in which “[c]ertain core legal institutions 
 
 35 Roy Licklider, Obstacles to Peace Settlements, in ELGAR HANDBOOK OF CIVIL WAR AND 
FRAGILE STATES 284, 284–85 (Graham K. Brown & Arnim Langer eds., 2012). 
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continue to . . . function” and “minimal principles of legality are not 
transgressed.”36 A post-authoritarian society can also be characterized 
by a “corrupt and dysfunctional” system, wherein some features of the 
rule of law remain, and the “judiciary and legal system exists in name,” 
but the judiciary generally lacks impartiality and independence, and 
institutions generally lack public trust.37 Both characterizations would 
apply to post-apartheid South Africa, as well as Ghana after military 
rule. However, while the “state[] of disrepair” in a post-conflict context 
may resemble some characteristics of a post-authoritarian society, in 
massively destructive conflicts, the state is generally “[d]evastated and 
non-functional,” “[t]he rule of law [completely] disintegrates,” and “the 
entire formal legal apparatus of a society collapses.”38 Liberia and Sierra 
Leone are paradigmatic cases of this dysfunction. 
Notably, I do not intend for the distinction between post-conflict 
and post-authoritarian countries to cover the entire universe of 
societies. There are of course non-transitional or consolidated 
democracies that would not be conceptualized as “post” anything 
because their transition from conflict or authoritarianism occurred 
many years ago. Thus, there is a temporal element of a recent history of 
conflict or authoritarianism. Additionally, there are countries that do 
not neatly fit into any one category: Colombia, for example, has been 
experiencing a low-intensity armed conflict for almost seventy years, but 
has utilized transitional-justice mechanisms.39 South Africa’s transition 
from apartheid also defies easy categorization as the repressive white-
only apartheid government certainly had attributes of authoritarianism. 
However, the struggle against white-only rule in South Africa also 
involved massive violence from non-state actors both against the 
apartheid regime and amongst competing black political parties, which, 
combined, resulted in approximately 40,000 deaths.40 Countries that 
combine elements of authoritarianism and conflict fall along the 
spectrum of post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies. Those with 
comparatively stronger institutions are placed closer to authoritarian 
regimes than countries that have experienced massively destructive 
conflicts. I conceptualize this spectrum as one of capacity, with post-
conflict countries generally falling lower on that spectrum and post-
 
 36 See RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION 73 (2002) (italics omitted). 
 37 Id. at 73–74. 
 38 Id. at 73, 75. 
 39 See CHRISTINE EVANS, THE RIGHT TO REPARATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR VICTIMS 
OF ARMED CONFLICT, 203–22 (2012) (discussing the long-running conflict and the use of a 
truth commission, amnesty, and reparations in Colombia); see also SUE MAHAN, RESTORING 
JUSTICE IN COLOMBIA: CONCILIATION IN EQUITY 5, 13–24 (2012) (discussing the violence in 
Columbia dating back to 1940 and generally discussing the use of restorative justice practices in 
Colombia). 
 40 See WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 18, at 36. 
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authoritarian countries falling higher on that spectrum.41 Indeed, where 
weak institutions exist to support a truth-telling process, numerous 
victims and perpetrators overwhelm the capacity of truth commissions 
and low levels of moral consensus surrounding mass violence are 
present. Even if the societies are properly designated as “non-
transitional,” we would anticipate that these factors would have the 
same predictive power in gauging the utility of truth commissions. 
Thus, the labels of post-conflict or post-authoritarian are best 
understood as useful generalizations or frameworks to clarify several 
critical variables. 
This Part provides an overview of the historical context in which 
abuses took place in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, and briefly 
discusses the nature of the transitions: post-authoritarian in Ghana and 
post-conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia. This Part also provides 
background on the relative number of alleged perpetrators and victims 
and the relative strength of institutions post-transition in Ghana, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, which is critical to understanding the varied 
impact of the truth commissions in all three countries and the hybrid 
court in Sierra Leone. This Part concludes with a discussion of the limits 
of transplanting truth commissions. 
A.     Ghana’s Transition from Authoritarian Rule and Establishment of a 
Truth Commission 
After the 1966 overthrow of Ghana’s charismatic independence 
leader, Kwame Nkrumah, a series of military coups destabilized the 
country.42 Various military governments ruled for a total of twenty-one 
years, with one remaining in power for over a decade.43 The First 
Republican government and the four military juntas: the National 
Liberation Council (1966–1969), the National Redemption Council and 
Supreme Military Council (1972–1979), the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) (1979), and the Provisional National 
Defense Council (PNDC) (1981–1992), committed gross violations of 
human rights.44 To many Ghanaians, the record of human rights 
violations perpetrated by the AFRC/PNDC, led by Flight-Lieutenant 
 
 41 See Syed Mansoob Murshed, Conflict and the Social Contract, in ELGAR HANDBOOK OF 
CIVIL WAR AND FRAGILE STATES, supra note 35, at 59, 60 (discussing how “state capacity (its 
ability to both police citizens and provide public goods) is greater in established autocratic or 
democratic societies, rather than in societies undergoing transition”). 
 42 See 1 NAT’L RECONCILIATION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION 43–76 (2004) [hereinafter 1 NRC REPORT]. 
 43 See id. 
 44 See id. 
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Jerry Rawlings, was unparalleled in the country’s history.45 The range of 
human rights violations that occurred during periods of authoritarian 
rule in Ghana included “killings, abductions, disappearances, torture, 
sexual abuse, detentions, ill-treatment, seizure of properties, . . . [and] 
interference with the right to work . . . .”46 The NRC estimates that, out 
of the violations reported to it, 8686 victims suffered abuses over the 
periods of repressive rule in Ghana.47 This figure provides a rough 
approximation of the level of victimization in Ghana. There are no 
reliable estimates of the total number of alleged perpetrators implicated 
in abuses during the periods of unconstitutional rule in Ghana.48 For 
our purposes, it suffices to say that these numbers were lower than the 
perpetrator classes in the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
Ghana’s transition from authoritarian rule49 occurred due to a 
combination of internal and external factors that influenced the 
Rawlings regime to move towards democratic rule. Before leaving office, 
Rawlings’s authoritarian regime inserted indemnity clauses into the 
Constitution, prohibiting any court from questioning or granting 
remedies or relief regarding any executive, legislative, or judicial actions 
of past military governments.50 Ghanaians held a national referendum 
accepting the 1992 Constitution under Rawlings and the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC).51 The Constitution bars parliament from 
 
 45 See CDD-GHANA, PUBLIC OPINION ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN GHANA: SURVEY 
EVIDENCE 12 (2001) [hereinafter CDD-GHANA, PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY] (discussing 
nationwide survey with sample size of 1000 respondents in which 68% of respondents 
perceived the AFRC to have the worst human rights record and 56% perceived the PNDC as 
such). For example, the regime arrested three former heads of state, tried them before 
“kangaroo courts” for corruption, and promptly executed them. The regime also arrested, 
tortured, and executed other influential military officers and civilians, including a number of 
senior judges who had questioned the government. Some suffered detention for long periods. 
Fearing for their lives, many fled into exile. Abuses did not only target the powerful; soldiers 
stripped market women naked and beat them publicly merely for selling matches above 
government prices. See generally 1 NRC REPORT, supra note 42. 
 46 1 NRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 10.  
 47 Id. at 164. 
 48 It has been difficult to come across any source with aggregate numbers. While 
governmental documents, U.N. reports, NGO reports, books, and news analyses contain some 
figures, none of them cite total figures of those perpetrating abuses over the various 
authoritarian regimes in Ghana. For example, the National Reconciliation Commission 
estimates that out of the violations reported to it, the military perpetrated 53%, the police forces 
perpetrated 17%, unknown actors perpetrated 12%, and the prison service perpetrated 9%. 1 
NRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 160. 
 49 For more on Ghana’s transition from authoritarian rule, see generally ASIRIFI DANQUAH, 
HISTORY OF GHANA: PREZ. NKRUMAH TO PREZ. KUFUOR (2007); GHANA: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF RECOVERY (Donald Rothchild ed., 1991); GHANA: TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
(Kwame A. Ninsin ed., 1998); AKWASI P. OSEI, GHANA: RECURRENCE AND CHANGE IN A POST-
INDEPENDENCE AFRICAN STATE (1999); YOURY PETCHENKINE, GHANA: IN SEARCH OF 
STABILITY, 1957–1992 (1993); KEVIN SHILLINGTON, GHANA AND THE RAWLINGS FACTOR 
(1992). 
 50 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, 1st sched., §§ 34–35. 
 51 See 1 NRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 184. 
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amending the indemnity provisions.52 In 2000, Ghanaians voted the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by John A. Kufour into power.53 The 
indemnity provisions limited the choices available to the NPP 
government,54 which would later establish a truth commission. The 
then-opposition party (NDC) did not support the use of a truth 
commission in Ghana because it was concerned that the commission’s 
investigations would target its members, but public support for the 
commission was strong.55 In January of 2002, the Ghanaian Parliament 
passed the National Reconciliation Commission Act into law56 in a vote 
boycotted by the NDC. 
B.     Liberia’s and Sierra Leone’s Civil Wars and Transitional Justice 
Institutions 
The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were interrelated 
tragedies of immense proportions, resulting in approximately 50,000 
deaths in Sierra Leone57 and over 250,000 deaths in Liberia,58 and 
creating millions of refugees and internally displaced people.59 Both 
countries’ situations quickly deteriorated as rival warlords competed for 
political power and economic resources, which destroyed each country’s 
flailing infrastructure and left each country without electricity, sewage 
systems, or running water. The war in Sierra Leone is internationally 
known for mass amputations and forcible recruitment of children.60 
Other violations included forced cannibalism, sexual slavery, assault, 
torture, rape, as well as looting and property destruction.61 Similar 
 
 52 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, 1st sched., § 37. 
 53 See 1 NRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 1; see also DANQUAH, supra note 49, at 243. 
 54 See, e.g., OSEI, supra note 49, at 113 (discussing how the indemnity clause limited 
accountability options). 
 55 See CDD-GHANA, PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY, supra note 45, at 15 fig.2 (88.7% of those 
surveyed supported the government’s decision to establish the NRC). 
 56 See The National Reconciliation Commission Act, 2002 (Ghana), available at 
http://www.ghanareview.com/reconact.html (the NRC Act). 
 57 See John Bellows & Edward Miguel, War and Institutions: New Evidence from Sierra 
Leone, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 394, 394 (2006). 
 58 Ezekiel Pajibo, Civil Society and Transitional Justice in Liberia: A Practitioner’s Reflection 
from the Field, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 287, 288 (2007). 
 59 See id. (noting that one million people were displaced in Liberia); Nsongurua J. 
Udombana, Globalization of Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s War Crimes, 17 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 55, 74 (2003) (noting that the war in Sierra Leone “caused the 
displacement of more than a million” civilians). 
 60 See Amanda Bryant Banat, Solving the Problem of Conflict Diamonds in Sierra Leone: 
Proposed Market Theories and International Legal Requirements for Certification of Origin, 19 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 939, 941 (2002). 
 61 See 3A TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA 
LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 470 (2004), available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume3A.pdf. 
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human rights violations were committed in the civil war in Liberia.62 
While there are clearly many other indicators of “victimization” besides 
loss of life, the differences in the death toll in Liberia and Sierra Leone is 
a stark indicator of the relative sizes of the victim class in each country, 
with roughly five-times as many victims in Liberia. The Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs supported by the 
international community in Sierra Leone provided approximately $150, 
skills training, and starter kits to 73,000 ex-combatants.63 In Liberia, the 
programs disarmed 101,496 ex-combatants and provided approximately 
90,000 of them with $300 as well as some skills training.64 These figures 
provide a rough estimate of the number of alleged perpetrators in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia following their conflicts. While a thorough discussion 
of the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone65 are beyond the scope of this 
Article, I provide a brief synopsis below. 
1.     Civil War and Establishment of the Truth Commission in Liberia 
The civil war began in Liberia in December 1989 when a band of 
rebels known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by 
Charles Taylor, invaded Liberia from Côte d’Ivoire.66 The NPFL aimed 
to overthrow the brutal and corrupt regime of President Samuel Doe, 
who gained power through a coup in 1980 that overthrew President 
William Tolbert, Jr. and ended over 100 years of settler hegemonic rule 
by the minority Americo-Liberians.67 The Economic Community of 
West African States brokered a cease-fire in Liberia in 1990, which the 
cease-fire monitoring group, the Economic Community of West African 
 
 62 See TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF LIBERIA, CONSOLIDATED FINAL REPORT 262 
(2009) [hereinafter TRC-L FINAL REPORT], available at http://trcofliberia.org/resources/
reports/final/volume-two_layout-1.pdf. 
 63 See Chandra Lekha Sriram, Victim-Centered Justice and DDR in Sierra Leone, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PEACEBUILDING ON THE GROUND: VICTIMS AND EX-COMBATANTS, 
supra note 20, at 159, 166–67. 
 64 Rosalind Raddatz, Tempering Great Expectations: Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 
in Liberia, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PEACEBUILDING ON THE GROUND: VICTIMS AND EX-
COMBATANTS, supra note 20, at 179. 
 65 For more details on the conflict in Liberia, see generally STEPHEN ELLIS, THE MASK OF 
ANARCHY: THE DESTRUCTION OF LIBERIA AND THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF AN AFRICAN 
CIVIL WAR (1999); MARY H. MORAN, LIBERIA: THE VIOLENCE OF DEMOCRACY (2006); COLIN 
M. WAUGH, CHARLES TAYLOR AND LIBERIA: AMBITION AND ATROCITY IN AFRICA’S LONE STAR 
STATE (2011). For more details on the conflict in Sierra Leona, see generally 
BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND TERROR: THE SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR (Ibrahim Abdullah ed., 
2004); LANSANA GBERIE, A DIRTY WAR IN WEST AFRICA: THE RUF AND THE DESTRUCTION OF 
SIERRA LEONE (2005); DAVID KEEN, CONFLICT AND COLLUSION IN SIERRA LEONE (2005); 
Alfred B Zack-Williams, Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991–98, 20 
THIRD WORLD Q. 143 (1999). 
 66 See ELLIS, supra note 65, at 75–76. 
 67 See id. at 50, 54–56, 66–74. 
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States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), implemented.68 President 
Joseph Momoh’s regime in Sierra Leone played a prominent role in the 
establishment of ECOMOG.69 Taylor wanted to weaken ECOMOG, 
which he believed to be blocking his attempts to take control of the 
capital of Liberia.70 He vowed that Sierra Leone would soon “taste the 
bitterness of war.”71 
Between 1990 and 1997, various factions competed for political 
control of Liberia, signing and reneging on thirteen peace agreements.72 
Taylor won a dubious election in 1997, as many Liberians were afraid of 
the consequences of his “returning to the bush” and continuing to 
warmonger.73 Neighboring countries supported dissidents within their 
borders to unseat Taylor due to his support of armed groups within 
their territories.74 Fighting continued intermittently in Liberia, led by 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and its splinter 
group, the Movement for Democracy and Elections in Liberia.75 The 
intensity heightened during 2002 and 2003, which forced Taylor to 
declare a state of emergency and come to the negotiating table.76 In 
2003, Nigeria brokered a deal granting Taylor asylum in return for his 
resignation.77 Shortly thereafter, the interim government in Liberia and 
rebel groups signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which set the 
terms for new negotiations for remedying past violence.78 Although the 
peace agreement did not provide for blanket amnesty,79 many factions 
in Liberia held a misconception that the peace agreement included 
one.80 
 
 68 See WAUGH, supra note 65, at 141, 144–46. 
 69 See id. at 209–10. 
 70 See id. at 147–48; see also KEEN, supra note 65, at 37. 
 71 See ELLIS, supra note 65, at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72 See generally WAUGH, supra note 65, at 123–201. 
 73 A popular campaign slogan expressed this: “He killed my ma, He killed my pa, I’m going 
to vote for him.” Douglas Farah, Standing By as a Brutal Warlord Plots His Return, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 2, 2005, at B3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also WAUGH, supra note 65, at 
234. 
 74 See WAUGH, supra note 65, at 264–68. 
 75 See LANSANA GBERIE, DIAMONDS WITHOUT MAPS: LIBERIA, THE UN, SANCTIONS AND 
THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS 5 (2004). 
 76 See WAUGH, supra note 65, at 265–73. 
 77 See PRISCILLA HAYNER, NEGOTIATING PEACE IN LIBERIA: PRESERVING THE POSSIBILITY OF 
JUSTICE 18 (2007), available at http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/89Negotiatingpeace
inLiberia-PreservingthepossibilityforJustice.pdf. 
 78 See HAYNER, supra note 77, at 5, 6. 
 79 Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, art. XXXIV, Aug. 18, 2003 [hereinafter Liberian Peace 
Agreement], available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/
peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf. 
 80 See HAYNER, supra note 77, at 18; see also Jonny Steinberg, Briefing: Liberia’s Experiment 
with Transitional Justice, 109 AFR. AFF. 135, 138 (2009). 
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Instead, it called for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC-L), to “address issues of impunity,” “provide . . . an opportunity 
for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to share 
their experiences,” and “deal with the root causes of the [war].”81 The 
National Transitional Legislative Assembly of Liberia approved the 
TRC-L Act on June 10, 2005.82 The TRC-L Act contains an ambiguous 
amnesty clause.83 The truth commission in Liberia also had more 
explicit punitive powers than the other commissions, which included 
ensuring political accountability and recommending prosecutions.84 
2.     Civil War and Establishment of the Truth Commission and Court 
in Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone’s conflict began in 1991, when Former Army Corporal 
Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) made a series of 
armed incursions from Liberia with the assistance of Taylor’s NPFL.85 
The incursions contributed to the breakdown of state authority in Sierra 
Leone and further destabilized Momoh’s corrupt and dysfunctional 
regime.86 In March 1996, wartime elections brought Ahmed Tejan 
Kabbah to power in Sierra Leone.87 However, disgruntled soldiers led by 
Major Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) and affiliated with the RUF, overthrew Kabbah in May 
1997.88 Internal resistance and the intervention of Nigerian troops 
enabled Kabbah to return to power in March 1998.89 Sierra Leone’s 
conflict was a battle between the RUF and successive civilian and 
military governments, in alliance with the government-aligned Civil 
Defense Force (CDF).90 After several unsuccessful peace accords, the 
government and the RUF signed the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 
1999.91 
 
 81 Liberian Peace Agreement, supra note 79, art. XIII. 
 82 An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (June 10, 2005), 
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/473c6b3d2.html. 
 83 See id. art. VII, § 26(g); see also infra text accompanying notes 258–64. 
 84 Id. art. VII, § 26(d), (j). The TRC-L was empowered to “ensur[e] accountability, political 
or otherwise, for any such violation” it determined responsibility for, as well as to “ make[] 
recommendations” for “prosecutions in particular cases[,] as [it] deems appropriate.” Id. For 
further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 239–40. 
 85 See WAUGH, supra note 65, at 209. 
 86 See KEEN, supra note 65, at 32–35. 
 87 See WAUGH, supra note 65, 214–15. 
 88 Id. at 218–19. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See id. at 335. 
 91 See id. at 220–22. 
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The peace agreement granted blanket amnesty to all fighters.92 It 
purported to install Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, as Vice 
President.93 The common belief was that the RUF would not sign the 
agreement if there were any prospect of trials.94 The Special 
Representative of the U.N. Secretary General appended a disclaimer 
stating “that the amnesty provisions of the Agreement shall not apply to 
international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”95 This 
disclaimer foreshadowed that the amnesty provision would prove to be 
meaningless. The peace agreement made provision for creating a 
commission “to address impunity, break the cycle of 
violence . . . facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation,” as well as 
“recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of 
human rights violations.”96 Sierra Leone’s Parliament passed The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC-SL) Act on February 2000.97 
A few months after the legislature passed the TRC-SL Act, the RUF 
fighters took 500 U.N. peacekeepers hostage and killed civilians who 
were protesting.98 The Sierra Leonean president requested that the U.N. 
Secretary General create a court to try the RUF.99 The U.N. created the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) “to prosecute persons who bear 
the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of 
Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.”100 The SCSL is a hybrid tribunal 
that incorporates both international and Sierra Leonean law.101 Notably, 
the SCSL sat where the war crimes occurred in order for its proceedings 
 
 92 Id. at 222. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See id. (discussing the international community’s desire for “peace at any price”). 
 95 3B TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA 
LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 364 (2004) [hereinafter 3B TRC-SL REPORT], 
available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume3B.pdf. 
 96 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone, art. XXVI, July 7, 1999, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/
lomeaccord.html. 
 97 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000 (Sierra Leone), available at 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/SeirraLeone-
Charter.pdf. 
 98 See 3B TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 95, at 366. 
 99 See id. (citing Letter from Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of Sierra Leone, to 
Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations (June 12, 2000)). 
 100 See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fbdda8e4.html. 
 101 See Mark E. Wojcik et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 2004 Disputes, 39 
INT’L LAW. 279, 289 (2005). The U.N. did not establish the SCSL under Security Council 
Chapter VII powers, and therefore, the SCSL also lacks the ability to compel other states to 
cooperate. See id. at 291. In this respect, the SCSL differs from both the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, which the U.N. created under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Id. 
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to be more impactful.102 The international community did not create a 
similar tribunal in Ghana or in Liberia. No domestic prosecutions have 
occurred to address wartime atrocities in Liberia or human rights 
violations committed during Ghana’s authoritarian regimes. On January 
18, 2002, Kabbah declared the conflict over in Sierra Leone and lifted 
the four-year state of emergency ahead of general elections in May 2002, 
which he won.103 
Notably, Sierra Leone had two transitional institutions—the TRC-
SL and the SCSL. They were to fulfill complementary roles, with the 
SCSL “prosecut[ing] those who bore the greatest responsibility” for 
atrocities and the commission making recommendations for 
institutional reform and providing a complete record of the conflict.104 
The TRC-SL’s Report released in 2004 concluded that many who might 
have wished “to participate in the truth-telling process” stayed away for 
fear that their information may be turned over to the SCSL and that 
“[t]he Commission’s ability to create a forum of exchange between 
victims and perpetrators was . . . retarded by the presence of the 
[SCSL].”105 During my interviews with court personnel in 2008, they 
also observed that coexistence hindered their work, particularly because 
the SCSL could not question individuals about information disclosed to 
the TRC-SL and was prohibited from accessing its archives.106 Despite 
the initial negative assessments of the two transitional institutions in 
Sierra Leone, this Article demonstrates how the concurrent operation of 
the two mechanisms ultimately increased perceptions of both 
institutions’ abilities to accomplish their goals. More recent survey 
results have found that a majority of Sierra Leoneans perceive the two 
institutions to have mutually reinforcing goals.107 Further, the 
 
 102 See id. See generally Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, available 
at www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html (setting forth powers, jurisdiction, and 
composition of the SCSL); S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (requesting 
Secretary-General to negotiate agreement establishing the SCSL). 
 103 See WAUGH, supra note 65, at 224–25. 
 104 See 3B TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 95, at 129, 370. 
 105 Id. at 378. 
 106 Interviews with former staff of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone 
(TRC-SL), staff of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), Commissioners of the Human 
Rights Commission for Sierra Leone (HRC-SL), civil society leaders, professors, lawyers, and 
civil servants, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (Nov. 3–13, 2008) [hereinafter Interviews from Sierra 
Leone]. See infra Methodological Appendix for a discussion of the nineteen interviews 
conducted. Although 74% of interviewees viewed coexistence as a mistake, I conducted the 
majority of the interviews in Sierra Leone with urban elites and as such did not capture the 
views of those in rural areas and non-elites. See id. 
 107 See L. ALLISON A. SMITH & SARA MELI, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, MAKING 
JUSTICE COUNT: ASSESSING THE IMPACT AND LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA 
LEONE IN SIERRA LEONE AND LIBERIA 45 Annex 18 (2012) [hereinafter SCSL SURVEY], available 
at http://www.npwj.org/node/5599 (showing that 54% of Sierra Leoneans surveyed reported 
that the goals of SCSL and the TRC-SL were complementary or the same, while 37% indicated 
that they were not). An earlier survey conducted by the SCSL in 2007 was criticized for its 
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experience of Liberia—where one transitional institution operated alone 
in similar circumstances, but with results that are more dismal—is also 
particularly instructive.108 
This Article identifies key social and institutional conditions in 
post-conflict countries that interact to limit the utility of transplanted 
truth commissions. During my field research, I observed that 
interviewees in post-conflict countries were generally more pessimistic 
about the ability of their truth commissions to achieve stated 
objectives.109 This Article will demonstrate that in Ghana, which had 
relatively well-functioning institutions after the transition from 
authoritarian rule, comparatively small victim and perpetrator “classes,” 
and a comparatively higher degree of moral consensus about abuses 
committed by military regimes, Ghanaians perceived the truth 
commission to contribute toward many of its stated objectives. 
However, in Liberia, which had significantly weaker or non-existent 
institutions following the civil war, a comparatively much larger victim 
“class,” a more threatening number of alleged perpetrators, and a lack of 
moral consensus about the violence committed during the civil war, 
Liberians did not perceive the truth commission as advancing many of 
its stated objectives. Yet, in Sierra Leone (which had some of the same 
defining factors as Liberia), the combination of truth and punishment 
mechanisms, although not without its problems, led to more favorable 
assessments of both the commission’s and the court’s contributions 
toward their goals. In Sierra Leone, the court helped fill important 
institutional gaps that existed after the conflict in ways that the truth 
commission operating alone in Liberia was unable to emulate. 
A comparative summary of the transitional justice mechanisms 
used in each country and the key factors examined in this Article is 
included in Table 1. The estimates of low, medium, and high are relative 
and are not based on any absolute scale. 
  
 
methodology and impartiality. See Ford, supra note 31, at 443 n.189 (discussing criticisms of a 
2007 SCSL-commissioned survey). The methodology of the court-commissioned 2012 survey 
has modest improvements, but the impartiality concerns persist. Accordingly, this Article 
discounts the SCSL survey and relies more heavily on other surveys conducted in Sierra Leone. 
For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 239 & n.75). 
 108 For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 240, 
247–48. 
 109 See infra Methodological Appendix. 
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 a I based the approximation of victims and perpetrators on the percentage of the 
population during the operation of the commissions. For South Africa, Ghana, and Sierra 
Leone I relied on the U.N. Population Division data for 2000, and for Liberia, I relied on the 
data for 2005. See POPULATION DIV., U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, WORLD 
POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2012 REVISION 169, 171 (2013), available at http://esa.un.org/
wpp/Documentation/pdf/WPP2012_Volume-I_Comprehensive-Tables.pdf (noting that 
Ghana’s population was approximately nineteen million, Sierra Leone’s approximately four 
million, Liberia’s approximately three million, and South Africa’s approximately forty-five 
million). For Ghana, I used the approximately nine thousand victims identified by the NRC, see 
NRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 164, and the estimated nineteen million in the population 
during the commission’s operations to determine that roughly 0.04% of the population was 
victimized. This approximation only reflects those who engaged with the commission and likely 
underestimates the number of those victimized. Due to the paucity of data of human rights 
violations committed in Ghana during various authoritarian regimes, the figures collected by 
the NRC are the most reliable aggregate data available. These figures are, however, also over-
inclusive, as they include all forms of violations reported to the commission, whereas I limited 
the other countries’ estimates of victimization to loss of life. There are numerous limitations 
associated with using loss of life as a proxy for indicating the level of victimization in a given 
society. Loss of life is a crude measure, as it is grossly under-inclusive of the range of violations 
endured during periods of mass violence. However, the finality of death makes it one of the 
most severe forms of human rights violations. Furthermore, loss of life is often accompanied by 
other gross human rights violations, and data on the number of deaths is usually recorded 
during periods of mass violence. These factors make loss of life a more reliable and useful 
indicator of victimization than other proxies. Accordingly, I use loss of life as an indicator of 
victimization for all the countries in this study except for Ghana. For South Africa, I used the 
estimated forty thousand people that were killed in mass violence, see WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, 
supra note 18, at 36, and the estimated forty-five million in the population during the 
commission’s operation to determine that 0.08% of the population was victimized. Actual 
estimates of the number of perpetrators in South Africa are hard to come by. Cf. MAHMOOD 
MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS 266 (2001) (“In the white population in Apartheid 
South Africa, there were few perpetrators but many beneficiaries.”). I use the roughly seven 
thousand amnesty applicants as a stand-in for those who self-identified as perpetrators. See 
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TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 25, at 11. Using this figure is 
inadequate because it does not capture those who perpetrated abuses but did not request 
amnesty from the truth commission. See id. at 250–52 (noting lack of amnesty applications 
from members of the security forces and former political leaders). However, it does allow us to 
get an incredibly rough estimate of the 0.01% of the population that self-identified as 
perpetrators. For Sierra Leone, I used the approximately fifty thousand people that died in the 
Sierra Leonean civil war, see Bellows & Miguel, supra note 57, and the estimated four million in 
the population during the commission’s operation to determine that roughly 1.2% of the 
population was victimized. I used the seventy-three thousand ex-combatants that disarmed 
during the DDR process in Sierra Leone to determine a rough estimate of 1.8% percent of the 
population that self-identified as perpetrators. For Liberia, I used the approximately 250,000 
people that died in the Liberian civil war, see Pajibo, supra note 58, and the estimated three 
million population size at the time of the commission’s operation to determine that roughly 8% 
of the population was victimized. I used the 101,496 ex-combatants that disarmed during the 
DDR process in Liberia to determine that 3.3% of the population self-identified as perpetrators. 
Using the DDR figures is over-inclusive—capturing those who did not perpetrate abuses but 
who wanted to receive monetary and other benefits from the programs. See Raddatz, supra note 
64, at 180 (discussing the program in Liberia). The figures are also under-inclusive because they 
depend on the robustness of the DDR process, which excluded many women and girls who did 
not have weapons to submit. For further discussion, see id. at 179–81 and Sriram, supra note 
63, at 166–68 (discussing the DDR program in Sierra Leone). The above limitations in the 
estimates of the number of victims and perpetrators are unavoidable. They nonetheless provide 
us with some indicia of the comparative size of the victim and perpetrator classes. They also 
correspond with data from the truth commissions. See discussion infra notes 329–332 and 
accompanying text. 
 b See discussion supra note 47 and accompanying text; discussion infra notes 329–332 and 
accompanying text. 
 c See discussion supra notes 48, 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 d The state-weakness categorizations are based on the Index of State Weakness in the 
Developing World. See SUSAN E. RICE & STEWART PATRICK, BROOKINGS INST., INDEX OF STATE 
WEAKNESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 3, 10, 39, 41 (2008) [hereinafter INDEX OF STATE 
WEAKNESS], available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/2/
weak%20states%20index/02_weak_states_index.pdf (“[W]eak states [are] countries that lack 
the essential capacity and/or will to fulfill four sets of critical government responsibilities: 
fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing 
and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their 
populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human 
needs of their population.”). For further discussion of my reliance on the indicators in the 
Index of State Weakness, see infra Methodological Appendix. 
 e Moral consensus has been defined as shared moral values about “how [people] ought to 
act.” Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views 
About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account when Formulating 
Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 725, 733 (2000). For our purposes, it is best to 
conceptualize moral consensus surrounding mass violence as the level of agreement on the 
nature and “justness” of violence. Moral consensus about mass violence includes the level of 
agreement over historical responsibility—which party bears responsibility for violence, who 
were the victims, and who were the perpetrators. I discuss the moral consensus surrounding 
mass violence in the societies examined in this Article based on information from my field 
research and survey data from various sources. For further discussion on the inherent 
difficulties of measuring moral consensus, see infra Part V; infra Methodological Appendix. 
 f “[S]tates to watch” are defined as those states that perform “particularly poorly . . . in at 
least one of the four core areas of state function” or poorly in at “least two core areas,” “but 
their aggregate scores” tend to fall within the top two tiers. INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra 
note d, at 20. 
 g There are no reliable estimates of the total number of perpetrators in Ghana. See NRC 
REPORT, supra note 45, at 160. 
 h “[C]ritically weak states” are defined as those states “least capable of fulfilling most, if not 
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all, of the four critical functions of government.” INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra note d, at 
10. 
 i Lustration describes a process of removing or preventing alleged perpetrators from 
maintaining or acquiring positions of authority, usually in key branches of government and the 
security sector. See HAYNER, supra note 3, at 9 (discussing the process of lustration in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America). Lustration is a less punitive form of punishment than incarceration 
and was widely used in post-communist Europe. See Roman Boed, An Evaluation of the Legality 
and Efficacy of Lustration as a Tool of Transitional Justice, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 357, 365–
85 (1999) (discussing the use of lustration in Czechoslovakia); Roger Duthie, Introduction to 
JUSTICE AS PREVENTION: VETTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 17–19 
(Alexander Mayer-Rieckh & Pablo de Greiff eds., 2007) (defining, among others, vetting, 
lustration, and purges). For further discussion on the lustration process in Liberia, see Sirleaf, 
Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26 (manuscript at 36–38). 
 
C.     The Limits of Transplants 
Alan Watson, the scholar who coined the term “legal transplants,” 
defined it as “the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country 
to another, or from one people to another.”110 Watson noted that 
transplanting is a practice that has been around since the earliest 
recorded history.111 The literature on legal transplants is vast, touching 
on nearly every topic—from political and legal reform112 to economic 
growth.113 The fascination with legal transplants is simple: “If the law 
can be transplanted, policymaking by governing powers and 
international institutions can achieve objectives that require legal 
reform through [the use of] legal transplants.”114 Daniel Berkowitz and 
others have argued that in order for legal transplants to be effective, “a 
 
 110 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (1974). 
 111 See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L. Q. REV. 79, 80–81 (1976). 
 112 See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
602, 605–07 (2010); Erin Grahm et al., The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research, 43 BRITISH J. 
POL. SCI. 673, 673 (2012) (noting that between 1958 and 2008 over eight hundred articles have 
been published in the field of political science alone on policy diffusion); Penelope (Pip) 
Nicholson, Comparative Law and Legal Transplants Between Socialist States: An Historical 
Perspective, in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES 143 (Tim Lindsey ed., 
2007); Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, The Transformative Power of Europe: The European 
Union and the Diffusion of Ideas 7–8 (KFG, Working Paper No. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/WP_01_
Juni_Boerzel_Risse.pdf; see also Wade Jacoby, Inspiration, Coalition and Substitution: External 
Influences on Postcommunist Transformations, 58 WORLD POL. 623 (2006) (reviewing books 
considering the role that the United States and Western Europe has played in encouraging 
post-communist institutional change).  
 113 See, e.g., John Flood, The Vultures Fly East: The Creation and Globalisation of the 
Distressed Debt Market, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 257, 257–62 (David Nelken & Johannes 
Feest eds., 2001); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1115 (1998); 
Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131–32 (1997); 
Tony Prosser, Marketisation, Public Service and Universal Service, in ADAPTING LEGAL 
CULTURES, supra, at 223, 235. 
 114 Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge, 10 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 723, 727 (2009). 
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demand for law must exist so that the law on the books will actually be 
used in practice” and that the transplant must also be adapted “to local 
conditions.”115 Where this does not occur, a “transplant effect” happens 
wherein less effective legal institutions persist when compared to the 
origin country.116 However, some scholars, like Pierre Legrand, have 
challenged the very idea of legal transplants, arguing that law as a social 
construct, by necessity, cannot remain the same once it is removed from 
its context (“historical, epistemological, or cultural baggage”).117 A more 
nuanced understanding of legal transplants contends that “transplants 
always involve a degree of cultural adaptation” because transplants 
“represent instances of mediated action” and cannot merely reproduce 
the original.118 
While much of the legal-transplant literature is preoccupied with 
the study of legal transplants from the West to other areas of the 
world,119 the insights from the legal-transplant literature apply to the 
transplanting of truth commissions as well. The institutional emulation 
of truth commissions is not surprising to scholars writing in the fields of 
comparative and international law because “[w]hen faced with an 
institutional problem, lawyers typically look around the world for 
examples of how other legal systems have dealt with [similar] 
issue[s].”120 The legal-transplant literature helps to explain why 
common-law countries like Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Liberia would 
seek to mimic the truth commission in South Africa.121 Additionally, 
South Africa, Ghana, and Sierra Leone are all former British colonies 
and current members of the Commonwealth.122 As Watson explains, it 
 
 115 Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 33, at 167–68. 
 116 Id. at 168; accord Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Osvaldo Saldías, Transplanting the 
European Court of Justice: The Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 
629, 634–35 (2012). 
 117 See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & 
COMP. L. 111, 114 (1997). 
 118 Graziadei, supra note 114, at 723, 728, 737. 
 119 See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 110, at 71–74; Karen J. Alter, The Global Spread of 
European Style International Courts, 35 W. EUR. POL. 135 (2012) [hereinafter Alter, Global 
Spread]; Graziadei, supra note 114, at 728, 737–38; Andrew Harding, Comparative Law and 
Legal Transplantation in South East Asia: Making Sense of the “Nomic Din”, in ADAPTING 
LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 113, at 119; Jacoby, supra note 112; Luke Nottage, The Still-Birth 
and Re-birth of Product Liability in Japan, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 113, at 
147, 147–48. 
 120 Alter, Global Spread, supra note 119, at 138. 
 121 The policy diffusion literature also helps to explain this phenomenon because where 
leading countries serve as “exemplars” policymakers in other countries often play “follow the 
leader” even “in the absence of evidence of the efficacy of those policies.” Beth A. Simmons et 
al., Introduction: The Diffusion of Liberalization, in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND 
DEMOCRACY 7 (Beth Simmons et al. eds., 2008); see also KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC 
FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD 
ACROSS COUNTRIES, 4, 14–15 (2013) (discussing why the policy choices of rich, large, and 
proximate countries are emulated regardless of consequences).  
 122 Their common colonial background may help to explain, in part, why the Liberian 
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is easier for transplants to be successful where they can “graft onto 
existing legal norms and practices.”123 
While a number of truth commissions preceded the commission in 
South Africa, “[n]o truth commission has received the global attention 
and near universal acclaim of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.”124 Thus, despite the different historical contexts of the 
transitions in each country—Ghana emerging from an authoritarian 
regime and Sierra Leone and Liberia emerging from massively 
destructive civil wars—all three countries adopted South African-style 
truth commissions. In Ghana, some expressed concern that a truth 
commission was inappropriate because abuses were isolated incidents 
occurring under various regimes,125 as opposed to systematic violations 
occurring over a prolonged period. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, there 
occurred widespread and divisive conflicts that pitted different groups 
against each other with abuses committed openly, which led some to 
question the utility of a truth commission because its revelatory 
function would be limited.126 Juxtaposed “to the secret, cloak-and-
dagger nature of political violence in South Africa” and Ghana, mass 
violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone “did not happen under cover of 
darkness, with hardly a witness in sight, and with every effort to destroy 
the evidence.”127 Additionally, the transitional institutions were 
established at significantly different intervals after their transitions, with 
Ghana’s commission established some ten years after its transition from 
authoritarian rule, Liberia’s only two years after the end of its civil war, 
and Sierra Leone’s transitional institutions established a mere seven 
months after the peace agreement was signed. Further, U.N. 
peacekeeping missions were operating in both Sierra Leone and Liberia 
during the period of the commissions’ operations. 
The limits of truth commissions become particularly apparent 
when these institutions are transplanted from post-authoritarian 
contexts and expected to function similarly in post-conflict contexts. 
Although the South African truth commission has reached iconic status, 
it is far from clear that the limited success achieved by that 
 
commission underperformed when compared to the other commissions. Yet, the key-variable 
approach developed in this Article puts forward a much more convincing account. See 
discussion infra Parts II, III, IV. 
 123 Alter, Helfer & Saldías, supra note 116, at 634 (citing Watson, supra note 111). 
 124 WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 18, at 35. 
 125 See Meredith Wain, Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission, PEACE MAGAZINE, 
Apr.–June 2003, at 18, available at http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v19n2p18.htm. 
 126 Interviews with human rights victims, staff, and Commissioners of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission for Liberia (TRC-L), civil society leaders, professors, lawyers, civil 
servants, and U.N. personnel, in Monrovia, Liberia and Lofa, Nimba, Bong, and Grand Gedeh 
counties, Liberia (Dec. 8–22, 2008; January 5–8, 2009) [hereinafter Interviews from Liberia]; 
Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 127 Cf. MAMDANI, supra note a (tbl.1), at 267 (contrasting South Africa with Rwanda). 
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commission128 can be emulated elsewhere, particularly in societies that 
have experienced the kinds of massively destructive conflicts with which 
this Article is most concerned. Indeed, it is far from evident that the 
experiences with truth commissions in post-authoritarian countries, 
such as Argentina, Chile, and South Africa, would look anything like 
those of post-conflict countries.129 
A comparative summary of the objectives and functions of each 




















































SATRC Act, supra 
note 1, § 3(1) 
Sierra Leonean 
Peace Agreement, 
supra note 96, art. 
XXVI , § 1 
NRC Act, supra 
note 56, § 13(a)  
Liberian Peace 
Agreement, supra 
note 79, art. XIII, § 
1   
Promote 
Reconciliation 
SATRC Act, supra 
note 1, § 3(1) 
TRC-SL Act, supra 
note 97, § 6(1)  
NRC Act, supra 
note 56, § 20(2)(g)  
TRC-L Act, supra 
note 82, art. IV, 
§ 4(b)  
Grant Amnesty to 
Persons Who Make 
Full Disclosures 
SATRC Act, supra 
note 1, § 3(1)(b), 
4(c) 
  
TRC-L Act, supra 






TRC-SL Act, supra 
note 97, § 6(1)  
NRC Act, supra 
note 56, § 20(2)(g) 
TRC-L Act, supra 
note 82, art. IV, 
§ 4(b)  
 
 128 See, e.g., Margaret (Peggy) Maisel, Have Truth and Reconciliation Commissions Helped 
Remediate Human Rights Violations Against Women? A Feminist Analysis of the Past and 
Formula for the Future, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143, 155–56 (2011) (discussing how 
the commission was biased against women when it only looked at violations that occurred “in 
the course of political conflicts,” only examined individuals’ experiences and not communities’, 
and disregarded the harm women faced “from sexism and gender inequality” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Mahmood Mamdani, Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique 
of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC), 32 DIACRITICS 
33, 33–34 (2002) (discussing the following limitations of the SATRC’s work: the “reduc[tion of] 
apartheid from a relationship between the state and entire communities to one between the 
state and individuals;” the failure “to highlight the . . . nature of apartheid as a form of power 
that governed natives differently from non-natives;” and the “exten[sion of] impunity to most 
perpetrators of apartheid”); Zanaida Miller, Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in 
Transitional Justice, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 266, 290 (2008) (arguing that structural 
violence in South Africa may persist despite the commission’s intervention); see also 
WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 18, at 35 (“South Africans are more ambivalent about the 
TRC.”). 
 129 Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 17, 27. 
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Establish an Accurate 
Historical Record of 
Human Rights 
Violations 
SATRC Act, supra 
note 1, § 3(1)(a) 
TRC-SL Act, supra 
note 97, § 6(1)  
NRC Act, supra 
note 56, § 20(2)(b)  
TRC-L Act, supra 
note 82, art. VII, 




SATRC Act, supra 
note 1, § 3(1)(c) 
TRC-SL Act, supra 
note 97, § 7(6) 
NRC Act, supra 
note 56, § 20(2)(h) 
TRC-L Act, supra 





SATRC Act, supra 
note 1, § 4(a)(v) 
TRC-SL Act, supra 
note 97, § 6(1)   
TRC-L Act, supra 
note 82, art. IV, 
§ 4(b)  
Restore Dignity to 
Victims 
SATRC Act, supra 
note 1, § 3(1)(c), 
4(f)(i) 
TRC-SL Act, supra 
note 97, § 6(2)(b)  
NRC Act, supra 
note 56, § 20(2)(d) TRC-L Act, supra 
note 82, art. VII, 




SATRC Act, supra 
note 1, § 3(1)(d), 
4(h) 
TRC-SL Act, supra 
note 97, § 15(2)  
NRC Act, supra 
note 56, § 20(2)(f)  
TRC-L Act, supra 
note 82, art. VII, 
§ 26(j)(ii) 
Prevent Violence and  
Repetition of Abuses 
SATRC Act, supra 
note 1, §§ 3(1)(d), 
4(h) 
TRC-SL Act, supra 
note 97, § 6(1)  
NRC Act, supra 
note 56, § 20(2)(e)  
TRC-L Act, supra 
note 82, art. IV, § 4  
 
In addition to mimicking a number of functions and objectives of 
the SATRC, the West African commissions also adopted key design 
features of the South African model:130 
(1)  Gathering information and taking statements from 
individuals;131 
(2)  Holding public hearings and conducting investigations;132 and 
(3)  Compiling a public report of findings and recommendations.133 
It is also worth noting the overwhelming and unrealistic number of 
goals attached to each institution.134 
 
 130 Notably, however, they did not copy certain design features, such as the SATRC’s three 
subcommittees: “the Committee on Human Rights Violations,” “the Committee on Amnesty,” 
and “the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation.” See Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 § 3(3)(a)–(c) (S. Afr.). 
 131 Id. § 4(b); see The National Reconciliation Commission Act, 2002 § 9(3) (Ghana), 
available at http://www.ghanareview.com/reconact.html; An Act to Establish the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (June 10, 2005) art. VII, § 26(e), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/473c6b3d2.html; Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of 
2000 § 7(1)(c) (Sierra Leone), available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/
collections/commissions/SeirraLeone-Charter.pdf. 
 132 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 §§ 28–30, 33 (S. Afr.); see 
The National Reconciliation Commission Act, 2002 §§ 10, 1 (Ghana); An Act to Establish the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (June 10, 2005) art. VII, § 26(p); Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000 § 7(1)(a)–(b) (Sierra Leone). 
 133 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 §§ 3(1)(d), 4(e) (S. Afr.); 
see The National Reconciliation Commission Act, 2002 § 20 (Ghana); An Act to Establish the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (June 10, 2005) art. X, §§43–44; Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000 §§ 15–16 (Sierra Leone). 
 134 See supra Table 2. For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, 
supra note 26, at 259–88. 
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The legal-transplant literature informs us that changes in 
transplanted institutions indicate adjustments for domestic 
conditions.135 Thus, blind copying weakens the effectiveness of the 
transplanted institution.136 The analysis below indicates that copying 
may work better where there is more similarity between the origin and 
transplant country. Accordingly, we would anticipate that the truth 
commissions that hewed the most closely to the South African model, in 
very different contexts would fare the worst. The truth commissions in 
Ghana and Sierra Leone exhibited the most variation from the 
objectives and functions of the South African commission. A major 
innovation in Sierra Leone was the use of a hybrid court alongside the 
truth commission. Additionally, only the Ghanaian commission’s 
constitutive act attempted any limitation of its goals. The truth 
commission that mimicked the South African model the most closely 
was Liberia’s commission, which was the only commission empowered 
to grant amnesty,137 in drastically different circumstances than South 
Africa and without strong legal institutions to support the process. 
While the SATRC did not provide for it to “promote healing,”138 the 
drafters of the SATRC likely assumed the commission’s contribution to 
this objective, as reconciliation and healing are concepts that (though 
distinct) are often used synonymously.139 
The almost identical objectives of the West African commissions as 
well as their similar design features are no mere coincidence. Many of 
the actors involved in designing the South African truth commission 
were instrumental in diffusing the model and supporting the creation of 
the truth commissions in West Africa and elsewhere.140 Some of the 
commissioners even went on study trips to learn about South Africa’s 
experience and to find out about best practices.141 The international 
 
 135 See e.g., Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 33, at 179. 
 136 Id. at 171. 
 137 See An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (June 10, 
2005) art. VII, § 26(g), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/473c6b3d2.html. For further 
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 258–64. 
 138 See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.). 
 139 See id. § 3 (providing that the commission shall promote “reconciliation”); see also Phil 
Clark, Establishing a Conceptual Framework: Six Key Transitional Justice Themes, in AFTER 
GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION 
IN RWANDA AND BEYOND 191, 195 (Phil Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman eds., 2009). 
 140 Victoria Baxter, Critical Challenges for the Development of the Transitional Justice 
Research Field, in ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 326 
(noting that “there is a recognized pool of people who have worked on the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission” and that “[t]hese individuals tend to be mobile and work in 
other transitional justice contexts and have therefore become influential in the development of 
transitional justice policy in a variety of countries”); see also WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 
18, at 35 (“Many in the international human rights community are inured to the potential of 
truth commission based almost entirely on the South African model.”). 
 141 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. See infra Methodological Appendix for a fuller 
discussion of the eighty-seven interviews conducted. 
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community and donors were also very influential in the diffusion of the 
South African model.142 Yet, this is not merely a case of another 
transplant from the West to non-Western countries (this time simply 
via South Africa). Instead, as Desmond Tutu reflected in his book, the 
SATRC was infused with principles of “ubuntu,” meaning that “[m]y 
humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.”143 The 
principles of ubuntu emphasize reciprocity, inclusivity, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation.144 Chapman and van der Merwe have noted that the 
expansion of the goals of truth commissions from primarily “truth 
recovery” to encompassing many other objectives, including 
“promot[ing] forgiveness and reconciliation” “is primarily due to the 
influence of the South African model.”145 There had previously been 
commissions on the disappeared in Argentina, Uganda, and Sri Lanka; 
truth and justice commissions in Haiti and Ecuador; and now, 
increasingly, truth and reconciliation commissions since the 
commission in South Africa. In particular, a number of post-conflict 
countries have sought to copy and paste many of the features of the 
South African Commission.146 
Parts II, III, and IV will explore some of the ways the commissions 
in West Africa mimicked the South African model, particularly 
highlighting difficulties faced in promoting truth-telling, healing, 
establishing an accurate historical record, and providing redress and 
acknowledgment for victims. This Article illuminates the challenges 
posed for truth commissions in post-conflict countries due to the 
interaction of key factors—the relative weakness of institutions, the 
lower levels of moral consensus surrounding mass violence, and the 
larger number of victims and perpetrators. While I discuss these key 
variables separately below for ease of explanation, it should be recalled 
 
 142 Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 16–17 (“International human rights groups and U.N. 
agencies are encouraging this templatization.”). For a more in depth discussion of international 
policy diffusion, see Simmons supra note 121, at 34–35.  
 143 See DESMOND TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 31 (1999) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID, supra note 18, at 263. 
 144 See Tim Murithi, Towards African Models of Transitional Justice, in WHERE LAW MEETS 
REALITY: FORGING AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 203–04 (Moses Chrispus Okello et al. eds., 
2012). 
 145 See Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo van der Merwe, Introduction to TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID THE TRC DELIVER?, supra note 25, at 4. 
 146 For example, the truth commission in the Solomon Islands was established with the 
assistance of Desmond Tutu, the former chair of the SATRC. Desmond Tutu Launches 
Commission to Restore Peace in Solomon Islands, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME (Apr. 28, 
2009), http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2009/04/28/
archbishop-tutu-opens-solomon-islands-truth-and-reconciliation-commission; see also Doki, 
supra note 15 (discussing the South Sudanese government’s plans to launch a truth and 
reconciliation process based on the South African model); Nossiter, supra note 14 (discussing 
how the government in Libya was considering a truth commission to draw on the South 
African experience). 
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that they interact in numerous ways. Further, I discuss the key variables 
in order of significance, with institutional strength having the most 
impact on a truth commission’s abilities and the number of victims and 
perpetrators in a given society having the least. 
II.     INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS AND THE LIMITED IMPACT OF TRUTH 
COMMISSIONS 
Post-conflict states have significant social problems, which “require 
comprehensive reforms in their political, economic, social, and security 
sectors.”147 Resolving these problems “require[s] a strong state, [which] 
at a minimum [is] able to provide security for its citizens, make 
decisions in a politically acceptable way, . . . create organizations that 
will implement these decisions,” and generate revenue to “pay for the 
whole process.”148 In the aftermath of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, many vital state institutions were non-existent or significantly 
weakened. For example, the Index of State Weakness in the Developing 
World (“Index”), which ranks all 141 developing countries according to 
their performance in four key areas—economics, politics, security, and 
social welfare—ranked Liberia ninth, Sierra Leone thirteenth, and Ghana 
eighty-fourth (with a lower ranking representing a weaker state).149 As a 
point of comparison, the Index ranked South Africa 110th out of 141 
developing countries and categorized it as a “state to watch.”150 This 
provides a rough approximation of the level of state capacity during the 
periods the commissions were operating in each country, with the Index 
categorizing Liberia and Sierra Leone as “critically weak states” and 
Ghana as a “state to watch.”151 Following their respective transitions, the 
 
 147 Licklider, supra note 35, at 294 (quoting Krishna Kumar, The Nature and Focus of 
International Assistance for Rebuilding War-Torn Societies, in REBUILDING SOCIETIES AFTER 
CIVIL WAR 1, 3 (Krishna Kumar ed., 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 148 Id. 
 149 INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra note d (tbl.1), at 3, 39, 41. The scale also looked at 
twenty “subindicators,” which included widely recognized indicators in each area. See id. at 3, 
30–36. The data sources used coincide with the periods of operation of the transitional justice 
mechanisms in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and South Africa. 
 150 See id. at 10, 13, 41. The Index of State Weakness was only recently created, and the 
oldest version of the Index is from 2008, which weighs data from 1991 to 2007 when compiling 
scores. See id. at 30–37. The earliest available data for South Africa is in the “Failed States 
Index,” which also ranks it 110th. See The Failed States Index 2006, FUND FOR 
PEACEhttp://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2006-sortable (last visited June 29, 2014). “The Failed 
States Index . . . is perhaps the best-known rankings of countries according to their relative 
weakness.” INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra note d (tbl.1), at 7. I rely on the Index of State 
Weakness as opposed to the Failed States Index because the latter underestimates the role of 
“inadequate health care and education” in contributing to state weakness, “relies extensively on 
selected” media coverage, and “lacks full transparency.” Id. at 7. 
 151 INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra note d (tbl.1), at 10, 39, 41 (“[C]ritically weak states” 
are defined as those states “least capable of fulfilling most, if not all, of the four critical 
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economies in all three countries were also relatively weak, with Ghana 
having a relatively stronger economy than Sierra Leone, and Liberia 
with the weakest economy.152 Additionally, Ghana performed 
significantly higher than Liberia and Sierra Leone in terms of the 
provision of social welfare to its citizens, with Sierra Leone faring the 
worst.153 The Index considered five factors: “child mortality,”154 
“primary school completion,”155 the “prevalence of 
undernourishment,”156 “access to improved water sources [and] 
improved sanitation facilities,”157 and “life expectancy.”158 This provides 
some sense of the level of comparative social and economic deprivation 
in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. A number of interviewees during 
my field research also commented on the socio-economic difficulties 
faced. For example, one interviewee in Liberia stated, “every woman in 
village was raped, or gang raped, but we don’t even have a pump for safe 
drinking water, the ones placed here do not even work.”159 Another 
Liberian interviewee lamented, “The country is hard, what will we eat? 
The price of rice is high. There are no roads for commerce, no 
transportation. People are catching hell.”160 Another interviewee stated 
 
functions of government,” while “states to watch” “perform better overall than those in the 
bottom two quintiles,” but “score . . . poorly in at least one of the four core areas of state 
function” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 152 Id. at 39, 41. For instance, the composite score in the economic sphere on the Index was 
3.39 for Liberia, 5.04 for Sierra Leone, and 5.92 for Ghana on a scale of one to ten (with a lower 
score representing a worse score). Id. at 39, 41. The Index relied on five economic indicators: 
“growth of gross domestic product,” id. at 34 (relying on World Development Indicators 2007, 
WORLD BANK, with data coverage from 2002–2006), “gross national income,” id. at 33 (relying 
on World Development Indicators 2007, supra, with data coverage from 2006), “inflation,” id. at 
34 (relying on World Economic Outlook Database, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 2006), 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/index.aspx, with data from 2003–2007), 
“income inequality,” id. (relying on the World Development Indicators 2007, supra, with data 
from 2006), and “regulatory quality,” id. (relying on Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance 
Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996–2006 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 
No. 4280, 2007), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999979, with data 
from 2006). 
 153 INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra note d (tbl.1), at 39, 41. The Index gave a composite 
score of 0.76 to Sierra Leone, 1.25 to Liberia, and 5.48 to Ghana on a scale of one to ten, 
according to their performance in the provision of social welfare. Id. 
 154 Id. at 35 (relying on UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2007 (2006), 
available at http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/The_State_of_the_Worlds__Children__
2007_e.pdf, with data coverage from 2005). 
 155 Id. (relying on the World Development Indicators 2007, supra note 152, with data 
coverage from 2000 and 2005). 
 156 Id. (relying on Statistics, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, with data coverage 
from 2004). 
 157 Id. (relying on the World Development Indicators 2007, supra note 152, with data 
coverage included from 2004). 
 158 Id. at 31 (relying on the World Development Indicators 2007, supra note 152, with data 
coverage included from 2005). 
 159 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
 160 Id. 
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that after the war “when people returned, our houses were burned 
down, we need help to put our lives back together, zinc to build our 
homes.”161 These statements provide us with additional context for how 
drastically different the circumstances were for the commissions 
operating in post-conflict countries. 
Given the realities of operating a truth commission in a post-
conflict context with significantly weakened or non-existent institutions 
concomitant with general deprivation, the difficulties Liberia and Sierra 
Leone faced are not surprising. Field research revealed that both the 
TRC-SL and the TRC-L effectively lost portions of their preparatory 
period and the first couple of months of their mandates due to 
administrative and management difficulties within their Secretariats.162 
Additionally, interviewees stressed how inadequate funding plagued all 
of the commissions,163 but that this was particularly problematic for the 
commissions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, given the large number of 
victims and alleged perpetrators their commissions had to engage. The 
experience of Liberia and Sierra Leone is likely typical of other post-
conflict contexts, where state capacity is low following mass violence, 
and funding for truth-telling processes is limited. Field research 
exhibited how, comparatively, the international community better 
financed and supported the SCSL. Accordingly, the SCSL did not face as 
many administrative and management difficulties as the truth 
commissions.164 Parts II.A and II.B focus on examples of how fragile 
institutions following the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone limited 
the impact of truth commissions in these countries and how the 
combination of truth and punishment mechanisms helped to fill 
important institutional gaps in Sierra Leone. 
 
 161 Id. 
 162 In Liberia, the commission lost all of its preparatory period and six months of its 
operational mandate due to similar challenges. The TRC-L functioned for almost a year 
without an Executive Secretariat. In January 2007, the International Contact Group for Liberia 
intervened, enumerating ways in which the TRC-L had not performed optimally and creating a 
TRC Working Group to monitor its activities. Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; 
Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 163 The NRC struggled to attract international funding for its initial $5 million budget and 
was forced to operate within the $1.5 million budget provided by the Ghanaian government. 
See SARA TOLLEFSON & KIM STANTON, CDD-GHANA, INTERIM REPORT ON THE NRC 5 (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The TRC-SL also faced a considerable shortfall 
of its initial $10 million budget and had to operate on a $4.1 million budget. See 1 TRUTH & 
RECONCILIATION COMM’N, WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 103–05 (2004) [hereinafter 1 TRC-SL REPORT], available at 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume1.pdf. Comparatively, the Liberian 
government provided tremendous financial support, donating approximately $4.2 million of 
the almost $8 million budget of the TRC-L. See TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 38–40. 
In contrast, the SATRC had an estimated budget of $33 million and a staff of 400 at its peak. See 
Hugo van der Merwe & Audrey R. Chapman, Did the TRC Deliver?, in TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID THE TRC DELIVER?, supra note 25, at 247. 
 164 Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
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A.     Weak Security Institutions 
Post-conflict states face enormous challenges establishing security 
for its citizens, but this is arguably the most fundamental objective for 
the new state, as victims need assurances to resume their lives.165 “[A] 
police force has to be created,” and they in turn “need[] a set of laws to 
enforce,” which requires “a judicial system with judges and lawyers” as 
well as a functioning prison system, all of which, following a conflict, 
needs to “be built from the ground up.”166 The fragility of security 
institutions167 following the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone limited 
the impact of their commissions. For example, the Index gave Sierra 
Leone a composite score of 5.43, Liberia 6.01, and Ghana 8.44 on a scale 
of one to ten according to their performance in security (with a lower 
score representing a worse score).168 The Index relied on five security 
indicators: “conflict intensity,”169 “political stability and absence of 
violence,”170 “incidence of coups,”171 “gross human rights abuses,”172 and 
“territory affected by [the] conflict.”173 These figures provide some sense 
of the comparative level of insecurity in the three countries. 
Because of the heightened levels of insecurity in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, both commissions had significantly fewer people participate in 
their public hearings despite the relatively large size of the victim and 
perpetrator classes. While the commission in Sierra Leone heard 350 
people,174 and the commission in Liberia heard approximately 800 
people,175 the commission in Ghana ultimately heard 1866 people176 in 
public hearings. In Sierra Leone, obtaining witnesses for the TRC-SL 
was difficult because many people had returned to their communities, 
 
 165 Licklider, supra note 35, at 294–95. 
 166 Id. at 295. 
 167 Security institutions are those institutions that have primary responsibility for 
maintaining security, such as the military and the police. 
 168 INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra note d (tbl.1), at 39, 41. 
 169 Id. at 31 (relying on Monty G. Marshall, Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946–2007, 
CENTER SYSTEMIC PEACE, http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm (last updated Mar. 27, 
2014), with data coverage from 1993–2007). 
 170 Id. (relying on Kaufmann et al., supra note 152, with data coverage from 2006). 
 171 Id. at 31–32 (relying on the ARCHIGOS, A DATABASE ON LEADERS (Version 2.8, 2007), 
with data coverage from 1992–2006). 
 172 Id. at 32 (relying on Mark Gibney et al., POLITICAL TERROR SCALE, 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org (last updated Dec. 1, 2013), with data coverage from 2002–
2006). 
 173 Id. at 33 (relying on Political Instability Task Force, CTR. GLOBAL POL’Y, 
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/political-instability-task-force-home (last updated June 20, 2012), 
with data coverage from 1991–2005). 
 174 See CTR. FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE? TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA 24 (Yazeed Fakier ed., 
2007). 
 175 TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 189. 
 176 1 NRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 91. 
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others no longer wished to testify, and some feared repercussions if they 
testified.177 Field research revealed that the commission in Liberia 
similarly struggled with public hearings, in a context where many 
known perpetrators roamed freely.178 Interviewees noted that the 
witness protection scheme put in place by the TRC-L had limited 
impact in encouraging involvement.179 Women interviewees in post-
conflict countries especially feared stigma and retaliation if they testified 
publicly.180 Paradoxically, fewer people engaged in the public hearings in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia than did in Ghana181 because security 
institutions, which might have provided victim and witness protection, 
were significantly weakened or non-existent. 
Liberia had only one transitional-justice mechanism, which was 
solely responsible for fulfilling a host of justice-promoting objectives, in 
a context with very large numbers of perpetrators. A majority of 
interviewees in Liberia remarked that their truth commission had not 
helped to consolidate peace and stability.182 In Sierra Leone, however, 
the court helped to fill important institutional gaps and buttressed the 
efforts of the TRC-SL. For example, 81% of those surveyed by the SCSL 
felt that the court had contributed to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace.183 Additionally, 43% of respondents in Liberia and 39% of 
respondents in Sierra Leone thought that the closing of the SCSL would 
affect peace in their country and the region because “[i]t [would] no 
longer serve as a deterrent”184 or that closing the court would “bring 
back fear.”185 In particular, interviewees in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
routinely singled out Charles Taylor’s trial before the SCSL186 for its 
 
 177 See 1 TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 163, at 99. 
 178 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
 179 Id.; see also AMNESTY INT’L, LIBERIA: TOWARDS THE FINAL PHASE OF THE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 22–23 (2008); TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 62 
(noting that “witness protection was applied on an individual case by cases basis due 
inadequate resources and the limited time” of the TRC-L’s mandate). 
 180 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106; 
see also TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 200 (noting that only 32% of those who 
participated in the public hearings were women). 
 181 For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 244. 
 182 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
 183 SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107, at 30. The SCSL is also recognized for contributing to 
peace-building in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Many respondents in Sierra Leone (72%) and 
Liberia (68%) thought that the SCSL had contributed to the development of other peace-
building mechanisms in their respective countries. Id. at 51 Annex 36. Notably, 32.06% of 
respondents in Liberia thought that the SCSL did not have an impact because there was no 
“Special Court in Liberia.” Id. at 30. 
 184 Id. at 43 Annex 13. Overall, 37.25% of respondents indicated this. Id. 
 185 Id. Overall, 23.52% of respondents indicated this. Id. 
 186 A thorough analysis of the more-than-2000-page trial judgment, see Kevin Jon Heller, 
The Taylor Sentencing Judgment: A Critical Analysis, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 835, 836 (2013), is 
beyond the scope of this Article. See generally id.; Kenneth S. Gallant, Charles Taylor, Arms 
Dealers, and Reparations (UALR-William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 12-08, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079768. 
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contribution to deterrence. My field research demonstrated that a 
number concluded that his trial helped to contribute to regional stability 
and put other leaders on notice that “there is accountability for 
fomenting war in neighboring countries.”187 While it is difficult to draw 
any larger conclusions about the impact of the court on deterrence in 
and beyond the sub-region,188 it seems clear that the SCSL’s perceived 
contribution to preventing violence and the non-repetition of abuses 
bolstered both processes. It also appears that the court helped to fill 
perceived security gaps. 
Overall, Sierra Leone’s experience indicates that in post-conflict 
countries, where security institutions (where they exist) are relatively 
weak, the combination of a hybrid court and a commission can help to 
fill key institutional gaps and increase perceptions of effectiveness for 
both institutions. In particular, perceptions of security are important as 
prosecutions can potentially create a greater sense of security that truth 
commissions can then benefit from. In Sierra Leone, the hybrid court 
had much more capacity and resources than the commission. If both 
institutions were equally under-resourced, the beneficial relationship 
between court and commission would likely not be replicated. Liberia’s 
experience is also instructive because it indicates that where the 
commission and fragile state-security institutions provide insufficient 
witness and victim protection following a conflict, the truth 
commission’s efforts to fulfil its mandate will be frustrated. The 
experience of Liberia and Sierra Leone is likely typical of other post-
conflict contexts, where there are numerous perpetrators who threaten 
or intimidate victims to discourage them from participating fully in the 
process. The commission in Ghana operated in a more secure 
environment, and accordingly had more people come forward in public 
hearings. Part II.B discusses how weak political institutions following 
the conflicts limited the impact of the truth commissions. 
 
 187 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 188 Taylor’s trial suffers from the same challenges posed by deterrence theory at the domestic 
level. See Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for 
Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 63–71 (2002). For example, “it is 
difficult to prove that threats of legal sanctions, rather than other motivations, . . . prevent[] 
people from offending.” Id. at 65. Additionally, deterrence theory “only works in relation to 
some crimes and some offenders,” id., who are rational actors, but in the context of mass 
atrocities, it is unclear that we are dealing with rational actors making these calculations, id. at 
66. Further, in the real, world punishment is never swift, certain, or severe and is often 
determined by a host of factors, which limit the ability for deterrence to play a role. Id. at 64–
65. 
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B.     Weak Political Institutions 
The weakness of the political institutions189 in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone limited the impact of the commissions. For example, the Index 
gave a composite score of 3.87 to Sierra Leone, 3.91 to Liberia, and 7.02 
to Ghana on a scale of one to ten, according to their performance in the 
political sphere (with a lower score representing a worse score).190 The 
Index used political indicators that measured five factors: “government 
effectiveness,”191 the “rule of law,”192 “control of corruption,”193 “voice 
[and] accountability,”194 and “freedom.”195 This provides a rough 
comparator of the variance in political institutions in each country. 
Field research revealed that political institutions too weak to carry 
out reforms and the lack of political will have been the main challenges 
for the implementation of all the commissions’ recommendations.196 In 
Ghana, interviewees stated that the work of the NRC has seemingly 
fallen off the political radar.197 During my field research, some 
interviewees remarked that the NRC “has not met expectations,” with a 
few commenting, “people have forgotten about it.”198 Given the 
 
 189 Political institutions are those institutions that are primarily in charge of governing, such 
as the legislative and executive branches. 
 190 INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra note d (tbl.1), at 39, 41. 
 191 Id. at 30 (relying on Kaufmann et al., supra note 152, with data from 2006). 
 192 Id. (relying on Kaufmann et al., supra note 152, with data from 2006). 
 193 Id. (relying on Kaufmann et al., supra note 152, with data from 2006). 
 194 Id. (relying on Kaufmann et al., supra note 152, with data from 2006). 
 195 Id. at 31 (relying on Freedom in the World 2007, FREEDOM HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2007), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm? page=70&release=457, with data from 2007). 
 196 In Ghana, the NRC’s key recommendations involved reparations payments and restoring 
seized assets as well as recommendations for institutional reform, particularly regarding the 
security sector, the judiciary, and other institutions. See 3 NAT’L RECONCILIATION COMM’N, 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 1–50 (2004). In Sierra Leone, the 
commission’s main recommendations concerned addressing corruption, creating a new Bill of 
Rights, strengthening the legislature and the judiciary, security sector reform, decentralizing 
governance, delivering basic services, increasing participation for youth and women in 
decision-making, and establishing a reparations program. See 2 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION 
COMM’N, WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION 123–25 (2004) [hereinafter 2 TRC-SL REPORT], available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume2.pdf. In Liberia, the commission’s main 
recommendations pertained to criminal prosecutions and lustrations. See TRC-L Final Report, 
supra note 62, at 347–61, 369–76. The TRC-L also recommended the creation of a national 
palava hut (local mechanism for reconciliation), the establishment of a reparations program, 
greater human rights protection, and amnesty for children. Id. at 363–67, 377–94, 402–03. For 
further discussion of the commissions’ recommendations, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & 
Punishment, supra note 26, at 274–75. 
 197 Interviews with former staff and Commissioners of the National Reconciliation 
Commission (NRC), civil society leaders, human rights victims, professors, lawyers, and judges, 
in Accra, Ghana (Nov. 18–29, 2008) [hereinafter Interviews from Ghana] (a number of 
interviewees mentioned that there was insufficient awareness about the NRC). See infra 
Methodological Appendix for discussion of the twelve interviews conducted.  
 198 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197. 
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politicization of the NRC in Ghana, interviewees feared that later 
governments might summarily dismiss the NRC’s recommendations as 
a creature of the opposition party, which was previously in power.199 Far 
more interviewees expressed concern about the lack of political will in 
Sierra Leone than did in Ghana.200 In Sierra Leone, Kabbah’s 
government did not demonstrate sufficient political will or leadership 
concerning implementation of the commission’s recommendations. 
Some interviewees noted that the government’s apathetic attitude 
toward the commission might have resulted from the criticisms leveled 
against it.201 Despite initial representations,202 the new Sierra Leonean 
government, led by President Ernest Bai Koroma, also demonstrated 
insufficient political will. Similarly, in Liberia, the commission’s report 
has united much of the political class in opposition against it,203 because 
it recommended prosecution and debarment from public office for 
much of the political elite.204 Indeed, there does not appear to be any 
implementation strategy in place other than avoidance of the report’s 
recommendations.205 In all three countries, alleged perpetrators or 
parties affiliated with alleged perpetrators, either are currently in power 
or continue to have political influence. In the post-conflict countries, 
various actors have generally been able to obstruct or slow the pace of 
institutional reforms recommended by the commissions.206 The 
 
 199 In Ghana, the truth commission’s investigations mainly targeted members of the current 
ruling party (the NDC). Id. 
 200 Id.; Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 201 Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 202 See HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N FOR SIERRA LEONE, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS & UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED OFFICE IN SIERRA LEONE, REPORT ON THE 
CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE ON THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (2007) [hereinafter STATUS OF 
IMPLEMENTATION OF TRC-SL] (referring to a statement from the president that he would fully 
implement the TRC-SL’s recommendations). 
 203 Steinberg, supra note 80, at 143. 
 204 For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 261–62. 
 205 See Joint Resolution Suspending Action on TRC Report Signed into Law, EXECUTIVE 
MANSION (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.emansion.gov.lr/2press.php? news_id=1327. The 
Liberian government has indicated that it is reviewing the legal implications of implementing 
the TRC-L’s recommendations. See Ellen Presents TRC Recommendations Performance Report 
to Legislature, NEW DAWN LIBERIA (Mar. 18, 2010, 12:15), http://www.thenewdawnliberia.com/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=398:ellen-presents-trc-recommendations-
performance-report-to-legislature&catid=25:politics&Itemid=59. The slow pace of the review 
and consultations has raised questions about the government’s willingness to implement the 
recommendations at all. 
 206 The post-conflict governments delayed the establishment of the follow-up bodies to the 
commissions. In both Sierra Leone and Liberia, the truth commissions’ acts provided for the 
establishment of a formal body whose mandate focused on follow-up activities. See Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000 § 18 (Sierra Leone), available at http://www.usip.org/
sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/SeirraLeone-Charter.pdf; An Act to 
Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (June 10, 2005) art. X, § 46, 
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/473c6b3d2.html. The government of Sierra Leone 
did not create a follow up committee to facilitate the implementation of the commission’s 
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institutional independence and rigor necessary to carrying out reforms 
without directives from the governmental leaders is also lacking. In the 
post-conflict countries, this has been more pronounced because these 
institutions have less capacity to respond effectively and 
independently.207 The above factors combined with the lack of 
awareness about the commissions more generally have also limited the 
impact of the truth commissions. 
“[G]overnmental accountability to citizens” is another indicator of 
the strength of political institutions.208 Yet, the political institutions in 
all three countries have not been called to account for their lack of 
action in implementing the commissions’ recommendations because 
public awareness about the commissions and their reports, particularly 
in the post-conflict countries, is lacking.209 For example, a survey 
conducted in Liberia by the Human Rights Center at University of 
California, Berkeley revealed that while 73% reported awareness of the 
commission’s existence, over 90% stated they had “no (45%) or little 
(46%) knowledge of the TRC[-L],” with 32% of respondents “incapable 
 
recommendations as stipulated in the TRC-SL Act. Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 
106. The follow-up committee was to consist of representatives from the “Moral Guarantors” of 
Sierra Leone’s “Lome Peace Agreement.” Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000 
§ 18(1) (Sierra Leone). The Sierra Leonean government considers the Human Rights 
Commission for Sierra Leone (HRC-SL) to be the de facto follow-up committee. Interviews 
from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. This is problematic because “the government has not put in 
place measures to adequately resource the work of the Commission” for this task. STATUS OF 
IMPLEMENTATION OF TRC-SL, supra note 202, at 20. There is also the danger that the HRC-SL 
will become overwhelmed in meeting its other priorities and not be able to prioritize TRC-SL 
follow-up. Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. In Liberia, the government delayed 
establishing the follow-up body due to amendments to the TRC-L Act, as well as the 
legislature’s rejection of the executive’s nominees. See PAUL JAMES-ALLEN ET AL., BEYOND THE 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS IN LIBERIA 12 
(2010) [hereinafter BEYOND THE TRC-L]. Apparently, some legislators rejected the nominees to 
prevent any follow-up work on the TRC-L’s recommendations. Id. at 12 n.45. The government 
finally established the follow-up body in October 2010. Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
It has faced a number of operational and financial troubles, which inhibited its ability to serve 
as an effective follow-up mechanism. Id. In Ghana, the commission’s act did not provide for a 
formal follow-up mechanism. 
 207 See INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra note d (tbl.1), at 8. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Sixty-eight percent of the 102 victims interviewed by CDD-Ghana indicated that they 
were aware of the Commission’s existence before it started its hearings. CDD-GHANA, 
OPINIONS OF VICTIMS OF PAST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN GHANA AFTER THE NATIONAL 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION’S PUBLIC HEARINGS 9 (2006) [hereinafter CDD-GHANA, 
VICTIMS SURVEY], available at http://cddghana.org/publications/Other-Publications. Due to 
the purposive sampling used in selecting respondents and the limited sample size, I only rely on 
the findings from the survey as indicative of opinions of victims, but I do not generalize these 
findings. Thus, it is not clear how many Ghanaians in general understood the commission’s 
role or were aware of the NRC and its report. Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197. 
Additionally, many Liberian interviewees from my field research in rural areas were confused 
about the role of the TRC-L. Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
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of recalling any” of the commission’s recommendations.210 Similarly, 
89% of Sierra Leoneans surveyed by the BBC were aware of the TRC-SL, 
yet only 23% were aware of the content of the TRC-SL’s report and its 
recommendations.211 This has made implementation of the 
commissions’ institutional reforms recommendations haphazard 
because many officials in Sierra Leone lack adequate knowledge of the 
TRC-SL’s findings and recommendations.212 Some officials were not 
aware that, if they implemented a number of planned activities, it would 
fulfill one or more recommendations.213 A number of interviewees in 
Sierra Leone also pointed out the lackluster response of the international 
community in supporting the implementation of the commission’s 
recommendations and ensuring that the government of Sierra Leone 
acts.214 Many more interviewees in Sierra Leone expressed frustration 
with the government’s failure to act than did in Ghana.215 
Lack of awareness about the commissions’ reports has also meant a 
lack of adequate pressure to follow-up on the work of the commissions 
from civil society and victim groups. For example, in Ghana, staff from 
a prominent NGO remarked that “the reform needs are so many that it 
has been difficult to sustain focus on implementing recommendations, 
and efforts to get funding both internationally and domestically for 
post-NRC follow-up have gone nowhere.”216 In Sierra Leone, there are a 
few civil society groups advocating for TRC-SL-related follow-up.217 In 
Liberia, there is a coalition of civil society organizations that have been 
vocal in advocating for the implementation of the commission’s 
recommendations, but to no avail.218 Inadequate follow-up to the 
commissions’ recommendations may mean that the commissions’ 
reports are left gathering dust on the shelves. While follow-up has been 
lacking in all three countries, the import of this is likely more 
 
 210 See PATRICK VINCK ET AL., TALKING PEACE: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON 
ATTITUDES ABOUT SECURITY, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
IN LIBERIA 69–71 (2011) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., U.C. BERKELEY LIBERIA SURVEY], 
available at http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/59p3f3mn. Additionally, a survey conducted 
in 2012 indicated that 90% of those surveyed in Liberia had heard of the TRC-L. SCSL SURVEY, 
supra note 107, at 44 Annex 16. 
 211 INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, BBC WORLD SERV. TRUST, BUILDING A BETTER 
TOMORROW: A SURVEY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES TOWARD TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN 
SIERRA LEONE 25–26 (2008) [hereinafter BBC, SIERRA LEONE SURVEY]. 
 212 Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 213 See STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF TRC-SL, supra note 202, at 6. This information was 
corroborated in the interviews I conducted in Sierra Leone. Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra 
note 106.  
 214 Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 215 Compare Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197, with Interviews from Sierra Leone, 
supra note 106. 
 216 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197. 
 217 Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 218 See, e.g., Liberia Warned–Implement TRC’s Report and Recommendation Now to Ensure 
Peace, ALLAFRICA.COM (Nov. 14, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201211150667.html. 
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pronounced in post-conflict countries recovering from massively 
destructive civil wars, where reform or rebuilding needs are more 
pressing. It is unlikely that an “empty truth” (that is, a truth 
commission not followed by reform of abusive institutions) will forge 
the basis for rehabilitation, another important objective of the 
commissions.219 
In sum, this Part has shown how the limits of transplanting truth 
commissions become evident when these institutions are “copied and 
pasted” from post-authoritarian contexts with relatively well-
functioning institutions and expected to function similarly in post-
conflict contexts with significantly weaker or even non-existent 
institutions. Given the realities of operating a truth commission in a 
post-conflict context, we have seen how the Sierra Leonean and Liberian 
commissions struggled to fulfil their mandates due to weak security and 
political institutions. Yet, the Sierra Leonean commission outperformed 
the Liberian commission,220 even though they both operated in similar 
post-conflict societies. In Sierra Leone, since one transitional-justice 
mechanism was not solely responsible for carrying out complementary 
objectives and responsibility was somewhat diffused between the 
commission and the court, each mechanism bolstered the other’s 
ability.221 In contrast, Ghana’s commission functioned in a state with 
relatively strong key institutions in the security and political sectors, 
which influenced the commission’s relative success. In Ghana, the 
stronger security environment had a greater impact on the truth 
commission’s operations than on the strength of its political institutions 
because political will was generally lacking across all countries studied. 
As a point of comparison, South Africa ranked similarly to Ghana in the 
political and security spheres in the Index of State Weakness.222 The 
Liberian truth commission hewed the most closely to the South African 
model and, predictably, fared the worst of all three countries, in part 
because it did not have strong institutions to support its truth-telling 
process. Utilizing the same mechanism in drastically different 
circumstances and expecting similar results is unwise. Part III discusses 
how the lower levels of moral consensus surrounding violence in post-
conflict countries can thwart the effectiveness of truth commissions. 
 
 219 For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 281–85. 
 220 See id. at 258. 
 221 See id. at 239–41. 
 222 INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra note d (tbl.1), at 41. Ghana scored 8.44 according to 
its performance in security on a scale of one to ten, and South Africa scored 7.72. Id. 
Additionally, Ghana scored 7.02 on a scale of one to ten according to its performance in the 
political sphere, and South Africa scored 8.07. Id. 
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III.     LACK OF MORAL CONSENSUS SURROUNDING VIOLENCE LIMITS THE 
IMPACT OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
Moral consensus has been defined as shared moral values about 
“how [people] ought to act.”223 In other contexts, consensus is measured 
by examining “how close . . . opinions or preferences are.”224 Yet such 
measurements are rarely done following a conflict or the demise of an 
authoritarian regime. They would be incredibly difficult to undertake 
and the reliability of any exact figures would be inherently suspect. 
Following a conflict, the shared morality once held around issues such 
as murder or theft is generally unsettled.225 For our purposes, it is best to 
conceptualize moral consensus surrounding mass violence as the level 
of agreement or shared understanding of the nature and “justness” of 
violence, for example: Was it a civil war or was it genocide? Moral 
consensus about mass violence includes the level of agreement over 
historical responsibility: Which party bears responsibility for violence? 
Who was victimized? And who were the perpetrators?226 The significant 
numbers of those who have taken up arms combined with the incredible 
number of people victimized in massively destructive conflicts almost 
ensures that there will be much more moral dissensus about the nature 
of violence in post-conflict societies. However, in post-authoritarian 
societies, where the “truth” about abuses is generally not well known 
(because deception is central to the nature of the violations), and the 
numbers involved in the abuses are fewer, moral consensus about the 
nature of violence is generally easier to form. 
The varying levels of moral consensus surrounding mass violence 
in post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies are crucial because 
truth commissions are thought to provide a degree of moral sanction,227 
which occurs through the stigmatization that alleged perpetrators face 
when they are confronted by their victims and shunned by the rest of 
society. Expressive theories of punishment generally provide that a 
sanction is required to reverse the false message sent by the offender’s 
actions about the value of the victim relative to the offender.228 
 
 223 Tyler & Darley, supra note e (tbl.1), at 725, 733. 
 224 E.g., F. Chiclana et al., A Statistical Comparative Study of Different Similarity Measures of 
Consensus in Group Decision Making, 221 J. INFO. SCI. 110, 110 (2013). 
 225 See EMILE DURKHEIM, ON THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 108 (George Simpson Trans., 
Macmillan 1933) (1893) (discussing how crimes violate a society’s moral code and weaken those 
norms). 
 226 See RONEN STEINKE, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: GERMAN 
PERSPECTIVES FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE 11 (2012). 
 227 See HAYNER, supra note 3, at 29. 
 228 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of 
Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 47–48 (1996); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of 
Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 11–13 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992); see also Dan 
M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1641 (1998). 
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Expressive theorists view punishment as a form of moral 
communication used to express condemnation, revalidate a victim’s 
worth, and strengthen social solidarity.229 
Scholars and practitioners (to varying degrees) conceive of both 
trials and truth commissions as expressing the wrongfulness of past 
atrocities, communicating society’s condemnation of the conduct at 
issue, and creating social cohesion. Prosecutions can assist in producing 
moral consensus by incarcerating offenders, but they could also foster 
“feelings of bitterness,” “create scapegoats,” or “create a perception that 
the trial represents victor’s justice.”230 Truth commissions, on the other 
hand, predominantly rely on shaming as a moral sanction.231 However, 
shame is most effective when “the moral code is both pervasive and 
emphatic in its repudiation of the wrongs done.”232 Where a moral 
consensus about the nature of violence is deeply fractured, which is 
typical of post-conflict countries, shaming is not likely to be an effective 
form of punishment.233 Notably, moral dissensus is also likely to 
decrease over time when fewer partisans form part of the political 
community. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the United 
States civil war, there was much disagreement (at least among the ruling 
class) about the reasons for engaging in the war. Yet, today, there is 
much more consensus about the nature of violence. While there is 
unlikely to be total agreement about mass violence in any society, we 
can anticipate comparatively less moral consensus surrounding mass 
violence in a post-conflict context and more moral consensus about 
violence in a post-authoritarian context. 
The experiences of Liberia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone confirm this. 
For our purposes, it suffices to compare moral consensus in Ghana 
following authoritarian rule to moral consensus in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia following their conflicts. I discuss the moral consensus 
surrounding mass violence in the societies examined in this Article 
based on information from my field research and survey data from 
various sources. In particular, I focus on how competing understandings 
of mass violence affected the truth commissions’ ability to carry out 
 
 229 See, e.g., DURKHEIM, supra note 225; Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions 
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, 
Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 576 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010); Robert D. 
Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law 
Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 42–45, 69–71 
(2007). 
 230 Aukerman, supra note 188, at 76. 
 231 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 767 (discussing how one of the main purposes 
of truth commissions is to expose perpetrators and collaborators “to public outrage”). 
 232 DALY & SARKIN, supra note 23, at 144. 
 233 See TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 63 (noting that exchanges between alleged 
perpetrators and victims were “limited and did not occur frequently”). 
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some of their central objectives: promoting truth-telling and 
establishing an accurate historical record. This Part illustrates how the 
varying levels of moral consensus in post-conflict countries limited the 
truth commissions’ ability to promote the truth and establish an 
accurate historical record, and how the combination of court and 
commission buttressed those efforts in Sierra Leone. 
A.     Lack of Moral Consensus as an Impediment to Truth-Telling 
“Truth” in a transitional context can be understood as “people’s 
understandings of what occurred during periods of mass violence.”234 
Where the society in which truth is promoted shares a common moral 
consensus about the events investigated by the commission, promoting 
truth-telling will fit “comfortably within that pre-existing narrative.”235 
Accordingly, the commissions in post-conflict societies should fare 
much worse in their efforts to promote truth-telling. The experiences of 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana confirm this. 
During the public hearings, most of the commissions used their 
compulsory powers sparingly and relied mainly on moral suasion to get 
alleged perpetrators to appear before them.236 Due to the higher degree 
of moral consensus about mass violence in post-authoritarian societies, 
truth commissions in such countries will be able to rely on moral 
suasion more effectively. For example, in Ghana, the NRC published 
names of alleged perpetrators with a warning that, if they failed to 
respond, they risked the commission making findings of liability against 
them.237 The NRC’s “naming and shaming” of alleged perpetrators led 
to approximately eighty of them coming forward to rebut allegations.238 
Significantly, 60% of the victims surveyed by CDD-Ghana reported that 
they “believed the NRC obtained truthful confessions from abusers.”239 
Ghana’s experience indicates that in post-authoritarian societies, truth 
commissions may be better placed to promote truth-telling due to the 
comparatively easier task of marshalling moral sanction. The indemnity 
provision in Ghana’s Constitution likely also influenced alleged 
perpetrators to be more forthcoming when they appeared before the 
commission. Ghana’s experience is in some ways akin to that of South 
 
 234 Clark, supra note 139, at 203; see also DALY & SARKIN, supra note 23, at 147–48 
(discussing the impossibility of ever recounting the “truth” accurately and the need for truth-
telling in “multiple dimensions”). 
 235 DALY & SARKIN, supra note 23, at 145. 
 236 See Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 268–70. 
 237 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197. 
 238 See NAHLA VALJI, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, GHANA’S NATIONAL 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 13 (2006). 
 239 CDD-GHANA, VICTIMS SURVEY, supra note 209, at 22 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
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Africa, where the commission was able to use the prospect of amnesty to 
get alleged perpetrators to participate more in the truth-telling process. 
However, even if alleged perpetrators participate in greater numbers in 
authoritarian contexts, this does not mean that they will necessarily be 
more contrite.240 
Even so, Liberia’s experience indicates that truth commissions will 
be much less effective in post-conflict contexts. The TRC-L also relied 
on its powers of “moral suasion” and encouraged voluntary 
compliance.241 It published a list of individuals whom it urged to 
respond to allegations levied against them by victims of the civil war.242 
Yet, only thirty-three alleged perpetrators ultimately appeared before 
the TRC-L in response to this “naming and shaming.”243 This is so, 
despite the larger number of perpetrators in Liberia when compared to 
Ghana.  
In Liberia, many alleged perpetrators had a common 
understanding about mass violence. The DDR process, which gave 
benefits to ex-combatants, may also have bolstered a culture of 
“perpetratorhood” by seemingly sanctioning actions taken during the 
conflict.244 When alleged perpetrators appeared before the commission, 
their understandings of mass violence were on full display. One 
interviewee noted, “Liberians were promised ‘truth,’ but the nation is 
obligated to listen to lies.”245 For example, during his testimony, a 
former rebel leader who was responsible for the indiscriminate shelling 
of Monrovia asked the commission to create a monument in his honor 
for his efforts to “liberate” Liberians.246 The audience reacted violently, 
and the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia had to ensure 
calm.247 In contrast, in Ghana many more interviewees noted that the 
 
 240 See, e.g., VALJI, supra note 238, at 13. 
 241 TRC Public Bulletin No. 07 Policy Paper on Warrants and Compulsory Processes the TRC 
Will Sparingly Employ the Use of Subpeona, Warrants and Other Compulsory Processes as a 
Matter of Last Resort, TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION LIBERIA (Mar. 31, 2008), 
http://trcofliberia.org/press_releases/161. 
 242 See List of Perpetrators or Alleged Perpetrators Needed by the TRC to Respond to Various 
Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, TRUTH & RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION LIBERIA (Nov. 30, 2008), http://trcofliberia.org/press_releases/63; see also James 
Kpargoi, Jr., TRC Publishes List of Alleged Perpetrators and Persons of Interest, LIBERIAN J. 
(Nov. 30, 2008), http://theliberianjournal.com/index.php? st=news&sbst=details&rid=685. 
 243 See TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 202. “All [the] heads of [the] former warring 
factions appeared [before the commission] except [for] former president Charles Taylor . . . .” 
Id. at 190; see also Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197; Interviews from Liberia, supra note 
126; Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 244 For further discussion, see infra Part IV.C. 
 245 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
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hearings helped to “reduce tensions beneath the surface” and “lay the 
foundations for peace.”248 
Further, in Liberia many of those who appeared before the 
commission did not show remorse. Unlike South Africa and Sierra 
Leone, a credible threat of prosecutions did not exist in Liberia, which 
undoubtedly influenced the actions of alleged perpetrators before the 
truth commission. When they appeared, they vindicated their actions 
and engaged in political posturing and grandstanding.249 One 
interviewee noted, “it started as enjoyable theater, but now it is just 
despicable.”250 The Chair’s response was: 
[The] TRC[-L] is not about impeaching, disgracing, or exposing a 
witness more than they have already done. It is not a place to compel 
a witness to admit to wrong . . . . The TRC has created a forum for 
people to speak their minds and made to be accountable for what 
they have done . . . . An appearance before the TRC is an opportunity 
for self-redemption . . . . People have lived with their perceptions for 
years.251 
The failure to interrogate alleged perpetrators and the “neutral” 
approach adopted by the commission may have served to legitimate the 
views of revisionists or apologists. Since the TRC-L had determined not 
to create a forum for victims to confront their perpetrators,252 alleged 
perpetrators did not have to endure the “shame” of facing their victims. 
However, truth commissions in many ways depend on the morality play 
in which victims confront alleged perpetrators. Truth commissions need 
the “victim” and “perpetrator” to play their assigned roles, yet this is 
incredibly difficult to do in post-conflict contexts where moral dissensus 
on the nature of violence is so high. Thus, in Liberia alleged perpetrators 
were able to “isolate themselves . . . within their . . . closed communities” 
and avoid stigmatization.253 A number of alleged perpetrators even 
demonstrated disregard for the TRC-L commissioners, at times 
insulting them by referring to them as “little boy[s]” or “pekin.”254 
The conduct of alleged perpetrators at the hearings in Liberia led to 
heightened calls for retribution. One Liberian interviewee observed that 
Alleged perpetrators came to tell stories [before the TRC-L] and 
the[se] guys are deliberately lying and are using the TRC[-L] as a 
place to praise themselves. They show no regret, [they] just boast 
 
 248 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197. 
 249 Steinberg, supra note 80, at 140. 
 250 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
 251 Id. 
 252 See TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 63. 
 253 DALY & SARKIN, supra note 23, at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 254 Steinberg, supra note 80, at 140 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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about [their] roles and acts committed, acting as if it is good. The 
town and country is ablaze and wanting prosecution[s].255 
A number of interviewees during my field research echoed this 
sentiment; although they had previously supported the TRC-L, the 
behaviour of alleged perpetrators during the public hearings led them to 
prefer a more punitive approach.256 Others also called for adopting a 
more explicitly retributive approach, arguing that “there can be no 
reconciliation without justice.”257 Liberia’s experience may indicate that 
in post-conflict countries where moral consensus on the nature of 
abuses is contested or legitimated as “necessary,” moral sanction will be 
much more difficult to form, and shame will be viewed as an insufficient 
punishment. In these contexts, it is unlikely that the social opprobrium 
faced by alleged perpetrators will be enough; the inability of truth 
commissions to provide much more will leave a huge gap between 
expectations and reality. 
In Liberia, the inadequacy of the moral consensus surrounding 
mass violence is compounded by the fact that “almost everybody who 
prosecuted the war has done so well [materially] from the peace . . . .”258 
The perception is that alleged perpetrators have not faced any cost, 
social, political, moral, or otherwise. In its final report, the TRC-L 
named thirty-eight individuals whom it found to be responsible for 
committing “gross human rights violations” and recommended that 
these individuals not be prosecuted because they “cooperated with the 
TRC process, admitted to the crimes committed . . . and expressed 
remorse . . . .”259 The TRC-L Act expressly prohibits the grant of 
amnesty for such crimes.260 The list of those granted amnesty includes 
notorious individuals like Joshua Blahyi, or “General Butt Naked,”261 
 
 255 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Catholic Church Wants War Crimes Tribunal After TRC . . . As Lutheran Massacre 
Commemoration Begins, TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION LIBERIA (July 16, 2008), 
http://trcofliberia.org/press_releases/132. In 2006, a group called the Forum for the 
Establishment of a War Crimes Court in Liberia collected signatures, filed a petition to the 
National Legislature, and attempted to submit it to then U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. 
Liberia: Youth Petition for War Crimes court, IRIN (Apr. 11, 2006), http://www.irinnews.org/
report/58721/liberia-youths-petition-for-war-crimes-court; Interviews from Liberia, supra note 
126. The Forum is one of the main groups publicly advocating for prosecutions, particularly of 
President Sirleaf, Liberia’s current president, and authorities have continually harassed and 
arrested its leaders. Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. Popular opinion variously holds 
that Taylor’s cronies seeking revenge, or supporters of the main opposition party, sponsor the 
group in order to undermine the current government. Id. 
 258 Steinberg, supra note 80, at 140. 
 259 TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 353. 
 260 An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (June 10, 2005) 
art. VII, § 26(g), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/473c6b3d2.html. 
 261 See Steinberg, supra note 80, at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted). Blahyi once led 
the “Butt Naked Brigade” of child soldiers for one of the warring factions who reportedly 
believed that their nudity protected them from bullets. Truth and Justice on Trial in Liberia, 
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who stated before the commission that he was responsible for the killing 
of 20,000 people.262 In Liberia, there was never a formal truth-for-
amnesty process as there was in South Africa, where individuals applied 
for amnesty and disclosed the “truth” to their victims and the rest of 
society publicly. In contrast, there has been no such transparency 
around the amnesty process in Liberia—with no public hearings 
concerning amnesty applications, any record of whether the 
commission received such applications under its stated amnesty 
policy,263 or opportunity for victims and others to weigh in on the 
appropriateness of granting amnesty. The lack of procedural fairness in 
Liberia’s process as well as the limited voice of victims in the amnesty 
process also distinguishes the TRC-L’s granting of amnesty from the 
SATRC’s. Moreover, the final report does not specify how the 
commission reached its determinations of sufficient “truth” and 
“remorse” to make such recommendations. Unsurprisingly, perceptions 
about the ability of the Liberian commission to promote the truth are 
significantly lower when compared to the other commissions.264 
Comparatively, there has been much less contestation about the 
ability of the truth commission in Sierra Leone to promote the truth.265 
For example, the BBC Sierra Leone Survey found that 69% of 
respondents thought the TRC-SL had contributed to the “truth,”266 
despite the polarized nature of post-conflict Sierra Leone.267 The 
 
supra note 18, at 459. He has since established a local church in Liberia and published a book 
regarding his transformation. 
 262 Steinberg, supra note 80, at 142. 
 263 See, e.g., TRC Public Bulletin No. 06 Policy Paper on Application for Amnesty May Be 
Done in Writing Within a Limited Period Specified by the TRC, TRUTH & RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION LIBERIA (Mar. 31, 2008), http://trcofliberia.org/press_releases/162. 
 264 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., U.C. BERKELEY LIBERIA SURVEY, supra note 210, at 70 
(“[D]espite the work of the TRC[-L], just 44% [of respondents] believed that the truth about 
the civil war is known.”). For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra 
note 26, at 247–48. 
 265 Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. Some interviewees noted, “[p]eople went 
before the commission telling lies.” Id. 
 266 BBC, SIERRA LEONE SURVEY, supra note 211, at 32 (results were limited to those 
respondents who scored “excellent” or “good” on awareness of the TRC-SL). But see Amadu 
Sesay, Does One Size Fit All?: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Revisited 
7–8, 39 (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Discussion Paper No. 36, 2007) [hereinafter Sesay, Freetown 
Survey], available at http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:240853/FULLTEXT01.pdf 
(finding that 46.1% of respondents believed that the truth was told during the TRC-SL’s 
proceedings in a semi-structured survey that was supplemented by focus group discussions and 
was limited to residents of Freetown, Sierra Leone). One possible explanation for the variance is 
the distinction between the TRC-SL’s contributing to the “truth” and various actors telling the 
“truth” during the TRC-SL’s proceedings. In addition, the sample size was much smaller than 
the nationally representative sample used by the BBC in Sierra Leone. 
 267 See SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107, at 22. The SCSL SURVEY indicates that, when Sierra 
Leonean and Liberian respondents were queried about “how the truth can be established,” the 
most common responses were “[i]nquiry by a judicial system” (49.58%), as opposed to 
“[l]et[ting] people talk freely” (35.02%) or through a “truth commission” (27.17%). Id. 
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existence of the SCSL may also have limited the space for alleged 
perpetrators to contest the narrative surrounding mass violence; 
whereas in Liberia, there was no such check. Additionally, the 
commission in Sierra Leone did not have to rely mainly on moral 
suasion and moral sanction to encourage compliance. One institution 
was able to serve as a carrot and the other the stick—with the existence 
of the court emboldening the truth commission. For example, when 
several key role players did not appear, the TRC-SL issued subpoenas 
against five serving ministers and leaders of government institutions.268 
Yet, few alleged perpetrators ultimately testified before the commission 
in Sierra Leone because they feared that the SCSL would use the 
evidence against them.269 Some interviewees believed there was a tunnel 
between the two institutions where an appearance before the truth 
commission might literally result in an appearance before the court.270 
Despite the SCSL discouraging some perpetrators for participating in 
the truth-telling process, because both mechanisms were attempting to 
deal with issues of impunity, the concurrent operation of the two 
mechanisms increased the perception that justice was being done.271 
Most of the other commissions did not operate in a context where the 
incentives of alleged perpetrators were shaped by the threat of 
prosecution. In South Africa, prosecutorial justice and the truth 
commission also reinforced each other because “[f]ew would have 
applied for amnesty if not faced with the threat of prosecution.”272 In 
South Africa, the few trials of apartheid-era leaders encouraged a 
number of perpetrators to apply for amnesty. Even still, members of the 
three major political parties in South Africa were reluctant “to cooperate 
fully with the [SA]TRC’s truth recovery efforts.”273 Where multiple 
transitional justice mechanisms are engaged in truth-seeking, it is more 
likely that both institutions’ perceived ability to promote the truth will 
be higher. The converse is evidenced in Liberia where the truth 
commission operated without a court or credible threat of prosecution 
and relied mainly on moral suasion and sanction. In post-conflict 
contexts, the ability of truth commissions to rely on these moral forms 
of encouraging compliance will be limited because of the lower levels of 
moral consensus surrounding violence. Part III.B discusses how lower 
 
 268 See 1 TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 163, at 97. 
 269 Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 270 Id. 
 271 For example, a majority (57%) of respondents surveyed by the BBC believed that the 
TRC-SL had contributed to “justice.” BBC, SIERRA LEONE SURVEY, supra note 211, at 34 (results 
were limited to those respondents who scored “excellent” or “good” on awareness of the TRC-
SL). For more details, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 269–70. 
 272 Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the 
International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 209 (2000). 
 273 van der Merwe & Chapman, supra note 163, at 241, 246. Accordingly, “most survivors 
doubted that the TRC had succeeded in establishing ‘the truth.’” Id. at 248. 
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levels of moral consensus surrounding mass violence can also limit the 
impact of truth commissions’ efforts to establish an accurate historical 
record in post-conflict societies. 
B.     Lower Moral Consensus as an Impediment to Establishing an 
Accurate Historical Record 
While the “truth” is always subject to interpretation and 
manipulation, in the context of previously warring parties, the difficulty 
of finding consensus is particularly acute.274 The experiences of Ghana, 
Sierra Leone, and Liberia indicate that moral consensus around mass 
violence is unlikely to be uniform in post-conflict or post-authoritarian 
societies, but that in post-conflict societies the divergence will be much 
more pronounced. For example, in Ghana, after the NRC submitted its 
report to the President, it was leaked to the media prior to the 2004 
elections.275 The NDC perceived this as a partisan attempt to influence 
the outcome, and some NDC members denounced the report as being 
an “NPP-version of history.”276 In Liberia, the TRC-L released its final 
report on June 30, 2009,277 with one commissioner dissenting278 and 
another publicly distancing himself from it.279 In some ways, the failure 
of the TRC-L to rally around its report was predictable given the pre-
existing divisions in the Commission.280 Following the release of the 
TRC-L’s report, some of the leaders of warring factions held a press 
 
 274 See DALY & SARKIN, supra note 23, at 140–41. 
 275 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197. 
 276 Id. 
 277 The commissioners disagreed on the necessity of producing a report by the deadline set 
by the International Contact Group for Liberia. Id. The TRC-L submitted its “Preliminary 
Findings and Determinations” to the National Legislature on December 19, 2008. See REPUBLIC 
OF LIBERIA TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND 
DETERMINATIONS 81 (2008), available at http://trcofliberia.org/resources/reports/final/volume-
one_layout-1.pdf. The Vice Chair, joined by three other commissioners, subsequently denied 
knowledge of the report in writing and urged that it be withdrawn. Interviews from Liberia, 
supra note 126. The defecting commissioners argued that the Chair (supported by three other 
commissioners) did not have the authority to submit what was essentially a report in draft form 
to the Legislature and the President. Id.  
 278 See DISSENTING/REPORT OF COUNCILOR PEARL BROWN BULL COMMISSIONER, TO THE 
FINAL REPORT VOLUME 1, CONSOLIDATED REPORT VOLUME II OF THE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF LIBERIA (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 279 The commissioner who distanced himself was Sheikh Kafumba Konneh, who had not 
participated in the drafting of the report. See TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 325 
(noting that Commissioner Konneh gave “the impression that he had nothing to do with the 
entire work of the Commission over the last three years”). 
 280 For further discussion of the internal divisions within the commission, see Sirleaf, 
Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 257–58. Incredibly, in the final report of the 
TRC-L, it apologized for its various shortcomings and sought to reassure the public “that the 
report [was] objective and comprehensive.” See TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 267–68. 
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conference. They intimated that implementing the report (which 
recommended prosecution and debarment from public office for a 
number of those who convened the press conference) would lead to 
further instability in Liberia.281 Reportedly, two commissioners from the 
TRC-L had to go into hiding after receiving death threats.282 While there 
were strong reactions to the commissions’ reports in both Ghana and 
Liberia, the response was much more pronounced in Liberia, and with 
potentially more dangerous consequences. Additionally, in Liberia, the 
commission itself was unable to reach consensus on what constituted an 
accurate historical record, one of its key mandates.283 
To be clear, all of the commissions’ reports resulted in important 
disclosures and helped to establish a more accurate historical record.284 
For example, if not for the intervention of the commission in Ghana, 
many would not know the magnitude of violations, since they were 
generally concealed from the public. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, in 
contrast, human rights violations were committed openly, and there was 
much less emphasis on recovering hidden truths.285 The affected 
societies were well aware of the scale of abuses committed during the 
wars and had lived through them. Following the end of the conflicts 
however, there were multiple competing truths. In Sierra Leone, the 
commission helped to dispel the myth that only the RUF committed 
gross atrocities and exposed the extent of the violations carried out by 
the CDF and government forces. The TRC-SL also helped to guard 
against revisionists’ accounts. In Liberia, the commission also dispelled 
some myths about massacres286 and documented a number of mass 
graves.287 The variation among the countries’ experiences is largely 
explained by the different contexts. In Sierra Leone, the perceived 
contributions to establishing the truth of both the SCSL and the TRC-SL 
were mutually reinforcing.288 Since both mechanisms were attempting 
to establish various levels of “truth”—judicial (the SCSL) and historical 
 
 281 BEYOND THE TRC-L, supra note 206, at 10. 
 282 Steinberg, supra note 80, at 135. 
 283 For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 247–48. 
 284 Id. at 248–49. 
 285  Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; see also George Wachira & Prisca Kamungi, 
NPI-Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and Transitional Justice in Africa: Lessons 
and Implications for Kenya (Background Paper) 11 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) (so noting regarding Sierra Leone). 
 286 See, e.g., Truth and Justice on Trial in Liberia, supra note 18, at 460–61. 
 287 See TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 244–54. The TRC-L collected voluminous 
material from the United States and other governments documenting human rights violations 
during the Liberian conflict, and the final report catalogues some of these human rights 
violations. See id. at 216–43. 
 288 The BBC’s survey revealed that 56% of respondents believe that the TRC-SL has provided 
“an accurate account of what happened during the conflict in Sierra Leone.” BBC, SIERRA 
LEONE SURVEY, supra note 211, at 35. For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & 
Punishment, supra note 26, at 254. 
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(the TRC-SL)—and because responsibility was diffused between the 
institutions, the combination of court and commission were more 
effective at establishing stated objectives.289 While, at times, the court 
and commission in Sierra Leone acted at cross-purposes,290 the 
combination of the two mechanisms was more effective than the 
commission operating alone in Liberia.291 In Ghana, the truth 
commission was able to reveal the nature and scale of abuses committed 
under authoritarian regimes as was the case in South Africa, which 
meant, “previously hidden and silenced issues could now be debated, 
contextualized to some degree and dissected.”292 Additionally, in Ghana, 
the commission operated in a post-authoritarian context, with fewer 
alleged perpetrators to threaten its authoritative version of history. 
Recent survey results in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Liberia provide 
some indication of how mass violence is currently understood. In 
Liberia, 83% of those surveyed by the Afrobarometer indicated they 
would never “[u]se[] force or violence for a political cause”293 and 82% 
agreed that “[t]he use of violence is never justified in Liberia[n] politics 
today.”294 Only 19% believed that “competition between political parties 
[never] lead[s] to violen[ce]” in Liberia.295 In Sierra Leone, 86% of those 
surveyed by the Afrobarometer indicated they would never use “force or 
violence for a political cause”296 and 73% agreed that “[t]he use of 
violence is never justified in Sierra Leonean politics today.”297 Less 
heartening was the finding that only 4% believed that “competition 
between political parties [never] lead[s] to violen[ce]” in Sierra Leone.298 
 
 289 For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 9–10, 
254. 
 290 For further discussion, see generally Matiangai Sirleaf, Regional Approach to Transitional 
Justice? Examining the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth & Reconciliation 
Commission for Liberia, 21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 209 (2009) [hereinafter Sirleaf, Regional Approach to 
Transitional Justice?]. 
 291 For further discussion, see generally Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26. 
 292 BRANDON HAMBER, TRANSFORMING SOCIETIES AFTER POLITICAL VIOLENCE: TRUTH, 
RECONCILIATION, AND MENTAL HEALTH 147 (2009). 
 293 AFROBAROMETER, SUMMARY OF RESULTS: ROUND 4 AFROBAROMETER SURVEY IN LIBERIA: 
A COMPARATIVE SERIES OF NATIONAL PUBLIC ATTITUDE SURVEYS ON DEMOCRACY, MARKETS 
AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN AFRICA 10 (2008) [hereinafter AFROBAROMETER, LIBERIA RESULTS], 
available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/summary_results/lib_r4_sor.pdf. In 
Liberia, “the Afrobarometer surveyed a nationally representative . . . sample of 1200 adult 
[citizens]” between December 8 and 21, 2008. Id. at 2. 
 294 Id. at 16. 
 295 Id. 
 296 AFROBAROMETER, SUMMARY OF RESULTS: AFROBAROMETER ROUND 5 SURVEY IN SIERRA 
LEONE, 2012: A COMPARATIVE SERIES OF NATIONAL PUBLIC ATTITUDE SURVEYS ON 
DEMOCRACY, MARKETS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN AFRICA 13 (2012), available at 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/summary_results/srl_r5_sor.pdf. In Sierra 
Leone, “the Afrobarometer surveyed a nationally representative . . . sample of 1200 adult 
[citizens]” between June 23 and July 18, 2012. Id. at 2. 
 297 Id. at 43. 
 298 Id. at 23. 
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In contrast, in Ghana the results are much more encouraging, with 93% 
of those surveyed by the Afrobarometer indicating they would never 
“[u]se[] force or violence for a political cause”299 and 84% agreeing that 
“[t]he use of violence is never justified in Ghanaian politics today.”300 
Significantly, only 18% believed that “competition between political 
parties [never] lead[s] to violen[ce]” in Ghana.301 Ghana’s experience 
indicates that in post-authoritarian societies, a shared moral consensus 
about violence may be easier to form once knowledge about the scale 
and nature of abuses becomes widespread. Consider the case of South 
Africa, where agreement on the wrongfulness of the system of apartheid 
is so robust that it is now considered a crime against humanity.302 While 
there are undoubtedly elements that still view apartheid and actions 
taken by the apartheid government as legitimate or necessary for state 
security,303 these individuals are at the periphery. While there are no real 
measurements of moral consensus about the nature of the violence in 
the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia or during the various periods of 
authoritarian rule in Ghana, my field research and survey data from 
various sources indicate that moral consensus is lower in the post-
conflict countries. As Aukerman eloquently put it, “[a] society cannot be 
cured of a condition it does not regard as a disease.”304 Overall, the 
analysis above indicates that truth commissions can have much more 
meaningful roles promoting and establishing the truth in post-
 
 299 AFROBAROMETER, SUMMARY OF RESULTS: AFROBAROMETER ROUND 5 SURVEY IN GHANA, 
2012, at 15 (2012) [hereinafter AFROBAROMETER, GHANA RESULTS], available at 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/summary_results/gha_r5_sor.pdf. In Ghana, 
“the Afrobarometer surveyed a nationally representative . . . sample of 2,400 adult [citizens]” 
between May 8 and 27, 2012. See id. at 2. 
 300 Id. at 49. 
 301 Id. at 25. 
 302 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1)(j), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid, art. I, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, 
U.N. Doc. A/9030, at 75 (Nov. 30, 1973); GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID, supra note 18, at 
342 (“[N]early all South Africans reject the lawless means by which the apartheid state sought 
to maintain its position of political power.”); TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, 5 TRUTH 
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 212 (1998), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume5.pdf; van der Merwe & Chapman, 
supra note 163, at 253 (discussing how “[t]he overwhelming majority of . . . a national[ly] 
representative survey conducted” in South Africa in 2000 and 2001 believed “that apartheid 
was a crime against humanity”). 
 303 See, e.g., GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID, supra note 18, at 66, 335 (noting that 
“nostalgia about the old system is more commonplace than expected” among whites, but that 
“[w]hites cannot believe today that their apartheid state committed no atrocities against 
blacks”); HAMBER, supra note 292, at 158 (noting that “survey data indicat[ing] that 68% of 
whites agree[d] that apartheid was a ‘crime against humanity,’” “which is presumably more 
than did so during the apartheid [regime]”); Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 19, at 588 
(noting that “individual and group rationalizations for an alternative interpretation of the past” 
will always persist because it is unlikely that “everyone will accept the facts as stated”). 
 304 See Aukerman, supra note 188, at 76. 
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authoritarian societies as compared to post-conflict societies because the 
narratives put forward are less likely to face resistance. Part IV discusses 
how the larger size of the victim and perpetrator classes in post-conflict 
countries also inhibits the effectiveness of their truth commissions. 
IV.     SIZE MATTERS 
In the context of mass atrocity, determining who is a “victim” and 
who is a “perpetrator” is an immensely complicated task. The U.N. 
defines “victims” as “persons who, individually or collectively, have 
suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, 
economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, 
through acts or omissions that are in violation of the criminal laws 
operative within Member States . . . .”305 The U.N.’s definition of victim 
is quite broad, covering “the immediate family or dependents of the 
direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to 
assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization.”306 The 
“perpetrator,” in contrast, is the person or individuals who committed 
the harm described above, whether “identified, apprehended, 
prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship 
between the perpetrator and the victim.”307 The overly simplistic 
designations of “victim” and “perpetrator” do not adequately capture 
the experience of many victims who also committed war crimes or 
human rights violations.308 The term “victim” is perceived as deeply 
problematic due to its gendered origin—conjuring images of the 
helpless female.309 In a transitional context, being classified as a victim 
or a perpetrator is often accompanied by material consequences. 
Classifying who is a “victim/survivor” and who is a “perpetrator” under 
 
 305 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. 
Res. 40/34, Annex ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34/Annex (Nov. 29, 1985). While the U.N.’s 
definition is limited to criminal law, we can easily conceive of experiences of victimization 
covered by other bodies of law. 
 306 Id. Annex ¶ 2. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Similarly, in the criminal justice context, some may consider the term “victim” to be 
equally applicable to the complaining witness or the defendant. See SANDRA WALKLATE, 
IMAGINING THE VICTIM OF CRIME 27 (2007); see also Engstrom, supra note 20, at 45. For further 
discussion, see generally MAMDANI, supra note a (tbl.1) (discussing how so many ordinary 
Rwandans perpetrated horrific crimes). 
 309 See WALKLATE, supra note 308, at 27. For this reason, many in, and out of, the feminist 
movement have adopted the term “survivor” to demonstrate resistance to powerlessness, and 
not to define individuals by an experience of victimization. See id. However, it is possible to be 
a passive or active “survivor” or “victim,” making the distinctions drawn between “survivors” 
and “victims” somewhat nonsensical. See id. Moreover, I consciously uses the term “victim” to 
reject the notion that being a victim or being victimized is something that is inherently bad, as 
doing otherwise blames the victim for her experience, makes her shameful for someone else’s 
actions, or forces her to display strength at times when she may not wish or be able to. 
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these circumstances may very well be inherently arbitrary. Recognizing 
the complexities involved,310 I do not attempt to draw bright lines 
between alleged perpetrators and victims and recognize that there are 
infinite shades of gray between the two groups.311 
For our purposes, it is only necessary to consider the relative size of 
the class of victims and perpetrators in post-conflict countries compared 
to class size in post-authoritarian countries. It is particularly important 
to think about approximate proportions of the overall population 
victimized or identifying as perpetrators. In Liberia (and less so in Sierra 
Leone), where the truth commissions operated with significantly larger 
victim and perpetrator classes, we would anticipate that the post-conflict 
commissions would face more challenges carrying out their mandates. 
The more numerous the victims and perpetrators in post-conflict 
contexts, the greater the demands and expectations that will be placed 
on the truth commissions to respond to victims’ priorities, while at the 
same time balancing the interests of perpetrators. The experiences of 
Liberia and Sierra Leone indicate that truth commissions acting alone 
will generally not be able to do both. 
In Table 3 below, I provide a comparative summary of the rough 
approximations of the victim and perpetrator classes in each country for 




Country Victim Class 
(approximate percent of population) 
Perpetrator Class (approximate 
percent of population) 
Liberia 8% 3.3.% 
Sierra Leone 1.2% 1.8% 
South Africa 0.08% 0.01% 
Ghana 0.04% N/A 
 
                                                          
 a For further discussion of the rough approximations contained in this table, see supra 
note a (tbl.1). Recall that to estimate the size of victim classes I used loss of life as a proxy for 
victimization in most of the countries in this study; however, this should not be taken as an 
indication that loss of life is the only experience of victimization that matters. It is a rough 
proxy and an imperfect measure of victimization. No percentage for perpetrators in Ghana is 
included in the table because of a lack of reliable estimates. The chart nonetheless provides us 
with some indicia of the comparative size of the victim and perpetrator classes. It also 
corresponds with data from the truth commissions regarding the relative sizes of the victim and 
 
 310 Recognizing these complexities, the TRC-SL determined not to make a distinction 
between ex-combatants and victims for the purposes of reparations, but attempted to limit the 
ability of victims to benefit from both the DDR programs and the reparations program. See 2 
TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 196, at 245. 
 311 For further discussion, see DALY & SARKIN, supra note 23, at 171–72 (discussing the 
“gradations of culpability” between victims and perpetrators and the difficulty in trying to draw 
boundaries between the two groups). 
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perpetrator classes. See discussion supra note a (tbl.1); discussion infra notes 329–334 and 
accompanying text. 
 
Notably, the governments created a number of the commissions 
explicitly to respond to the needs of victims.312 This Part discusses the 
truth commissions’ attempts to respond to some of the demands of 
victims, including redress and rehabilitation. This Part also explores 
how the truth commissions balanced some of the interests of 
perpetrators: having their narratives and reasons for carrying out the 
conflict vindicated, having their material well-being unaltered, and 
shielding themselves from punishment. It illustrates how the relative 
size of the victim and perpetrator classes after the conflict in Liberia, in 
particular, limited the impact of its truth commission. It also highlights 
how the combination of the court and commission helped the 
transitional institutions in Sierra Leone to achieve a better balance of the 
demands of both groups. 
A.     Numerous Victims and Perpetrators Create Challenges for 
Acknowledgment 
Truth commissions purportedly satisfy the “need of some victims 
to tell their stories and be listened to.”313 This form of acknowledgment 
is central to the truth commissions’ efforts to “restore dignity to 
victims,” one of their central objectives.314 A common criticism of the 
commissions was the lack of follow-up with victims who provided 
statements. For example, in Sierra Leone, a number of interviewees 
expressed frustration with the process, with one explaining, “Five years 
afterward people don’t know what the outcome is of [the] statement 
given.”315 In Liberia, statement givers criticized the process for “opening 
the wound,” and then “not coming back to say anything.”316 A case in 
point is an interviewee in Liberia who explained how a statement taker 
came to town to talk about a massacre that had occurred. The 
interviewee noted, “[a]fter the TRC came here, we haven’t gotten any 
 
 312 See, e.g., The National Reconciliation Commission Act, 2002 § 20(2)(d) (Ghana), 
available at http://www.ghanareview.com/reconact.html (noting that the commission should 
“recommend the appropriate response to the specific needs of each victim or group of victims” 
in its report); Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000 § 6(1) (Sierra Leone), 
available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/
SeirraLeone-Charter.pdf (noting that a function of the commission was “to respond to the 
needs of the victims”). 
 313 HAYNER, supra note 3, at 135. 
 314 See supra Table 1. For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra 
note 26, at 241–44. 
 315 Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 316 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
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result. We asked the TRC to give us help and we haven’t heard from 
them . . . . We don’t have the contact information for those that came 
[and] haven’t gotten any information from them.”317 Similarly, the 
CDD-Ghana Victims Survey found that the NRC’s investigators had 
contacted only 32% of the 102 victims surveyed.318 Additionally in South 
Africa, “[i]t is estimated . . . that . . . over 90% of people . . . were not 
provided with new or meaningful information.”319 Many “came to the 
commission so that their suffering would be acknowledged” or because 
they assumed that the commission “would validate their memories and 
roles” or that “they would be able to achieve closure.”320 
The commissions in Liberia and Sierra Leone faced far greater 
challenges than Ghana in their attempts to “restore dignity to victims.” 
My field research indicates that, without adequate follow-up, victims 
were left feeling empty, without a clear sense of what happened to their 
statements, whether the commission was investigating the violations 
they reported, whether missing loved ones were being identified, and so 
forth.321 These sentiments were most common from post-conflict 
interviewees. Many interviewees questioned why the commission had 
not contacted them to participate in hearings or why they had not 
gotten some form of immediate material benefit after giving their 
statements.322 Indeed, many thought that their engagement with the 
truth-telling process would lead to some type of financial 
compensation.323 Numerous interviewees conceived of the truth-telling 
process in functional and transactional terms—emphasizing the 
importance of truth-telling “because maybe if you explain your 
condition, people will feel sorry for you, and help you.”324 My field 
research indicates that the truth commissions may even have done a 
greater disservice by raising expectations that they were unable to 
meet.325 While statement taking in all three countries created 
 
 317 Id. 
 318 CDD-GHANA, VICTIMS SURVEY, supra note 209, at 15. The results from this survey were 
similar to my findings during my field research, wherein a number of interviewees lamented 
that follow-up “should have been much more.” Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197. 
 319 HAMBER, supra note 292, at 147. 
 320 van der Merwe & Chapman, supra note 163, at 248. 
 321 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197; Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; 
Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 322 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197; Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; 
Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 323 See Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197; Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; 
Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106; see also 1 NRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 168 
(69% of those making statements to the NRC expected some form of monetary compensation, 
and 20.1% of those making statements to the NRC expected material compensation). This was 
the case in South Africa as well. GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID, supra note 18, at 262. 
 324 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
 325 For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 288–89 
(discussing the need to manage victims’ expectations). 
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expectations from victims that the commissions were not able to fulfill, 
this was particularly pronounced in the post-conflict countries with 
larger victim classes. Indeed, more interviewees in Ghana expressed the 
opinion that their commission had provided acknowledgment to 
victims.326 
Notably, providing statements privately did not pose the same 
security risks for victims as speaking publicly at hearings.327 
Accordingly, many more victims participated in the statement-taking 
process compared to the public hearings.328 For example, the Liberian 
truth commission gathered statements from approximately 20,000 
individuals329 regarding over 85,000 victims,330 while the truth 
commission in Sierra Leone gathered approximately 8000 statements,331 
concerning nearly 15,000 victims.332 The majority of these victims never 
heard their stories acknowledged publicly during hearings, which 
limited the impact of the commissions.333 The TRC-L in particular 
raised expectations that it could not deliver. Thus, it is unsurprising that 
the assessments of the commission in Liberia would be largely 
negative.334 In Sierra Leone, the victim class was not as large as in 
Liberia, and the truth commission in Sierra Leone gathered fewer 
statements, so not as many victims anticipated something in return. In 
addition, in Sierra Leone, because the truth commission had the benefit 
of the court, which was focusing its efforts on alleged perpetrators, the 
TRC-SL was freer to focus its attention on victims. 
In Liberia, given the large number of alleged perpetrators, the 
commission apparently decided to focus its efforts on alleged 
 
 326 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197. 
 327 This Article has already discussed how the large number of perpetrators in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone and the potential threat they posed influenced the number of victims willing to 
come forward and testify publicly at hearings. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 328 Id. 
 329 TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 185. By way of comparison, the commission in 
South Africa, which has a population fourteen times that of Liberia, gathered “approximately 
21,000 statements,” see Raddatz supra note 64, at 184, and collected information on over 35,000 
human rights violations, see, e.g., HAMBER, supra note 292, at 148. 
 330 KRISTEN CIBELLI, AMELIA HOOVER & JULE KRÜGER, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FROM 
STATEMENTS TO THE LIBERIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 4 (2009) [hereinafter 
BENETECH STATS.], available at http://trcofliberia.org/resources/reports/final/descriptive-
statistics-from-statements-to-the-liberian-trc-benetech.pdf (revealing that the approximately 
17,000 statements coded contained information about 86,647 victims). 
 331 See RICHARD CONIBERE ET AL., TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, APPENDIX 1: 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO THE REPORT OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF 
SIERRA LEONE 1 (2004) [hereinafter TRC-SL REPORT, APP. 1], available at http://hrdag.org/
content/sierraleone/SL-TRC-statistics-chapter-final.pdf. 
 332 Id. at 9 (noting that the TRC-SL’s database contained information on 14,995 victims). 
 333 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 313–20. 
 334 The TRC-L received unfavorable evaluations, with only 20% of those surveyed by the 
SCSL indicating that the TRC-L had “been successful in [achieving] its mandate” and almost 
half (48%) indicating that it had been unsuccessful. SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107, at 23. 
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perpetrators. For example, the TRC-L recommended prosecutions for 
208 individuals before a proposed court similar to the SCSL.335 The lists 
for prosecutions and investigations included the leaders of all the 
warring factions as well as prominent businesspersons and public 
officials, including several members sitting in the legislature. The TRC-L 
was preoccupied with compiling lists of alleged perpetrators—those 
needing to be debarred from public office, those for further 
investigation, those to be granted amnesty, and a host of other lists336—
as a means of ensuring accountability, while the TRC-SL instead 
compiled lists of victims to serve “as an acknowledgement of those who 
suffered.”337 The operation of the truth commission alongside the SCSL 
also meant that the aspirations of victims were not entrusted solely to 
one transitional institution. Thus, when, or if, the institutions failed to 
deliver, responsibility could be somewhat diffused between them. This is 
likely a positive thing from a victim’s perspective because it increases the 
chances for the victim’s satisfaction by creating multiple avenues of 
potential redress. From the standpoint of institutional design, this is also 
beneficial because it means that transitional institutions are less 
burdened with unrealistic expectations. Further, if either the court or 
the commission proved to be able to deliver, they both would benefit 
from positive evaluations since Sierra Leoneans viewed them as having 
complementary goals.338 
The large number of perpetrators in post-conflict societies will also 
complicate the truth commissions’ efforts to provide acknowledgment 
to victims. As discussed above, alleged perpetrators will be interested in 
having their narratives vindicated.339 They will also be concerned about 
shielding themselves from prosecutions. For example, in both Sierra 
Leone and Liberia, the perpetrators assumed very different roles in each 
society. In Liberia, many retained or acquired positions of power that 
could threaten the fragile peace, while in Sierra Leone the court indicted 
a number of perpetrators and held them in custody.340 Others had fled, 
were dead, or reintegrated back into society.341 Ghana had 
comparatively fewer alleged perpetrators than Sierra Leone and 
Liberia.342 The indemnity provision in Ghana’s Constitution also 
ensured that there would be no prosecutions for past human rights 
 
 335 TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 349–52, 356–58, 370–71. 
 336 Id. at 349–75. 
 337 2 TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 196, at 273. 
 338 SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107, at 45 Annex 18 (noting that 54% of Sierra Leoneans 
surveyed reported that the goals of SCSL and the TRC-SL were complementary or the same). 
 339 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 244–54. 
 340 For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 263–68.  
 341 See id. at 271. 
 342 See supra Table 1. 
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abuses committed by military regimes.343 The lower number of 
perpetrators in Ghana combined with immunity from prosecution 
meant that alleged perpetrators’ interests were not as threatened by the 
truth commission’s proceedings. Similarly, the TRC-SL’s proceedings 
did not significantly threaten the interests of alleged perpetrators. In 
Sierra Leone, a partial amnesty resulted because the limited 
prosecutions of the SCSL and the lack of domestic prosecutions, in 
effect, left the amnesty granted in the Sierra Leonean peace agreement 
intact for most perpetrators. In contrast, the de-facto amnesty in Liberia 
meant that the truth commission’s proceedings were much more 
threatening to the status quo and the interest of alleged perpetrators. 
This section has highlighted some of the ways that a truth commission’s 
impact can be limited due to amnesty provisions and the existence and 
influence of a large group of perpetrators and victims. Part IV.B 
discusses how large numbers of victims and perpetrators can also 
frustrate truth commissions’ efforts to promote healing in post-conflict 
societies, which also complicates efforts to provide acknowledgment for 
victims. 
B.     Large Victim and Perpetrator Classes Create Obstacles for 
Promoting Healing 
All of the commissions faced difficulties in their attempts to 
“promote healing.”344 Yet, this was more pronounced in the 
commissions operating in post-conflict contexts. They all presumed that 
“truth-telling” would lead to “healing,” when, in fact, the relationship 
between the two is far from clear.345 In the field of transitional justice, 
 
 343 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, 1st sched., §§ 34–35. 
 344 See The National Reconciliation Commission Act, 2002 § 20(2)(g) (Ghana), available at 
http://www.ghanareview.com/reconact.html (providing that the commission’s work was to 
“promote healing and reconciliation”); An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Liberia (June 10, 2005) art. IV, § 4(b), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/473c6b3d2.html (stating that the commission was to provide a 
forum “for both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences 
in order to create a clear picture of the past [so as] to facilitate genuine healing and 
reconciliation”); Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000 § 6(1) (Sierra Leone), 
available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/
SeirraLeone-Charter.pdf (noting that the commission was established “to promote healing and 
reconciliation”). 
 345 See, e.g., HAYNER, supra note 3, at 139–40; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that 
victims are often left “retraumatized . . . wondering to what end”); see also Jonathan Doak, The 
Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice: Emotional Repair and Victim Satisfaction in 
International Trials and Truth Commissions, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 263, 264 (2011) (noting 
that the consequences of victimization are not experienced on a collective basis and cannot be 
addressed through processes which prioritize societal objectives); Nina K. Thomas, Obliterating 
the Other: What Can Be Repaired by “Truth” and Testimony?, 6 INT’L J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUD. 321, 334 (2009) (noting the dangers of conflating truth and healing). 
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healing is conceptualized as a process that “help[s] individuals regain a 
sense of psychological or emotional wholeness”346 that has been 
shattered by experiences of trauma during a conflict or a period of 
repressive rule. In the context of post-conflict countries, where the 
‘truth” is particularly horrible and graphic, offering the “truth” from 
victims or alleged perpetrators, without more, may serve to undermine 
efforts to promote healing. 
Liberia’s experience with truth-telling is a classic example of the 
limits of truth commissions in promoting healing in post-conflict 
contexts. Given the numerous perpetrators and potential security 
concerns they posed to the commission and victims, along with the 
fragile, ineffective state institutions available to respond to any threats of 
violence, the TRC-L determined not to create a forum for victims and 
perpetrators to meet and reconcile. The commission made this decision 
due to concerns about “the physical and psychological welfare of 
victims.”347 Accordingly, exchanges between alleged perpetrators and 
victims during the TRC-L’s proceedings “were limited and did not occur 
frequently.”348 Interviewees in Liberia described the public hearings in 
which many alleged perpetrators came forward to speak as “playing in 
an old sore,” and “causing people’s heart[s] to burn.”349 The 
recriminations and misrepresentations emanating from alleged 
perpetrators at public hearings in Liberia made it difficult to “promote 
healing and reconciliation,” key objectives of the commission.350 For 
example, tensions heightened between Nimba and Grand Gedeh 
counties during the testimony of Prince Johnson, the former leader of a 
breakaway faction of the NPFL.351 Johnson is from Nimba and was 
responsible for the videotaped torture and murder of then President 
Doe, who was from Grand Gedeh. The United Nations Peacekeeping 
Mission in Liberia had to intervene to prevent fighting between the two 
 
See generally Karen Brounéus, The Trauma of Truth Telling: Effects of Witnessing in the 
Rwandan Gacaca Courts on Psychological Health, 54 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 408 (2010) (finding, in 
a randomized survey of 1200 Rwandans, that witnesses to truth-telling processes in Rwanda 
“suffer[ed] from higher levels of depression and [post-traumatic stress disorder] than [did] 
non-witnesses”); Claire Moon, Healing Past Violence: Traumatic Assumptions and Therapeutic 
Interventions in War and Reconciliation, 8 J. HUM. RTS. 71 (2009) (challenging the discourse of 
therapeutic interventions as a basis for legitimating new regimes and “cur[ing] people of the 
pathologies that” may lead to renewed violence); Stephan Parmentier et al., How to Repair the 
Harm After Violent Conflict in Bosnia? Results of a Population-Based Survey, 27 NETH. Q. HUM. 
RTS. 27 (2009) (finding that 35% of sample of 855 Bosnians felt that truth-telling would help 
assist with their individual healing). 
 346 Clark, supra note 139, at 199–200. 
 347 See TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 63. 
 348 Id. For further discussion, see Raddatz supra note 64, at 185. 
 349 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
 350 Many interviewees wondered how the process unfolding would contribute to 
“reconciliation” or “promote healing.” Id. 
 351 Id. 
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communities following his testimony. Additionally, the survey 
conducted by the Human Rights Center at U.C. Berkeley found that 
24% of Liberians “did not place particular emphasis on” the “truth,” 
most commonly because “it would bring [back] bad memories . . . or 
that it was better to forget.”352 My field research in rural Liberia also 
indicates that many do not presume that telling and hearing the “truth” 
was beneficial, with 55% indicating that the “past was too painful” to 
talk about, compared with 45% who stated that “talking about the past 
makes you feel better.”353 
In Sierra Leone, scholars have also found that public truth-telling 
and inquisitorial investigation had little resonance.354 One study found 
that participants viewed the commission as “based on western values of 
truth and reconciliation, while it operated in an alien African 
environment that was far from western.”355 During my field research, 
more interviewees in Liberia and Sierra Leone expressed the opinion 
that traditional and local methods of truth-telling and reconciliation 
should be used.356 The significantly weakened or non-existent mental 
health institutions, needed to provide victim support and counselling 
during and after the truth-telling process, further limited the 
experiences with truth-telling in post-conflict countries. Indeed, a 
number of interviewees also lamented that the commissions were not 
able to offer even limited psychological support and counseling to those 
who gave statements and testified.357 Moreover, a victim’s limited 
interaction with a truth commission is not a substitute for ongoing 
psychological support and counseling.358 This is particularly so when 
 
 352 HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., U.C. BERKELEY LIBERIA SURVEY, supra note 210, at 69. 
 353 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126 (containing results from forty-nine rural 
interviewees). 
 354 See Tim Kessal, Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 361, 380–91 (2005); see also 
Sriram, supra note 63, at 170. 
 355 See Sesay, Freetown Survey, supra note 266, at 44. 
 356 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197; Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; 
Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 357 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197; Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; 
Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 358 See, e.g., Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice, 30 
HUM. RTS. Q. 95, 115 (2008) (noting studies questioning the role of truth commissions in 
healing traumatized individuals). See generally Doak, supra note 345, at 290 (noting that truth 
commissions are not intended to be “therapy”); David Mendeloff, Trauma and Vengeance: 
Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Effects of Post-Conflict Justice, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 592 
(2009) (analyzing the effects of post-conflict justice on truth-telling and emotional healing); 
David Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the 
Enthusiasm?, 6 INT’L STUD. REV. 355 (2004) (arguing that post-conflict justice does not provide 
the claimed “peacebuilding” benefits); Leslie Swartz & Gerard Drennan, The Cultural 
Construction of Healing in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Implications for Mental 
Health Practice, 5 ETHNICITY & HEALTH 205, 212 (2000) (noting that “it is a mistake to confuse 
the TRC process with psychotherapy” and questioning “whether emotional self-
exposure . . . automatically has positive emotional consequences”). 
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one considers the small number of victims who actually end up 
participating in the truth-telling process in post-conflict countries.359 
The experience of truth commissions in post-conflict societies marked 
by large numbers of victim and perpetrator classes renders the claims of 
much of the literature even more suspect regarding a truth 
commission’s ability to assist with healing victims. 
These findings were not limited to the post-conflict countries. For 
example, in South Africa, studies found that the SATRC played a role in 
re-victimizing many of those who testified.360 The CDD-Ghana Victims 
Survey also found that 80% of respondents “‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ 
that the NRC made them re-live the horrors that their abusers had 
visited upon them.”361 Notably, in Ghana, 88% of respondents “agreed” 
or “strongly agreed” that the “NRC offered [a] platform for victims to 
overcome long held pain.”362 In post-authoritarian contexts, a 
commission’s ability to promote healing through truth-telling may be 
greater when compared to a commission’s ability to “heal” victims in 
post-conflict contexts, where the number of victims and perpetrators 
will likely be quite large and the scale and nature of the “truth” much 
less likely to promote healing. These results do not mean that these 
societies generally do not place importance on the truth;363 instead, they 
may indicate that the presumption of a relationship between public 
truth-telling and healing is not shared. As one interviewee aptly put it, 
we “need to remember the past, but not in detail.”364 Thus, it appears 
that there is a limit to the amount of detail about atrocities that can 
“profitably be disseminated”365 and expected to contribute toward 
healing, particularly in post-conflict societies. 
This section has illuminated some of the difficulties post-conflict 
truth commissions face in their attempts to promote healing, an 
important aspect of their mandate. Part IV.C discusses how numerous 
 
 359 See, e.g., SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107, at 44 Annex 17, 45 Annex 19 (noting that 9% of 
those surveyed in Sierra Leone and 8% in Liberia stated that they had “participate[d] in the 
work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” while 44% of respondents in Sierra Leone 
and 57% in Liberia indicated that they were “victim[s] of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity”). 
 360 See, e.g., HAMBER, supra note 292, at 133–34 (discussing how in many cases there was a 
level of “inequity distress” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Dan J. Stein et al., The 
Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Psychological Distress and Forgiveness in 
South Africa, 43 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 462, 467 (2008) (finding 
“significant associations between having attended the” truth-telling process in South Africa and 
increased psychological distress and anger). 
 361 CDD-GHANA, VICTIMS SURVEY, supra note 209, at 17. 
 362 Id. (alternation in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 363 SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107, at 43 Annex 14 (noting that 95% of Liberians surveyed and 
97% of Sierra Leoneans responded that it was “important to know the truth about war crimes 
and crimes against humanity”). 
 364 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
 365 See DALY & SARKIN, supra note 23, at 151. 
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victims and perpetrators can also complicate truth commissions’ efforts 
to provide redress in post-conflict societies. 
C.     Size of Victim and Perpetrator Classes Complicates Efforts to 
Provide Redress 
The post-conflict commissions faced numerous difficulties in their 
efforts to provide redress due to the size of the victim and perpetrator 
classes in their societies. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, field research 
indicated that the post-war focus on rehabilitating ex-combatants 
through DDR programs created resentment from human rights 
victims.366 The DDR process supported by the international community 
in Sierra Leone and Liberia provided a low salary, tool kits, and skills 
training to combatants as an incentive to get them to disarm. Over 
70,000 ex-combatants in Sierra Leone were disarmed through this 
process, while over 100,000 were disarmed in Liberia. Given the abject 
poverty in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, many interviewees expressed 
the sentiment that ex-combatants were compensated for committing 
atrocities.367 For example, Alhadji Jusu Jaka, President of the Amputees 
Association in Sierra Leone, observed “that when a civil war comes to an 
end, all the priority is given to address issues to benefit the armed 
groups who in more than 90% of the cases are the violators. Little or no 
consideration is paid to the victims.”368 Indeed, the international 
community’s disproportionate investment in DDR programs as well as 
retributive justice approaches sent perverse signals to human rights 
victims and complicated efforts to help restore victims’ dignity.369 These 
problems are particularly evident when one considers that mid- and 
lower-level perpetrators who benefited from the DDR programs were 
perceived as “most responsible,” yet they were not before the SCSL, but 
were instead “strolling around in their villages.”370 The long delay in 
Sierra Leone in establishing a reparations program (seven years after the 
DDR program began)371 exacerbated victims’ concerns and at times led 
to mass rallies.372 In contrast, to date, the government has not 
established a reparations program in Liberia. It is reasonable that 
victims would expect comparable or higher compensation than what 
 
 366 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 367 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106; 
see also Sriram, supra note 63, at 167. 
 368 STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF TRC-SL, supra note 202, at 35 (statement of Alhaji Jusu 
Jaka, Victims’ Representative). 
 369 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197; Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; 
Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 370 See Sriram, supra note 63, at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 371 Id. at 172. 
 372 Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
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was given to ex-combatants in Liberia or Sierra Leone. Indeed, in both 
countries, when asked, “[w]hat should be done for victims?” the most 
common replies involved some form of reparations.373 In Ghana, the 
tension between providing monetary support to victims and 
perpetrators did not occur, as Ghana did not experience a conflict. 
The challenge of providing redress to those victimized by the war 
was particularly acute in Sierra Leone due to the large number of 
potential beneficiaries. The commission recommended that “amputees, 
other war wounded, those who suffered sexual violence and 
children . . . be prioritised as victims . . . given the enduring effects of the 
violations they suffered.”374 Because of the limited resources available 
for the reparations program and the large numbers of potential 
recipients, the TRC-SL concluded that some distinctions had to be 
made. It prioritized those victims as to whom it felt there was national 
consensus regarding their continued vulnerability.375 Reportedly, some 
30,000 of the estimated 55,000 victims from Sierra Leone’s civil war 
came forward to register for reparations.376 During my field research, 
the agency in charge of administering reparations in Sierra Leone 
indicated that it planned to distribute reparations based on the results of 
this process as well as the TRC-SL’s Report.377 Because truth 
commissions are not able to engage with large numbers of victims, 
reparations programs that rely exclusively on lists provided by truth 
commissions may doubly victimize those deemed “ineligible.” While 
there were some flaws in the registration process,378 Sierra Leone is to be 
commended for realizing the limited reach of the truth commission.379 
Due to inadequate funding, eligible victims that registered were 
provided with a one-time interim payment ranging from $70 to $200.380 
Approximately, 20,000 victims reportedly received the first round of 
interim assistance,381 and an estimated 11,000 more are expected to 
benefit from the second round.382 Yet, it is not clear that human rights 
victims in Sierra Leone will receive anything beyond the “interim 
assistance” provided. Notably, the SCSL survey found that despite the 
 
 373 SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107, at 46 Annex 21. 
 374 2 TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 196, at 243. 
 375 Id. 
 376 MOHAMAD SUMA & CRISTIÁN CORREA, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, REPORT 
AND PROPOSALS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPARATIONS IN SIERRA LEONE 3–4 (2009). 
 377 Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 378 See SUMA & CORREA, supra note 376, at 4–6. 
 379 2 TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 196, at 242. 
 380 Amputees Still Waiting for Reparations Almost 10 Years On, IRIN (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/94037/sierra-leone-amputees-still-waiting-for-reparations-
almost-10-years-on. 
 381 See SUMA & CORREA, supra note 376, at 7. 
 382 INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, Sierra Leone Victims Receive Compensation, RELIEFWEB 
(June 26, 2012), http://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/sierra-leone-victims-receive-
compensation. 
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fact that nearly half of Sierra Leonean respondents reported that they 
were victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity, 74% reported 
that they had not received any form of financial or material 
reparations.383 
Liberia faced even more difficulties in providing redress to victims 
because its victim class is five times larger. The TRC-L Act provided that 
the TRC “determine beneficiaries as part of the outcome of [its] 
proceedings,”384 but the TRC-L did not provide a list of potential 
beneficiaries for reparations from the numerous statements it collected. 
Instead, it outlined categories of beneficiaries.385 The large number of 
potential claimants also influenced the commission to prioritize 
communal reparations as opposed to individual. For instance, the TRC-
L recommended school and health facilities, as well as road 
construction, “for communities most victimized by years of conflict.”386 
The downplaying of individual monetary reparations is not surprising 
when one considers survey data. For example, a survey done by the 
Human Rights Center at U.C. Berkeley found that, “[n]ationally, 78% of 
[Liberians] considered themselves . . . victim[s] of the civil war.”387 
Interviewees during my field research surmised that the government of 
Liberia seems to have concluded that since everyone was impacted by 
the war in some way and could potentially have a claim for reparations, 
the financial implications of reparations make it a “non-starter.”388 
Unlike Sierra Leone and Ghana, the Liberian government has not 
implemented any of the commission’s reparations recommendations. 
In contrast, in Ghana, the relatively small number of victims 
compared to Liberia and Sierra Leone has made the task of reparations 
easier. The NRC proposed a variable lump-sum payment for a range of 
violations, including loss of life, rape, torture, disability, detention, exile, 
 
 383 SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107, at 24 fig.17. Moreover, of the 23% of respondents who 
indicated that they had received some form of reparations, only 33.63% reported that they had 
received financial compensation. Id. at 24. 
 384 An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (June 10, 2005) 
art. IX, § 38, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/473c6b3d2.html. 
 385 For example, the TRC-L made a recommendation for “reparation[s] in the form of 
psychosocial, physical, therapeutic, counseling, medical, mental health and other health related 
services for all physically challenged individuals who were incapacitated as a consequence of the 
civil war . . . .” TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 378. 
 386 Id. at 379. In some ways this is akin to class actions, where the individual class members 
do not receive much compensation, but have some assurances of structural reform and can 
benefit from a general fund. 
 387 HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., U.C. BERKELEY LIBERIA SURVEY, supra note 210, at 35. The SCSL 
survey revealed that 57% of respondents in Liberia indicated that they were “victims of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.” SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107, at 45 Annex 19. 
Additionally, 66% of respondents indicated that their “family or friends [were] victims of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.” Id. at 45 Annex 20. 
 388 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126. 
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seizure of property, and unlawful dismissals.389 The NRC recommended 
that the provision of benefits be proportional to the harm suffered. For 
example, the proposed amount for loss of life due to killing or 
disappearance is the equivalent of $2222 to $3333, while the amount for 
exile ranged from the equivalent of $222 to $1111.390 Ghana’s decision 
to distribute reparations proportionately attempted to respond to the 
gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case.391 In October 
of 2006, the Ghanaian government began providing monetary 
reparations to human rights victims (and relatives of deceased victims) 
based on those identified by the NRC. The NRC determined specific 
amounts of monetary reparations for 2117 victims. As of June 2008, 
approximately 73% of those entitled to receive monetary reparations in 
Ghana had received reparations.392 Yet, the decision to rely on the NRC 
Report exclusively contributed to some names not appearing on the list 
for compensation,393 a fact, interviewees explained, that further 
alienated victims.394 My field research revealed that the transactional 
and trivial amount of monetary reparations provided, concomitant with 
the failure to provide other aspects of reparations, limited the overall 
impact of reparations.395 In Ghana, a survey of victims receiving 
reparations found that 77% of victims were dissatisfied with the process 
and the amount given to them.396 Of those indicating dissatisfaction 
with the process, 63.3% expressed that they expected a package that 
would be “far more than what they had lost,” or at least “equal in value 
to what was lost.”397 Notably, the amount of monetary reparations 
provided in Ghana (ranging from $111 to $3333)398 was less generous 
than that provided in South Africa. In South Africa, the SATRC 
recommended a series of holistic measures for reparations, which 
included symbolic and financial reparations in the form of a pension 
scheme. The government instead provided a one-off payment of urgent 
 
 389 1 NRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 175–76. 
 390 Id. at 175. In 2004, $1 was approximately 9000 Cedis. Since July 2007, Ghana has 
redenominated its currency so that the exchange rate with the U.S. dollar was approximately 
one to one. Today, the exchange rate is approximately $1 dollar is approximately 2.5 Cedis. 
 391 Cf. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, art. VII, § 11(b), art. IX, § 20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 
(Dec. 16, 2005). 
 392 See Franklin Oduro, Reparations in Ghana: Implementing the National Reconciliation 
Commission (NRC) Recommendations 2 (Nov. 2008) [hereinafter Oduro, Reparations in 
Ghana] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 393 Id. at 21 (noting that 4.2% of the victims surveyed had their names missing). 
 394 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197. 
 395 Id. 
 396 See Oduro, Reparations in Ghana, supra note 392, at 18–23 (discussing survey of sixty-
three victims conducted eight months after reparations began). 
 397 Id. at 22. 
 398 See 1 NRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 175–76. 
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interim reparations to 16,885 individuals ranging from approximately 
$260 to $790, and a one-off final payment of approximately $4000 to 
19,050 individuals.399 In South Africa, the government provided 
reparations five years after the victim hearings had ended. Victim 
dissatisfaction with reparations was also significant; for example, some 
felt that the SATRC had betrayed them, was more concerned with 
accommodating alleged perpetrators at the expense of victims concerns, 
and had compromised their right to seek redress and to make civil 
claims.400 
Yet, it is nearly impossible to quantify adequately the harm suffered 
from a victim’s perspective.401 Domestic tort law also grapples with 
calculating damages for harms that are hard to place a market value on, 
such as health and reputational harms.402 Victims may perceive such 
attempts as crass and insensitive. In Sierra Leone, a regional 
administrator responsible for implementing the reparations program 
proclaimed, “[i]f your tongue was cut it has a percentage . . . [i]f your 
eye was damaged it has a percentage, your arm . . . any part of your body 
that was damaged during the war, they are going to look at it on a 
percentage basis.”403 Yet, monetary “reparations can never 
fully . . . restore [victims] to the[ir] status quo ante.”404 Instead, 
governments provide reparations to send signals to victims, and to 
society more generally, that the successor regime is committed to 
respecting victims’ and fellow citizens’ rights. Reparations405 can 
contribute to restoring faith in new governments by fostering trust 
 
 399 See HAMBER, supra note 292, at 103–04 (using the May 2008 exchange rate). 
 400 See id. at 104. 
 401 See Aukerman, supra note 188, at 79 (noting that the “grossly disproportionate” amount 
of reparations when compared with the damage experience may tend to “trivialize suffering”). 
 402 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 810. 
 403 Kari Barber, Sierra Leone War Victims Sign Up for Reparations, RELIEFWEB (Feb. 19, 
2009), http://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/sierra-leone-war-victims-sign-reparations 
(second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 404 See 1 NRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 172. 
 405 A number of international treaties provide the legal basis for providing reparations to 
victims of human rights abuses. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 39, Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 14, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 
CAT]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 91, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, § 3(a), art. 9, § 5, art. 14, 
§ 6, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination art. 6, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Hague Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 3, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. Article 2, 
section 3(a) of the Convention of the Rights of the Child states that victims of human rights 
violations “shall have an effective remedy,” which has been interpreted to support reparations 
by the United Nations Human Rights Committee. See Human Rights Comm., General 
Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties 
to the Covenant, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004). 
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between citizens and the state.406 Reparative-justice407 models are 
utilized to help to establish or re-establish the social contract between 
the governed and the government.408 However, where reparative-justice 
efforts are explicitly administered “proportional” to the abuses suffered, 
such computations can undermine the ability of reparations to provide 
redress. 
Given the larger number of victims and perpetrators in post-
conflict contexts and even fewer available resources to fund reparations 
and disarmament efforts, it is inevitable that the gap between the 
realities of what the government provides and perceptions about what is 
due would be pronounced. This is compounded by the likelihood that 
alleged perpetrators would resist efforts to fund such programs. For 
example, in Ghana, although the NRC recommended that perpetrators 
who were willing to contribute to the reparations fund be encouraged to 
do so,409 none came forward to contribute to the fund. The TRC-L 
recommended that funds gained through “ill-gotten wealth” go toward 
any future reparations program.410 The TRC-SL similarly recommended 
that a number of actors implicated in abuses provide financial support 
to the reparations fund.411 Yet, it is unlikely that commissions in post-
conflict contexts will face much more success in getting alleged 
perpetrators to contribute toward reparations. The larger numbers of 
perpetrators and their potentially powerful political influence means 
that perpetrators will generally obstruct efforts to provide redress to 
victims, particularly where it involves their material interests. 
Overall, it appears that truth commissions are likely to be more 
successful where the victim and perpetrator classes are relatively small, 
as was the case in Ghana and South Africa. In those circumstances, truth 
commissions will likely be better placed to be responsive to victims’ 
priorities. This benefit, combined with the strength of the institutions in 
 
 406 OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR 
POST-CONFLICT STATES: REPARATIONS PROGRAMMES, at 30, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/08/1, U.N. 
Sales No. E.08.XIV.3 (2008). 
 407 As Mani explains, reparative justice models seek to remedy the legal, social, moral, and 
psychological injustice faced by victims after mass atrocity. See MANI, supra note 36, at 174. It 
contemplates “both material and non-material remedies.” Id. 
 408 See generally Murshed, supra note 41 (discussing the importance of rebuilding the social 
contract between the citizen and the state or sovereign authority in post-conflict societies). 
 409 1 NRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 169. 
 410 TRC-L FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 464, 467. Notably, almost 60% of those surveyed 
by the SCSL in Liberia and Sierra Leone believed that the perpetrators of violence should pay 
for reparations. SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107, at 25 fig.18. 
 411 TRC-SL recommended that the assets of Charles Taylor, the NPFL, and the RUF be 
traced and that those assets illegally removed from Sierra Leone should be used for reparations. 
See HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N OF SIERRA LEONE & UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED OFFICE IN 
SIERRA LEONE (UNIOSIL), MATRIX ON THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 39 (2007), available at 
http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/images/docs/finalmatrix_june2011.pdf. 
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post-transition Ghana and South Africa meant that these commissions 
were better able to balance the demands of both groups. This is because 
reparations programs require “a generally functional system” for their 
administration, “not one suffering massive breakdowns in every facet of 
life and governance.”412 In contrast, where the victim-class is relatively 
large, as is generally the case following a massively destructive conflict, 
we may expect truth commissions to have limited success in responding 
to the needs and aspirations of victims.413 Moreover, the more 
numerous and powerful the perpetrator class, the more careful the 
commission must be about balancing the interests of alleged 
perpetrators, so that they do not derail the truth-telling process. Where 
a court exists simultaneously with a commission, the commission will 
have to do less of this balancing act. The Liberian truth commission 
most closely mimicked the South African model, but operated in a 
vastly different context, which limited the impact of the transplanted 
model. 
V.     IMPLICATIONS 
One study estimates that sixty-eight countries have utilized truth 
commissions.414 The generalizability of my findings is limited, as I 
conducted an in-depth analysis of the experiences of only a handful of 
those countries. Much more research is needed using other case studies 
to determine definitively how the strength of institutions, the level of 
moral consensus about mass violence, and the sizes of the victim and 
perpetrator classes interact in other post-conflict and post-authoritarian 
societies. Yet, this Article has indicated that there are limits to the 
institutional transplantation of truth commissions based on the South 
African model to post-conflict contexts. The experiences of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone are likely typical of other countries that have experienced 
massively destructive conflicts, which left weak institutions, large 
numbers of perpetrators and victims, and low levels of consensus 
regarding the injustice of mass violence. Ghana’s experience is also 
likely typical of other post-authoritarian societies. If I am incorrect, and 
my results are limited to truth commissions in Africa alone, that would 
account for approximately 34% of the truth commissions in the 
world,415 given the prevalence of the mechanism. In addition, if my 
results really only tell us about the countries analyzed, there are still a 
 
 412 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 157, 181 (2004). 
 413 See id. (discussing how the limitations of reparations programs are exacerbated in 
contexts of mass violence because of the large number of victims). 
 414 See OLSEN et al., supra note 19, at 39. 
 415 Id. at 40. 
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number of important theoretical and policy offerings of this study. 
Namely, that greater attention should be paid to the transitional 
circumstances in which truth commissions are used in order to increase 
the likelihood of their effectiveness in accomplishing stated objectives. 
This Part discusses the theoretical and policy implications of this 
Article. 
A.     Theoretical and Policy Implications for Transitional Justice 
One of the main findings of this Article for the transitional justice 
literature is that the truth about truth commissions is that their success 
in fulfilling their mandates depends heavily on the context in which they 
operate. My key-variable approach has helped to illustrate in which 
contexts truth commissions may be the most effective. In particular, 
examining the size of the victim and perpetrator classes, the degree of 
moral consensus, and the relative strength of institutions are all crucial 
factors that influence the likelihood of a commission’s success carrying 
out its mandate. In post-authoritarian societies, with more capacity to 
support a truth-telling process, relatively small victim or perpetrator 
classes, and high levels of moral consensus condemning mass violence, 
truth commissions are likely to function more optimally. While it may 
seem like a bit of a tautology to state that truth commissions function 
better in societies with more capacity and do less well in societies with 
less capacity, this finding is more than simply an assertion that 
institutions in dysfunctional contexts will tend to be dysfunctional. This 
is because even in situations where institutional capacity may be weak, 
there are some institutions that perform better than others, and there 
are some countries that outperform others. Thus, much more nuance is 
required. 
Where post-conflict countries have shored up their capacity, as was 
the case in Sierra Leone, the transitional institutions have been much 
more effective. Instead of solely relying on a truth commission, Sierra 
Leone utilized both a commission and a hybrid court, which was a 
major advancement. The hybrid court helped to buttress the weak 
security and legal institutions left following the conflict. This placed 
Sierra Leone closer on the capacity spectrum to Ghana or South Africa, 
than to Liberia. Accordingly, this Article supports arguments made by 
Pablo de Grieff and others that a “holistic” approach should be used 
when formulating responses to mass violence—wherein multiple 
transitional justice mechanisms are adopted.416 However, recognizing 
that societies affected by mass atrocity will have various demands, 
prescribing that a combination of truth-telling and punishment 
 
 416 See, e.g., de Grieff, supra note 2. 
SIRLEAF.35.6 (Do Not Delete) 8/1/2014  8:01 PM 
2014] THE T RU T H  A B O U T  T RU T H  C O M M IS S IO N S  2333 
 
mechanisms should be adopted en masse is unwise. Similarly, 
sequencing decisions about whether the truth commission or court 
precedes the other or instead both operate concurrently should 
ultimately be made by the affected communities, considering lessons 
from other experiences.417 What is clear is that efforts to shore up 
institutional capacity are particularly important in post-conflict and 
fragile countries. 
Another major implication is that the adoption of a truth 
commission model may have more utility in post-authoritarian and 
even non-transitional states. For example, the findings from this Article 
support proposals put forward to establish a national truth commission 
in the United States to investigate allegations of torture and war crimes 
committed during the war on terror.418 Institutional strength to support 
a truth-telling process in the United States, as well as the relatively small 
number of victims and perpetrators that would be involved in the 
process, are all factors that may indicate that a truth commission would 
be useful.419 While this may seem counterintuitive, the small victim and 
perpetrator classes in South Africa and Ghana compared to the rest of 
the population enabled the commissions to have a much more impactful 
role. Moreover, the use of the criminal justice system in the United 
States to adjudicate the alleged crimes seems to be foreclosed for a 
number of reasons. In addition, the centrality of deception around the 
use of torture in the war on terror, the use of secret prisons to detain 
suspects, and the government’s operation of these facilities outside of 
United States territory are also factors that weigh in favor of adopting a 
truth commission. In addition, there remains a fair amount of agitation 
for more information about exactly what took place and for some 
semblance of accountability for those implicated in abuses. Further, 
there is a moderate level of moral consensus surrounding the 
wrongfulness of torture in the United States.420 The use of the truth 
 
 417 For more on sequencing, see generally William A. Schabas, Truth Commissions and 
Courts Working in Parallel: The Sierra Leone Experience, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 189 
(2004); Sirleaf, Regional Approach to Transitional Justice?, supra note 290; Abdul Tejan-Cole, 
The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship Between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 139 (2003); Elizabeth 
M. Evenson, Note, Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination Between Commission and 
Court, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (2004). 
 418 See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, The Truth Commission, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2008, at WK12. 
 419 But see Gibson, Legitimacy Theory and Truth Commissions, supra note 18, at 130 
(arguing that where the victim-class is large, it is likely to be more politically influential and 
more likely to focus the commission on the needs and priorities of victims). 
 420 The United States is a signatory to the Convention Against Torture. See CAT, supra note 
405. Survey results conducted by the Pew Research Center from August 17–21, 2011 among 
1509 adults found that 42% of respondents believed that the use of “[t]orture to gain 
information from suspected terrorists can be justified” rarely or never. See United in 
Remembrance, Divided over Policies: Ten Years After 9/11, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 1, 2011), 
http://www.people-press.org/2011/09/01/united-in-remembrance-divided-over-policies. 
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commission model in states like North Carolina and Illinois to 
investigate abuses may be important precedents for establishing a 
national body. Thus, it may very well be that, notwithstanding the 
prevalence of truth commissions in fragile states transitioning from 
conflict, truth commissions may have more impact in post-
authoritarian and even non-transitional states. 
Conversely, in post-conflict societies, the combination of weak 
institutions to support a truth-telling process combined with large 
numbers of victims and perpetrators will tend to overwhelm the 
commission. These factors concomitant with lower levels of moral 
consensus regarding mass violence interact to make truth commissions 
function less optimally in post-conflict contexts. This is pronounced 
when these institutions function alone, as was the case in Liberia. A 
majority of interviewees in Liberia and Sierra Leone stressed the 
importance of transitional processes resulting from local 
consultations.421 Truth-telling processes that are locally owned, created, 
and driven will be more effective at fostering the many objectives of 
more formalized truth commissions. These initiatives would look 
different in various societies and would likely include mini-
commissions or incorporate traditional reconciliation processes, 
without unduly romanticising them or presuming that they can be 
implemented everywhere. Even within societies, these initiatives would 
differ because of the diversity between and among cultures, as well as 
the awareness that certain practices cannot be adapted writ large. 
Traditional dispute-resolution practices may be especially relevant for 
dealing with certain types of crimes, like land and property disputes, in 
post-conflict societies and for reintegrating lower-level perpetrators and 
ex-child combatants into communities.422 In the same way that truth 
commissions “are not a panacea,” traditional or customary justice 
mechanisms are not, and do not necessarily guarantee, human rights.423 
There has been much debate about the use of traditional local practices 
to facilitate truth-telling and reconciliation,424 and there is no need to 
 
However, overall disapproval of the use of torture appears to be trending downwards. See id. 
 421 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 422 See, e.g., Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as 
Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 86–87 (2006). 
 423 See Raddatz, supra note 64, at 191. 
 424 See, e.g., PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND 
RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA: JUSTICE WITHOUT LAWYERS (2010); Sverker Finnström, 
Reconciliation Grown Bitter? War, Retribution and Ritual Action in Northern Uganda, in 
LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE 
135 (Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf eds., 2010); Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, The Role of 
Community in Participatory Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW: 
GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE 99 (Kieran McEvoy & Lorna 
McGregor eds., 2008); Susan Thomson, The Darker Side of Transitional Justice: The Power 
Dynamics Behind Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, 81 J. INT’L. AFRICAN INST. 373 (2011); Waldorf, 
supra note 422. 
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regurgitate these arguments here. It suffices to say that this Article 
supports the arguments made by Naomi Roht-Arriaza and others, who 
have advised that scholars and practitioners must resist the temptation, 
“so pronounced in the case of truth commissions,” to “extrapolate a 
‘formula’ that can be applied, with few changes, to any and all 
situations.”425 Given the unique attributes of post-conflict societies 
discussed in this Article, much more experimentation needs to be done 
in order to formulate effective and contextually appropriate responses to 
mass violence.426 Ultimately, transitional justice mechanisms must be 
“bespoke” by the affected societies in order for them to be effective.427 
B.     Theoretical and Policy Implications for Legal Transplants 
My analysis also yields a number of contributions for the legal 
transplant literature. The legal transplant literature cautions us that, in 
order for transplanted truth commissions to be effective, much more 
“innovation . . . correction . . . participation and involvement” is 
required.428 However, the findings from this Article indicate that, 
paradoxically, those countries with the lowest capacity are more likely to 
transplant institutions wholesale without much innovation, which in 
turn may lead to the “transplant effect.” These same countries are the 
ones that need to adapt transplanted institutions the most, given the 
level of disrepair following a conflict. The analysis above has illustrated 
that where post-conflict countries have sought to “copy and paste” 
many of the features of truth commissions from post-authoritarian 
societies, they have generally been ineffective. For instance, Liberia’s 
attempt to blindly mimic the South African amnesty process without 
any attempt to adapt it to local conditions left the commission’s 
recommendations for amnesty hollow and without societal resonance.429 
The key-variable approach helps us to begin to identify what factors 
exist in origin and transplant country that may indicate similarity, in 
order to determine how much innovation may be required for 
transplants to be effective. Ghana shared a number of similar 
characteristics with South Africa—relatively strong institutions post-
 
 425 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2, at 12. 
 426 See, e.g., Ellen Lutz, Transitional Justice: Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 2, at 325, 333–34. 
 427 See generally Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist 
Process Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010). 
 428 Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 33, at 189. 
 429 In contrast, in South Africa, a majority (57.3%) approved of the use of amnesty mainly 
“as contributing to the peaceful transition to majority rule in South Africa.” GIBSON, 
OVERCOMING APARTHEID, supra note 18, at 266–67; see also van der Merwe & Chapman, supra 
note 163, at 266 (noting that public acceptance of amnesty was also based in part on how “it 
would be ameliorated through apology, confession, and reparations”). 
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transition, relatively small perpetrator and victim classes, and a 
comparatively higher level of moral consensus around mass violence 
than did Sierra Leone and Liberia. Ghana’s experience with its truth 
commission also exhibits a fair amount of innovation from the South 
African model. For example, the NRC Act did not explicitly mandate it 
to “restore dignity to victims” or “address issues of impunity” like the 
other commissions.430 There were of course significant variations in how 
each truth commissions implemented their mandates, the quality of the 
work produced by each commission, and their legitimacy to the 
respective societies. Yet, Liberia’s use of a truth commission following 
its conflict left much to be desired, while Ghana’s use of a truth 
commission following its transition from authoritarian rule was 
comparatively more successful in contributing toward its stated 
objectives.431 Significantly, Ghanaians perceived their commission as 
contributing more to the central objective of truth recovery than did 
Liberians.432 
Other important variables might help to explain why it is that post-
conflict commissions might not function as optimally. For instance, it 
may be that where truth commissions are utilized following a low-
intensity conflict, which leaves fewer numbers of victims and 
perpetrators impacted by the war and less moral dissensus, they can 
function more optimally. Alternatively, the time between the transition 
and the establishment of transitional institutions, the role that amnesty 
plays in influencing the behavior of alleged perpetrators, cultural norms 
about legal institutions and judicial traditions, differences in patterns of 
state formation, colonization and decolonization experiences, as well as 
civil society activism433 may all have explanatory roles in the 
effectiveness of transplanted truth commissions. However, this Article 
did not discuss these variables at length, in part, due to time constraints, 
but also because I focused on institutional constraints. Much more 
research is needed to determine what explanatory roles these other 
factors may play. The key-variable approach begins that inquiry. 
 
 430 Compare The National Reconciliation Commission Act, 2002 (Ghana), available at 
http://www.ghanareview.com/reconact.html, with An Act to Establish the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (June 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/473c6b3d2.html, and Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Act of 2000 (Sierra Leone), available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/
collections/commissions/SeirraLeone-Charter.pdf. 
 431 For more discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26. 
 432 See, e.g., CDD-GHANA, VICTIMS SURVEY, supra note 209, at 22 (noting that 60% of the 
victims surveyed thought that “the NRC obtained truthful confessions from abusers” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., U.C. BERKELEY LIBERIA SURVEY, supra 
note 210, at 70 (“[D]espite the work of the TRC[-L], just 44% believed that the truth about the 
civil wars is known.”). 
 433 See Engstrom, supra note 20, at 51. 
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The experiences of all three countries suggest that the use of truth 
commissions to address gross human rights violations committed 
during periods of authoritarian rule as well as war crimes committed 
during widespread and divisive conflicts, without examining “the 
specific needs of the particular context,”434 requires some serious 
rethinking. Indeed, the legal-transplant literature informs us that, in 
order for transplants to be effective, there must be a “self-sustaining 
demand for legal innovation and change.”435 Less formal mechanisms of 
truth-telling are likely to be cheaper, resonate more with affected 
communities,436 and be “more efficient than the borrowed or externally-
imposed ones.”437 My research indicates that the “Western style 
hearings” of the truth commissions and the “very structure of the 
commissions” did not resonate with people on the ground.438 Many 
interviewees stressed the importance of local practices of truth-telling 
and reconciliation as opposed to importing foreign models.439 My 
research indicates that more de-centralized bodies, located outside of 
the capitals, will likely be more impactful at promoting truth-telling and 
fostering reconciliation. As van der Merwe and Chapman have noted, 
“[d]elivering restorative justice for individual survivors is not a realistic 
goal for a structure such as [a] TRC.”440 This is particularly so in post-
conflict countries441 due to the limited impact that the commissions 
have in rural areas.442 For example, in Sierra Leone, “it is estimated 
[that] 80 percent of the population does not access the formal justice 
sector.”443 The generally limited dissemination of truth commissions’ 
 
 434 Baxter, supra note 116, at 326. 
 435 Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 33, at 190. 
 436 Interviewees in all countries stated that they did not understand the truth-telling process. 
Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197; Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; Interviews 
from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 437 Sesay, Freetown Survey, supra note 266, at 43–44. 
 438 Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106; see also Sriram, supra note 63, at 169 
(discussing the commission’s lack of fit with Sierra Leonean political and social culture due to 
its formal structure, as well as the limited resonance of public confessions). 
 439 Interviews from Ghana, supra note 197; Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; 
Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106; see also Sriram, supra note 63, at 168 (discussing 
the use of cleansing ceremonies to reintegrate former child combatants in Sierra Leone). 
 440 See, e.g., van der Merwe & Chapman, supra note 163, at 272. 
 441 Interviews from Liberia, supra note 126; Interviews from Sierra Leone, supra note 106. 
 442 The commissions’ hearings in rural areas were inadequate, which limited the 
participation of those living in rural areas. For example, the NRC held hearings in all regional 
capitals for two weeks. The TRC-SL conducted weeklong hearings in each district. The TRC-L 
held county hearings for a week each and also embarked on county consultations to 
supplement the county hearings near the end of its mandate. Interviews from Liberia, supra 
note 126. Thirty-eight percent of the fifty-eight respondents from rural areas were either not 
informed about the TRC-L or did not understand what its purpose was, as compared with 
100% of the twenty-one interviewees in Monrovia who were familiar with the TRC-L. Id. 
However, the interviews I conducted in Monrovia were mostly with civil society leaders and 
other stakeholders. Id. 
 443 Sriram, supra note 63, at 165. 
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reports444 and high levels of illiteracy in some post-conflict countries 
also limit the impact that these mechanisms can have.445 In South 
Africa, the truth commission was infused with local principles of 
Ubuntu, as discussed earlier.446 The reality of the truth commission’s 
proceedings may not have always fully reflected traditional practices and 
ceremonies of reconciliation, and were likely subsumed in the 
commission’s efforts to document the truth and provide amnesty. 
Nonetheless, practices of truth-telling and reconciliation are especially 
locally and culturally specific and must be rooted in community norms. 
These attributes do not make for easy transplantation. Much of the 
critique of the legal-transplant literature has centered on concerns about 
Western imperialism and colonialism. Yet, my analysis indicates that 
transplanted institutions will likely face difficulties even when the 
transplants are ostensibly South-to-South. 
C.     International and Foreign Policy Implications 
International actors, such as the U.N. and the World Bank, that are 
involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts prefer models that can 
be easily transplanted from one country to the next. The policy 
implications of this Article suggest that the increased “templatization” 
of transitional justice measures, and in particular truth commissions, by 
the U.N. and other actors447 is unlikely to lead to desired results. A “one-
size-fits-all” approach is not likely to achieve desired results of norm 
internalization and compliance, particularly where affected societies do 
not seem to place a high premium on truth commissions.448 For 
example, many statement-givers to the TRC-L did not prioritize truth 
commissions, with less than 5% recommending adopting a restorative-
justice approach.449 Instead, the U.N. and other international actors 
should lend support to community and locally driven processes of 
truth-telling. Additionally, the foreign policy implications of this Article 
for the United States’ interventions in post-conflict and failed states that 
 
 444 See, e.g., van der Merwe & Chapman, supra note 163, at 253 (discussing the limitations 
of the SATRC report, which was released in five massive volumes, with no summary report 
available in any South African language). But see HAMBER, supra note 292, at 142 (discussing 
the wide audience that the SATRC weekly television broadcast generated and the arguably 
greater coverage on radio). 
 445 For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment, supra note 26, at 248. 
 446 For further discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 143–44. 
 447 See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM RIGHTS, RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR 
POST-CONFLICT STATES: TRUTH COMMISSIONS, U.N. DOC. HR/PUB/06/1 (2006). 
 448 See, e.g., SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107, at 22 (indicating that “truth commission” was not 
the most common response from respondents in Sierra Leone and Liberia “[w]hen asked how 
the truth could be established”). 
 449 BENETECH STATS., supra note 330, at 39 fig.26. 
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may pose security risks are also significant. This is especially poignant 
given the recent history of United States interventions in countries like 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and, potentially, Syria. In these circumstances, 
it is far less likely that the quick interventions supported by the United 
States, such as the Iraqi High Tribunal450 or the purging of Baathists in 
Iraq, would foster desired results. My research indicates that what 
transitional justice looks like in Iraq, which had an authoritarian regime 
in power prior to the United States’ intervention, and what it looks like 
in Afghanistan, which had been embroiled in a civil war for several 
decades prior to the United States’ involvement, would be quite 
different. For example, while a truth commission might be more 
appropriate for Iraq, it would likely have much less utility in 
Afghanistan. Instead, more long-term approaches aimed at building 
institutional capacity and moral consensus around the wrongfulness of 
mass violence would likely be better placed in Afghanistan. Yet, the long 
term interventions required to address the root causes of conflicts is 
likely to be “beyond the will and capacity” of the United States and other 
donor governments.451 “[I]t is [also] not at all clear that the US 
government,” or any other for that matter, “knows how to create a 
working state in a country where none exists,” yet there is a pressing 
need in post-conflict societies to establish permanent institutions 
“through which societal conflicts may be pursued without large-scale 
violence.”452 The United States and other donor countries can lend 
support to local initiatives, assist with capacity building of institutions, 
as well as provide increased economic assistance to post-conflict 
countries. 
Much of the existing literature, when discussing transitional 
institutions, ignores the particularities of post-conflict societies. The 
large number of individuals seeking redress in post-conflict societies, as 
well as the enormous number of perpetrators who must also be 
integrated back into society, means that a thicker conception of justice is 
required. Contrary to the claim of Gibson and others that “truth 
commissions are most effective when they attempt to transform a 
society” as opposed to focusing “on the needs of victims and 
perpetrators,”453 it is far more likely that the opposite is true. Moreover, 
no legal institution, court, or truth commission is going to achieve 
 
 450 The trials before the Iraqi High Tribunal had serious administrative, procedural, and 
substantive legal defects, which resulted in the failure to meet essential fair-trial standards, such 
that the credibility of the process itself is doubtful. See, e.g., NEHAL BHUTA, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, JUDGING DUJAIL: THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL (2006), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq1106webwcover.pdf. 
 451 See Engstrom, supra note 20, at 58. 
 452 Licklider, supra note 35, at 299–300. 
 453 See, e.g., Gibson, Legitimacy Theory and Truth Commissions, supra note 18, at 126. 
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societal transformation.454 Indeed, the overwhelming faith that scholars 
and practitioners place in legal institutions, like truth commissions, to 
respond to mass atrocity has served to obscure other justice priorities 
that victims and affected societies have concerning a more 
transformative distributive justice.455 Following a conflict, “social justice 
is on the minds of many,” as “[p]eople emerging from war expect life to 
improve.”456 Thus, it is particularly important that social, political, legal, 
and economic institutions are fashioned to address distributional 
concerns.457 In post-conflict societies, it is far less likely that a quick-fix 
mechanism, such as a truth commission or even a court, would be able 
to address the underlying causes of conflict because “there are . . . limits 
inherent in the recourse to judicial procedures and logics in addressing 
complex social and political problems . . . .”458 As noted above, much 
more attention needs to be given to formulating contextually 
appropriate responses following mass violence in post-conflict 
countries. Such attention is beyond the scope of this Article, but I intend 
to explore the potential for distributive and other approaches to justice 
in future works. 
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
I selected Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Liberia for this cross-national 
study because they are located in the same sub-region and have 
somewhat similar historical and cultural backgrounds as well as socio-
economic development levels. They represent a mix of transitions, with 
Ghana emerging from a series of authoritarian regimes, and Sierra 
Leone and Liberia transitioning from devastating conflicts. They utilized 
a combination of prosecutions (Sierra Leone), truth commissions (all 
three countries), amnesties (all three countries), reparations (Ghana and 
Sierra Leone), and lustrations (Liberia). The cross-national comparative 
study of these three countries provides a better approach to assessing 
 
 454 See, e.g., Doak, supra note 345, at 290 (noting that a plurality of objectives “can only be 
met through a long-term plurality of responses” and that “tasks will inevitably extend far 
beyond the time, attention and expertise that any court or truth commission could afford”). 
 455 Distributive justice models are both forward- and backward-looking, seeking to improve 
political and socio-economic conditions overall, but without presuming equality or ignoring 
historical grievances. MANI, supra note 36, at 179–82. Distributive justice approaches are 
particularly necessary in societies where a large portion of the population holds historical 
grievances that an intervening conflict has only exacerbated. Liberia and Sierra Leone are 
paradigmatic cases of this. 
 456 PETER REDDY, PEACE OPERATIONS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: GROUNDWORK FOR POST-
CONFLICT REGENERATION 30 (2012). 
 457 See, e.g., Frances Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict, in ELGAR HANDBOOK OF 
CIVIL WAR AND FRAGILE STATES, supra note 35, at 93, 103 (discussing the need to prioritize 
policies that “correct economic, social and political [horizontal inequalities]”). 
 458 See Engstrom, supra note 18, at 52. 
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the effectiveness of truth commissions and allows for more in depth 
analysis. This qualitative or “on the ground” approach is particularly 
useful because I have familiarity with the historical and cultural context 
in the countries in which the research was undertaken. Additionally, 
this “grounded-theory approach” enabled me to “generate[] theory from 
the data” gathered, “rather than testing a priori theories against found 
data.”459 
I conducted a series of interviews with 118 individuals in Ghana, 
Sierra Leone, and Liberia between November 2008 and January 2009. 
My fieldwork took place in the capital of each country as well as four 
rural counties in Liberia.460 In all, I conducted twelve interviews in 
Ghana, nineteen in Sierra Leone, and eighty-seven in Liberia, where 
rural interviews made up the majority (sixty-six). The interviews in 
Sierra Leone were with former staff of the TRC-SL, staff of the SCSL, 
commissioners of the Human Rights Commission for Sierra Leone 
(HRC-SL), staff of the National Commission for Social Action, the 
administrative body responsible for administering reparations, 
government officials, civil society leaders, professors, lawyers, victim 
representatives, and civil servants in Freetown, Sierra Leone from 
November 3 to 13, 2008. The interviews in Ghana were with former staff 
and commissioners of the NRC, civil society leaders, human rights 
victims who testified before the commission, journalists, professors, 
lawyers, judges, and other government officials in Accra, Ghana from 
November 18 to 29, 2008. In Liberia, I conducted twenty-one interviews 
with staff and commissioners of the TRC-L, civil society and religious 
leaders, professors, journalists, lawyers, civil servants, government 
officials, and U.N. personnel in Monrovia, Liberia. I also conducted 
sixty-six interviews in rural areas with mostly human rights victims as 
well as religious, civil society, traditional leaders, and government 
officials in Lofa (21), Nimba (12), Bong (18), and Grand Gedeh (15) 
counties. For the rural interviews, I went to a number of areas that were 
particularly victimized, including one town that was burned down 
during the war and another that was the site of a massacre. I conducted 
the Liberian interviews between December 8 to 22, 2008 and January 5 
to 8, 2009. I conducted more interviews in Liberia in order to assess the 
impact of the TRC-L, which was operating at the time. There is also a 
paucity of research on the transitional justice process in Liberia. 
I selected interviewees based on convenience rather than a 
scientific sample. I provide a brief summary of the demographics of the 
interviewees in Table 4 below: 
 
 
 459 KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE 201 (2011). 
 460 I selected those counties to ensure ethnic and geographic diversity. I also selected some 
areas because they served as rebel bases during the conflict. 
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N MALE FEMALE ELITE NON-ELITE URBAN RURAL 
GHANA 12 8 4 12  12  
SIERRA LEONE 19 13 6 19  19  
LIBERIA 87 53 34 38 49 21 66 
TOTAL 118 74 44 69 49 52 66 
PERCENT OF 
INTERVIEWEES 
100% 62.7% 37.3% 58.5% 41.5% 44.1% 55.9% 
 
I selected interviewees with the help of facilitators in each country. 
This was partially due to the difficulty of identifying research subjects. 
All interviews were conducted in person and lasted anywhere from 
thirty minutes to two hours or more, depending on the interviewee’s 
availability. All interviewees agreed to have their statements recorded. I 
transcribed all recorded interviews and analyzed them. Most interviews 
were in English or some variation (e.g., “pidgin” English or Krio in 
Sierra Leone). Facilitators doubled as translators where necessary. 
Interviewees expressed varying degrees of comfort with being quoted 
directly. As such, I generally do not attribute specific individuals with 
statements. Instead, I have included a small sample below of some of the 
questions I asked during my field research and common responses. 
 
Question 1. How do you evaluate the work of the truth commission in 
your country? 
Common Responses 
Respondents in all countries stated that the time frame was too short 
for the amount of work the commissions needed to do (more 
interviewees expressed this sentiment in Liberia). 
Respondents in all countries stated that outreach was inadequate 
about the truth-telling process. 
Post-Conflict Responses 
Interviewees in Sierra Leone and Liberia stressed the limited victim 
and perpetrator participation in the truth-telling process. 
Interviewees in Liberia and Sierra Leone expressed more concern 
about staffing and administration problems with their commissions, 
than did interviewees in Ghana. 
Inadequate funding was the most common response to this question, 
and interviewees in Liberia and Sierra Leone expressed this concern 
more than did interviewees in Ghana. 
Country Specific Responses 
More interviewees in Liberia responded that the statement taking 
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was not well managed than did in Sierra Leone and Ghana. 
Inadequate witness protection was a particularly popular response 
from Liberian interviewees. 
Interviewees in Liberia mentioned legitimacy and credibility problems 
with the commission more than did any other interviewees. 
 
Question 2. What are the tangible benefits of the truth-telling 
process in your country? 
Common Responses 
Interviewees across all countries indicated that the commission 
helped to document human rights violations and create a historical 
record. 
Interviewees in Ghana and Liberia responded that the commission 
helped to hold perpetrators accountable.461 
Post-Conflict Responses 
More interviewees in Liberia and Sierra Leone responded that public 
hearings did not facilitate truth-telling than did in Ghana. 
More interviewees in Liberia and Sierra Leone responded that the 
truth commission did not help facilitate healing and reconciliation 
than did in Ghana. 
More interviewees in Liberia and Sierra Leone stated that the impact 
of the commission was unclear (more respondents had this 
assessment in Liberia) than did in Ghana. 
Country Specific Responses 
Ghanaian respondents noted that the commission served as a 
deterrent. 
More interviewees in Ghana regarded the commission’s biggest 
contribution as reparations than did in the other countries. 
More interviewees in Ghana remarked that the commission had 
helped to consolidate democracy than did in the other countries. 
More interviewees in Ghana noted that the commission had provided 
acknowledgement of victims than did in the other countries. 
More interviewees in Liberia remarked that the commission had not 
helped to consolidate peace and stability than did in the other 
countries. 
More Sierra Leonean respondents noted that the commission’s report 
has left a positive legacy than did in the other countries. 
More interviewees in Sierra Leone responded that the commission 
created a platform for change and institutional reform than did in 
the other countries. 
 
 
 461 Both countries did not have a court to prosecute the alleged perpetrators of abuses. 
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Question 3. What were some of the main challenges for the truth 
commission in your country? 
Common Responses 
Both Sierra Leonean and Ghanaian respondents cited the delay with 
reparations.462 
Interviewees in Sierra Leone and Ghana noted the lack of focus on 
gender. 
Interviewees in Ghana and Liberia noted the lack of focus on 
ethnicity. 
Country Specific Responses 
Ghanaian respondents remarked on the politicization of the truth-
telling process. 
Many Sierra Leonean respondents viewed the coexistence of the court 
and the commission as a mistake, mainly because it hindered the 
work of the commission as opposed to the court.463 
 
Question 4. How do you evaluate the government’s implementation 
of the truth commissions’ recommendations (Sierra Leone and 
Ghana only)?464 
Common Responses 
Interviewees in both Ghana and Sierra Leone responded that there 
was limited civil society follow-up. 
Country Specific Responses 
More respondents in Sierra Leone noted that the government had not 
done much compared to respondents in Ghana. 
More respondents in Sierra Leone cited the lack of political will as a 
problem than did in Ghana. 
 
Question 5. How is the truth-telling process in your country 
perceived? 
Common Responses 
Respondents in all three countries noted that the truth-telling process 
was not well understood. 
Respondents across all countries responded that perceptions of the truth-
telling process had changed for the worse. 
More interviewees in Liberia noted that prosecutions would have 
been preferable than did in Ghana. 
 
 462 The truth commission in Liberia had not released its report or recommendations at the 
time of the interviews. 
 463 Some interviewees in Liberia also referenced the impact that Taylor’s trial before the 
SCSL had on the truth-telling process in Liberia. For further discussion, see Sirleaf, Regional 
Approach to Transitional Justice?, supra note 290, at 262–71. 
 464 The truth commission in Liberia had not released its report or recommendations at the 
time of the interviews. 
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Country Specific Responses 
Interviewees in Liberia noted that the process was a waste of time 
and resources. 
Interviewees in Liberia noted that the process opened old wounds. 
 
Question 6. What are some of the most important lessons learned 
from your country’s experience with transitional justice? 
Common Responses 
Interviewees across all countries stressed the need for local or 
national ownership of the truth-telling process (this was more 
pronounced from Sierra Leonean interviewees). 
Interviewees in Ghana and Sierra Leone commented that the 
hearings were too legalistic and that the structure of the commission 
did not fit society. 
Post-Conflict Responses 
Respondents in Sierra Leone and Liberia in particular stressed the 
importance of traditional and local mechanisms of reconciliation. 
Interviewees in Liberia and Sierra Leone responded that the 
transitional-justice processes used should be the result of 
consultations. 
Country Specific Responses 
Interviewees in Liberia highlighted the importance of proper vetting 
and selection of commissioners. 
Interviewees in Liberia emphasized that you cannot use a formulaic 
approach for truth commissions. 
Interviewees in Sierra Leone highlighted the need to sequence a court 
and commission. 
 
This Article also relies on additional instruments to corroborate 
and supplement results from my interviews. In Ghana, a nationally 
representative survey of 1000 adults was conducted in 2001,465 and a 
survey of 102 victims who engaged with the NRC process was 
conducted in March 2006.466 In Sierra Leone, a survey aimed at 
understanding Sierra Leoneans’ perceptions of peace, justice, and 
reconciliation was conducted in mid-2007 of 1717 adults randomly 
selected across nine districts in Sierra Leone,467 and a randomized 
survey of 101 residents of Freetown, Sierra Leone was conducted in 
2006.468 In Liberia, a nationwide survey of 4501 randomly selected 
respondents was conducted in late 2010,469 as well as a randomized 
 
 465 See CDD-GHANA, PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY, supra note 45. 
 466 See CDD-GHANA, VICTIMS SURVEY, supra note 209. 
 467 See BBC, SIERRA LEONE SURVEY, supra note 211, at 3. 
 468 See Sesay, Freetown Survey, supra note 266. 
 469 See HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., U.C. BERKELEY LIBERIA SURVEY, supra note 210. 
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survey of 2841 people across various regions of Liberia and Sierra Leone 
conducted in mid-2012.470 This Article also relies on the statistical 
analysis of the statements taken by the truth commissions.471 
Additionally, this Article relies on relevant survey results from the 
Afrobarometer, a comparative series of randomized surveys, which 
measures attitudes toward democracy, governance, and other issues in a 
number of African countries. It had data available for all three 
countries.472 
Lastly, I also use international metrics for determining state 
weakness, primarily relying on the Index of State Weakness.473 The 
Index ranks all 141 developing countries according to their performance 
in four key areas—economics, politics, security, and social welfare. The 
scale also looked at twenty “subindicators,” which included widely 
recognized indicators in each area. I eschewed the use of such indicators 
for evaluating the truth commissions and instead prioritized the 
perspectives of the purported beneficiaries of the commissions. I did so 
because my work attempts to assess truth commissions’ claims on their 
own terms and to determine how truth commissions affect real people. 
Chapman and van der Merwe adopted a similar methodological 
approach because “[t]he experience of direct victims of such abuses is an 
obvious starting point and critical measuring stick of efforts to 
overcome [a] legacy of abuse.”474 In determining how to evaluate 
“success,” I, like Gibson, relied on the specified “goals of the process.”475 
Additionally, since truth commissions describe themselves “as having a 
victim orientation,” and frame “claims of success largely in terms of the 
assistance [they are] able to provide to [victims],”476 my research, like 
Chapman and van der Merwe’s and Gibson’s work, attempts to assess 
truth commissions’ claims on their own terms. I also eschewed the use 
of such indicators due to the inherent difficulty in attempting to 
represent complex social phenomena, such as “reconciliation” or 
“truth,” with a numerical scale. Yet, the use of such indicators is far less 
problematic when comparing institutional capacity between different 
countries and evaluating factors like economic development and 
security. The data sources used in the Index span from 1991 to 2007477 
and coincide with the periods of operation of the truth commissions in 
 
 470 See SCSL SURVEY, supra note 107. 
 471 See BENETECH STATS., supra note 330; TRC-SL REPORT, APP. 1, supra note 332. 
 472 See AFROBAROMETER, GHANA RESULTS, supra note 299; AFROBAROMETER, LIBERIA 
RESULTS, supra note 293; AFROBAROMETER, SIERRA LEONE RESULTS, supra note 296. 
 473 INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra note d (tbl.1). 
 474 Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo van der Merwe, Preface to TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 25, at viii. 
 475 GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID, supra note 18, at 3 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 476 Chapman & van der Merwe, supra note 474, at viii. 
 477 INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS, supra note d (tbl.1), at 30–37. 
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Ghana (2001–2004), Sierra Leone (2000–2004), Liberia (2005–2009), 
and South Africa (1995–2003). 
The survey data does not necessarily coincide with when I 
conducted my field research. The data in this Article cover a period of 
between one and eight years in each country. Because baseline data is 
unavailable, it is not possible to measure how perceptions toward these 
mechanisms may have changed over time. As such, the data may reflect 
long-held perceptions and not necessarily be a result of the processes 
themselves.478 Further, the data used does not question the same set of 
respondents, nor was it feasible to conduct follow-up interviews or 
control the protocol of questions utilized in other surveys. Measuring 
the impact of transitional justice mechanisms is an inherently difficult 
exercise. This is particularly so with such nebulous concepts like moral 
consensus surrounding mass violence.479 Notwithstanding the above 
limitations, the use of both field research and survey data in this Article 
provides useful insights into the perceived impact of the transitional 
justice mechanisms utilized. 
 
 478 See Backer, supra note 25, at 53 (discussing the benefits and limitations of a longitudinal 
approach). 
 479 See supra Part III. 
